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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis uses liquidity to examine some stock market phenomena. It begins by 
researching the role of liquidity in explaining the “disappearing dividend puzzle” across 
several financial markets. Then, it examines the cash/stock dividend payouts and their 
determinants in China. Finally, this paper investigates the interplay among illiquidity, 
variance risk premium and stock market returns.  
 
The research studies the disappearing dividend puzzle with a large sample of firms 
representing eighteen countries over the sample period from 1989 to 2011. Our 
investigation finds that risk is an important determinant of firms’ dividend payout 
policy. For firms in the US, France, UK and other European markets, liquidity plays an 
additional role in explaining the changes in propensity to pay. Then we test the 
explanatory power of liquidity, risk and catering incentives in the “disappearing 
dividend puzzle”. The thesis finds support for catering theory among firms in common 
law countries but not those in civil law countries. The catering incentives persist even 
after adjusting the propensity to pay for liquidity. However, after controlling for risk, 
the significant explanatory power of catering incentives in the changes in propensity 
to pay disappears. Our results indicate that catering incentives capture the risk 
difference between dividend payers and non-dividend payers.  
 
Then, the research studies the payout patterns of both cash and stock dividend in 
China over the sample period 1999-2013. The Chinese stock market is a fast-growing 
market with some special characteristics, such as complicated corporate ownership 
structures. The specific characteristics of Chinese firms might affect the dividend 
payout policy in China. We first study the determinants of Chinese firms’ dividend 
payout policy. Our results indicate that lifecycle, risk and liquidity are important 
determinants of firms’ cash/stock dividend policy. We find that firms with larger board 
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size and fewer annual board meetings are more likely to pay cash dividends and less 
likely to pay stock dividends. Also, the research notes that managerial stake is 
insignificant in explaining Chinese firms’ cash/stock dividend payouts. Then, we 
investigate the catering theory in China. Our findings show that catering incentives 
matter in explaining the unexpected percentage of dividend payers if we do not control 
for liquidity/risk. However, once we control for liquidity/risk, the catering incentives 
contribute little toward explaining the changes in propensity to pay cash/stock 
dividends. Our results imply that Chinese firms’ cash/stock dividend policy is 
influenced by the board, rather than managers or investors.  
 
Finally, this thesis investigates the interplay among illiquidity, variance risk premium 
and market returns. Previous studies that test whether liquidity is useful in forecasting 
market returns ignore the question of whether variance risk premium might also be 
useful for this purpose. As a result, these papers potentially overestimate the role of 
liquidity in predicting market returns. This thesis tests whether liquidity and variance 
risk premium are useful for return forecasting by comprehensively investigating the 
interplay among illiquidity, variance risk premium and market returns. We adopt 
monthly US data from January 1992 to December 2010.  The results show that variance 
risk premium, reflecting investors’ risk aversion to volatility risk, causes variations in 
stock returns, and in turn causes market illiquidity, rather than vice versa. Furthermore, 
we find that variance risk premium has substantial forecasting power over future 
market returns, while liquidity measure does not. Additionally, our results indicate that 
variance risk premium impacts equity returns by acting on the risk factors, i.e. market 
risk premium, value factor and momentum factor.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we start by introducing the background and giving the main motivations 
behind the research. Then we present the contributions and main findings of this 
thesis. Finally, we outline the organization and structure of the entire thesis.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivations of the Research 
 
Liquidity is a broad and elusive concept that generally denotes the ability to trade large 
quantities quickly at low cost with little price impact. In the past ten years, researchers 
have studied the importance of liquidity in explaining various financial phenomena in 
the stock market. This dissertation studies the application of liquidity in stock market 
from three aspects. The first is the use of liquidity to explain the disappearing dividend 
puzzle across several financial markets. Then this thesis examines the cash/stock 
dividend payments and their determinants in China. Finally, this paper studies the 
interplay among illiquidity, variance risk premium and market returns. 
 
1.1.1 Motivations of Liquidity and Disappearing Dividend Puzzle  
 
Fama and French (2001) observe that the percentage of dividend payers declined 
significantly between 1978 and 1999, from 66.5% to 20.8%. They suggest that the 
proliferation of newly listed small firms with low profitability and great investment 
opportunity during that period could explain the decreasing dividends. However, even 
after controlling for firm characteristics such as size, profitability and investment 
opportunity, the percentage of dividend payers between 1978 and 1999 still presents 
a dramatic pattern of decline. Fama and French (2001) term this phenomenon the 
“disappearing dividend puzzle”.  
 
Subsequently, the “disappearing dividend puzzle” has been studied widely. 
Investigating firm-level data of UK companies, Benito and Young (2003) find that 
during the period 1974-1995, the proportion of firms that did not pay dividends 
increased from 14.3% to 25.2%. Examining dividend payments between 1989 and 
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2002 in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
Denis and Osobov (2008) note that, although the magnitude of the decline in the 
propensity to pay dividends differs among the six countries, the fraction of dividend 
payers in all countries fell during this period.  
 
Attempts to explain the disappearing dividend puzzle draw on a number of theories, 
including the life-cycle explanation (DeAngelo et al., 2006) and the tax explanation 
(Julio and Ikenberry, 2004). Liquidity and risk factors have also been advanced as 
possible explanations of the puzzle. Theoretically, there is a negative relation between 
stock liquidity and the likelihood of firms paying dividends. As rational investors prefer 
firms with high liquidity, they impose high discount rates when evaluating firms with 
low liquidity, thereby lowering their valuations on such firms. In order to raise their 
valuations, firms with low liquidity are more likely to pay dividends. Banerjee et al. 
(2007) adopt turnover ratio, illiquidity ratio, trading volume, and proportion of days 
with no trading as liquidity measures and find that liquidity holds pronounced 
explanatory power in dividend payout policy after controlling for firm characteristics. 
This corroborates the evidence found by Bulan et al. (2007) that the incidence of 
dividend initiations is relatively higher for firms with higher illiquidity. However, they 
show that change in illiquidity is not a significant predictor of firms’ dividend initiations.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2004b) put forward the catering theory to explain the puzzle. 
Based on the theory of investment sentiment, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) suggest that 
managers execute the dividend policy that caters to irrational investors’1 demand to 
boost their stock price above the fundamentals (Baker and Kolb, 2009). They construct 
the dividend premium to measure the prevailing investor demand for dividend payers. 
The dividend premium is defined as the difference between the book-value-weighted 
market-to-book ratios of dividend payers and nonpayers. When the dividend premium 
is positive, there exists a general stock market incentive to pay dividends, and when it 
is negative there is an incentive not to pay. Also, they note that this measure of investor 
                                                     
1  As defined in Baker and Wurgler (2004a), irrational investors are investors that view 
nonpayers as growth firms, and judge the prospects of these firms relative to their own 
assessment of growth opportunities.  
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demand for dividend payers would reflect both rational clientele demands and 
investor sentiment for payers. 
 
The empirical evidence for catering theory is rather inconclusive. The theory finds 
support in some studies, such as Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Kale et al. (2012). Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) examine several alternative reasons, such as asymmetry, dividend 
clienteles, and catering incentive, and claim that dividend premium, the proxy for 
catering incentive, holds the best explanatory power for the time-series fluctuations 
in the propensity to pay dividends. Kale et al. (2012) analyse several dividend theories, 
such as signalling, agency cost and catering theory, using the Compustat data of 5875 
US firms over the period 1979-1998, and conclude that dividend premium, the proxy 
for catering incentive, is positively related to dividend initiations. Evidence supportive 
of the catering theory is also reported in Baker and Wurgler (2004b), Hsieh and Wang 
(2006), Neves et al. (2006) and Ali and Urcan (2012). 
 
However, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and Savovy and Weber (2006) find no evidence 
for the presence of catering incentive. Julio and Ikenberry (2004) identify a 
considerable decline in the incidence of dividend payers with US firm-level 
observations during the period 1984-1999, and claim that catering incentive has little 
power to explain the declining percentage of dividend payers after controlling for age 
and size.  Similar evidence is reported with international data. Savovy and Weber (2006) 
select German firm data over the period 1982-2003 and do not find any evidence that 
supports catering theory, even after controls for current growth rate to avoid 
multicollinearity. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find that after controlling for risk, the 
explanatory power of the catering incentive disappears. Thus, they suggest that 
dividend premium matters in Baker and Wurgler (2004a) not because it reflects 
investors’ preference, but rather because it acts as a proxy for risk.  
 
While the inconsistencies in prior empirical research are likely to be at least partially 
related to the use of different models and estimation methods, some studies also point 
towards the possibility that country-specific idiosyncrasies impact on the factors that 
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drive dividend payout policies. With a large dataset of firm-level observations from 23 
countries over the period 1995-2003, Ferris et al. (2009) suggest that firms cater to 
investors’ sentiment in common law countries but not in civil law countries. The 
authors point out the difference in results garnered from areas with different levels of 
investor protection. Compared with those in civil law countries, shareholders in 
common law countries hold more protection. For example, the investor protection 
laws in common law countries encourage more accurate financial reporting (Leuz et al, 
2003). Thus, managers and controlling shareholders in these countries are less likely 
to expropriate the firm’s resources and more likely to invest in projects that benefit 
shareholders (Wurgler, 2000; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002, Bakaert et al. 2010). 
Hence, shareholders in common law countries have more right to force managers to 
cater to their demand. However, this finding is inconsistent with that of Denis and 
Osobov (2008), who document that the estimated coefficients of catering incentive 
are insignificant in common law countries and significantly negative in civil law 
countries. By contrast, the estimates reported in Denis and Osobov (2008) are in line 
with the agency-cost explanation of dividends payment. Alternatively, Renneboog and 
Szilagyi (2006) document the application of catering theory in Dutch listed companies 
due to their special structure and mechanisms. 
 
1.1.2 Motivations of Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy 
 
Unlike those markets that have been used previously to explore the disappearing 
dividend puzzle, China has a unique economic and financial environment. Investment 
in listed companies is a comparatively new phenomenon in China. Since the inception 
of the Shanghai (SHSE) and the Shenzhen (SZSE) Stock Exchanges, the Chinese stock 
market has experienced a rapid expansion; nevertheless, in terms of regulation the 
Chinese capital market lags far behind that of countries such as the USA or UK. These 
specific characteristics of Chinese listed companies and the Chinese stock markets 
might lead to different financial behaviours and dividend policies than those observed 
in other countries, which make the setting worthy of exploration. 
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One of the important characteristics of Chinese firms is the existence of large numbers 
of state-owned firms, thus it is worthwhile to consider the potential impact of the 
existence of controlling government block ownership on firms’ propensity to pay 
cash/stock dividends. If government blockholders effectively contribute to the 
supervision and control of managers, the presence of controlling government 
blockholders is likely to improve corporate governance (Chen et al., 2009) and increase 
the pressure on managers to pay dividends. However, alternatively, there is a risk that, 
due to a lack of personal economic incentives, government representatives contribute 
little to corporate governance (Chen et al., 2009), or they might indeed collude with 
managers to exploit other shareholders in order to pursue government objectives, 
such as economic growth and employment (Firth et al., 2010). In this case firms might 
be less likely to pay dividends. 
  
Stock dividends payment is another a significant feature of Chinese firms’ dividend 
policy (Chen and Yuan, 2004). Wei and Xiao (2009) suggest that on average 34.46 per 
cent of listed Chinese firms pay stock dividends over the period 1993-2006. They argue 
that the listed companies in China would like to pay stock dividends Research also finds 
that public investors in China favour stock dividends over cash dividends. (Chen and 
Yuan, 2004) Chen and Yuan (2004) argue that the rapid expansion of Chinese stock 
market in terms of market capitalization and number of listed companies implies 
strong public demand for stock shares. This is mainly because that there have been 
limited investment opportunities in China for individuals. Until 1998, the real estate 
market and mutual funds do not exist in China. Also, before the inception of the 
Shanghai (SHSE) and the Shenzhen (SZSE) Stock Exchange in 1990, limited government 
bond and bank deposits are individuals’ only investment opportunities in China. (Wei 
and Xiao, 2009) In addition, in China, the return on equity is generally high. Zhang 
(1998) reports that the average premium on initial public offerings is about 90 per cent. 
Furthermore, as the capital gains from stock investments are tax free, both individuals 
and institutional investors would like to invest in the stock market. We therefore set 
the second chapter in a Chinese context to study both the cash dividend and stock 
dividend payment patterns in China. 
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Meanwhile, although there is a general acknowledgement that dividend payments, 
managerial ownership and board structures all contribute to control agency-problems 
in firms (Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Chen and Yu, 2012; La Porta et al., 2000b; Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2011), prior empirical literature tends to ignore the potential impact of 
firm-specific corporate governance on managers’ catering to investors’ preferences for 
dividend payments. If capital markets are efficient and investors perceive managerial 
ownership or board structures as substitutive corporate governance mechanisms to 
dividend payments, managers in firms with high levels of managerial ownership and 
comparatively strong and independent boards are expected to be under less pressure 
to pay dividends. This suggests a positive relationship between these variables and the 
propensity to pay dividends. However, alternatively, if capital markets are inefficient, 
dividend payments are more likely to be under managerial discretion. In this case 
managers’ ownership incentives and independence of the board of directors are likely 
to determine managers’ ability and incentive to engage in opportunistic behaviour. 
This suggests a negative relationship between managerial ownership, key board 
characteristics and the propensity to pay dividends. 
 
1.1.3 Motivations of Liquidity, Variance Risk Premium and Market 
Returns 
A growing literature shows that volatility risk and (il)liquidity risk can predict future 
excess stock returns. However, it is still unclear whether stock returns are triggered by 
these risk factors. Variance risk premium is defined as the difference between implied 
volatility and realized volatility. It contains information on both conventional risk 
measures, and also reflects exclusive information of investors’ risk aversion to the 
volatility risk (Bakshi and Madan, 2006).  Bollerslev, Tauchen and Zhou (2009) and 
Drechsler and Yaron (2011) examine the predictability of variance risk premium for the 
US stock market return, and find that the variance risk premium has a strong predictive 
power at monthly and quarterly horizons. However, Zhou (2010) adopts a different 
measure of variance risk premium, and finds that the variance risk premium cannot 
predict market returns. 
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With regard to (il)liquidity, a number of studies suggest that (il)liquidity plays a 
substantial role in forecasting future stock market returns (e.g., Jones, 2002; Baker and 
Stein, 2004). These studies indicate that increases in liquidity predict lower future 
returns. Considering the existence of irrational overconfident investors and the short-
sale constraints, Baker and Stein (2004) advance a behavioural explanation for the 
liquidity-return relation over time. Specifically, irrational investors overreact to the 
private information about future fundamentals and thus boost the liquidity.  The short-
sale constraint eliminates the possibility that the irrational investors’ valuation is lower 
than that of rational investors. Hence, higher liquidity serves as an indicator of greater 
presence of these irrational investors, and, as a result, of the extent to which the 
market is overvalued. Jones (2002) studies the annual time series of liquidity and stock 
market returns over the entire 20th Century for the US market. The results imply that 
liquidity can predict future market returns up to 3 years ahead. Similar evidence is 
reported by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2007). 
 
However, if we step out of the traditional view on the liquidity-return relation, and 
question how the liquidity might be generated, it is quite natural to expect that return 
could affect future liquidity. This is empirically confirmed by Chordia et al. (2002) and 
Griffin et al. (2004). Chordia et al. (2002) document that stock market returns are able 
to forecast future market (il)liquidity rather than vice versa for the US market.  Similarly, 
with a large sample of data across 46 countries, Griffin et al. (2004) find a positive 
relationship between past stock returns and future trading activity, which is measured 
by turnover. Their results show that an up market predicts higher (il)liquidity, with 
approximately the same magnitude of effect as for a previous down market. However, 
there is no generally agreed explanation for the relation between past stock returns 
and future liquidity. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) adopt an inventory 
paradigm to explain the relationship between past returns and future liquidity. 
According to the theory, (il)liquidity depends on the inventory holding cost, which 
arises from financing constraints and risk. Such cost seems particularly high in falling 
markets, where market marker inventory levels might be quite high, and vice versa. 
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Thus, (il)liquidity will follow the previous market moves. In addition, behavioural 
theories, such as overconfidence bias theory (Odean, 1998) have been explored to 
explain the association between past returns and (il)liquidity, while Griffin et al. (2004) 
have investigated participation cost theory in this regard. However, Bekaert et al. (2007) 
find that liquidity can be predicted by past market returns only in emerging markets, 
and not in the US. They also note that the participation cost cannot be used to explain 
their findings. 
 
Hence, the literature for the return-liquidity relation has not come to a generally 
agreed conclusion. Furthermore, to date there has been no comprehensive 
examination on that relation. Therefore, it is important to comprehensively study the 
direction and magnitude of the return-liquidity relation.  
 
Moreover, the association between the variance risk premium and the market liquidity 
has not yet been investigated in the literature. If return can impact the future market 
liquidity, then the variance risk premium may also affect the future liquidity. Failure to 
recognize that liquidity is the causal variable may cause misjudgements in the interplay 
among liquidity, stock return, and variance risk premium. Also, if liquidity responds to 
past returns or past variance risk premium then it makes sense to include these 
variables to supplement any forecasting tests of liquidity. Doing so is likely to avoid 
overestimating the true forecasting power of liquidity. Previous studies mainly focus 
on the determinant role of the variance risk premium and liquidity; hence it is 
important to comprehensively test the interplay among variance risk premium, 
illiquidity, and stock returns. 
 
1.1.4 Objectives 
The research questions of the thesis are as follows: 
 An investigation into the determinants of dividend policies across a large 
sample of firms representing 18 countries, over the period 1989-2011. 
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 Could liquidity/or risk explain the declining propensity to pay dividends across 
several financial market? 
 A re-examination of the validity of the catering hypothesis after adjusting the 
propensity to pay with the key determinants, e.g. risk, liquidity, and life-cycle 
effect.  
 An examination of the cash and stock dividend payment patterns in China. 
 An investigation into the impact of shareholders, managers and board on the 
dividend payout decisions among Chinese firms.  
 Could governance blockholders determine the cash/stock dividend payments 
in China? 
 Are liquidity/risk/lifecycle/leverage the determinants of cash/stock dividend 
payment policies in China? 
 An investigation of the validity of the catering hypothesis after adjusting the 
propensity to pay with corporate governance variables and other key 
determinants, e.g. risk, liquidity, and lifecycle in China. 
 A study of whether past liquidity could cause stock market return, or whether 
past stock market return could affect market liquidity. 
 An investigation into the direction and magnitude of the relationship between 
variance risk premium and return using the Granger-causality test and impulse 
function. 
 A test of forecasting power of the variance risk premium and liquidity for excess 
stock market returns.  
 A study of how the variance risk premium/liquidity are related to the US 
equities returns by investigating into the relation between variance risk 
premium/liquidity and the risk factors, specifically, Carhart (1997) four factors.  
 
 
1.2 Main Findings and Contributions of the Research 
 
This thesis contributes current literature from the following aspects. 
 
1.2.1 Liquidity and Disappearing Dividend Puzzle 
The first contribution of this research is to use stock market liquidity to explain the 
declining propensity among firms to pay dividends. Banerjee et al. (2007) study the 
link between liquidity and dividend policy but do not test for the role of liquidity in 
explaining changes in the propensity to pay dividends. Furthermore, we explore the 
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life-cycle, risk and catering explanations on the changes in propensity to pay.  We find 
that catering incentives have a significantly positive impact on the changes in the 
unpredicted proportion of dividend payers for firms operating in common law 
countries in our sample, namely Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and the UK. 
The result is insignificant for the case of firms operating in the US and in civil law 
countries, namely France, Germany and Other European countries. Our results concur 
with Ferris et al. (2009) in that countries with greater investor protection (common 
law countries) are more responsive to changing investor preferences and therefore 
significant catering occurs in such countries. The existence of catering incentives is still 
significant when the changes in propensity to pay are adjusted for liquidity or life-cycle 
effect. However, when adjusting the propensity to pay for risk, we find little evidence 
for the existence of catering incentives, even among the common law countries. Our 
results indicate that the role of catering reflects the risk-reward relationship in the 
changing propensity to pay dividends. In other words, catering incentives actually 
capture the risk difference between firms that pay dividends and firms that do not. 
Our evidence corroborates Hoberg and Prabhala’s (2009) findings in the US market 
and reveals that the risk-based explanation of the catering phenomenon persists 
across several financial markets. 
 
The second contribution of this research is that we employ several liquidity measures, 
namely turnover ratio, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, relative bid-ask spread and 
Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure, thereby capturing the different dimensions of liquidity. 
We find that the traditional liquidity measures - illiquidity ratio and relative bid-ask 
spread - do not explain the dividend payout policy in most markets. However, turnover 
ratio and Liu’s liquidity measure significantly explain the probability of a firm being a 
dividend payer, with turnover ratio highly significant for all nine financial markets. This 
means that the trading quantity dimension of liquidity significantly explains the 
propensity to pay dividends. When considering the liquidity effect along with risk, we 
find the effect of liquidity is significant in the case of the US and UK, France, and Other 
European markets. Hence for these markets, liquidity is an additional important 
determinant of dividend policy, along with risk.  
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1.2.2 Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy 
 
While previous research has considered the impact of board characteristics (Anderson 
et al., 2011) or managerial ownership (Nam et al., 2010) or investors’ preference 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) on firms’ dividend payout policy, this research considers 
all three aspects.  Hence, the first contribution of Chapter 2 is to consider the impact 
of shareholders, managers and board on the payout decisions. We find that for both 
stock dividend and cash dividend, managerial stake contributes little toward 
explaining firms’ dividend decision. Our results also show that firms with larger board 
size and fewer annual board meetings are more likely to pay cash dividend to mitigate 
the conflict between firms and investors. In addition, such firms are less likely to pay 
stock dividend. Further, this chapter finds that after controlling for risk/liquidity, 
catering incentives are insignificantly related with propensity to pay cash/stock 
dividend. Therefore, board rather than investors or managers impacts cash/stock 
dividend payout policies in China.  
 
This chapter further makes the second contribution, which is to study the time series 
cash dividend payout pattern in China, to explore changes in the cash dividend 
payment pattern. We observe significant decline in the percentage of dividend payers 
over the period 2002-2006 and recovery after that. Further, we find that catering 
incentive matters for explaining the unexpected percentage of dividend payouts, if we 
do not control for risk or liquidity. However, once we control the propensity with risk 
or liquidity, the significant explanatory power of dividend premium disappear. This 
indicates that the catering proxy measures the risk/liquidity difference between 
dividend payers and non-dividend payers. That is, the significance of the dividend 
premium is because it acts as a proxy for risk, not because it captures investors’ 
demand for dividends. 
 
The third contribution of this Chapter is that we examine stock dividend payment 
pattern and the determinants of stock dividend payments in China. This is the first 
study, to the best of our knowledge, to investigate stock dividend payment pattern. 
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Also, this is the first paper to adopt stock dividend premiums to test the catering 
theory for stock dividends. We find that the percentage of stock dividend payers in 
China has decreased dramatically, from 13.82% in 1999 to 2.36% in 2013. Also, our 
results show that state-owned firms are less likely to pay stock dividends. Meanwhile, 
we find that risk is negatively related with the probability of being a stock dividend 
payer, while liquidity measured by stock turnover is positively correlated with stock 
dividend payment in China over our sample period. Further, we test the applicability 
of catering theory to stock dividend payouts in China. We find little support for the 
hypothesis that changes in stock dividend payment pattern reflect firms’ catering to 
investors’ preference for stock dividend payments in China. Absent liquidity or risk 
controls proxy for the investors’ preference in explaining the disappearing stock 
dividends, but the proxy is insignificant once we control for liquidity or risk.  
 
1.2.3 Liquidity, Variance Risk Premium and Market Returns 
 
The first contribution in this chapter is that we comprehensively investigate the 
interplay among (il)liquidity, stock market return and variance risk premium. For the 
return-liquidity relation, we find that illiquidity does not cause stock returns, while 
stock returns can cause illiquidity. The results show that the liquidity, measured by the 
illiquidity ratio, follows the past stock market return rather than vice versa for the US 
market over the period 1992-2010. This indicates that we should include the stock 
market return to supplement the forecasting test of liquidity. For the relationship 
between variance risk premium and (il)liquidity, we find that the variance risk 
premium can cause stock returns and illiquidity, rather than vice versa. Our finding is 
robust for different sub-samples. The result indicates that we should add the variance 
risk premium in the forecasting tests of liquidity. Also, the result clarifies the interplay 
among illiquidity, stock returns and variance risk premium: variance risk premium 
leads to the stock market return and illiquidity, and stock market return leads to 
liquidity. Thus the traditional view that illiquidity predicts future stock returns may be 
simply serendipitous. Since variance risk premium, measuring investors’ risk aversion 
to volatility risk, affects stock market return and then the illiquidity, illiquidity contains 
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information about the variance risk premium and thus indirectly impacts the stock 
market return.  
 
The second contribution of this chapter is that we test the forecasting power of 
(il)liquidity and the variance risk premium for excess stock market returns. We find 
that the variance risk premium rather than (il)liquidity can significantly enhance the 
predictive power of the benchmark model. This indicates that the variance risk 
premium rather than (il)liquidity contains useful information for forecasting future 
stock market returns. Moreover, in order to study how the variance risk 
premium/(il)liquidity are related to the US equities returns, we investigate the relation 
between the variance risk premium/(il)liquidity and the risk factors, specifically the 
Fama-French three factors and the momentum factor. The Granger-causality 
investigation shows that market (il)liquidity cannot cause movement in the four risk 
factors, but the market risk premium and momentum do cause variations in 
(il)liquidity. The results also show that the variance risk premium Granger-causes the 
market risk premium, value factor and momentum factor. That is, the variance risk 
premium affects the equity returns via these risk factors.  
 
1.3 Organization of the Research 
 
This thesis comprises five chapters. The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: What drives the disappearing dividends phenomenon? In Chapter 2, we 
study the determinants of dividend payout policy and examine the role of liquidity, 
risk and catering in explaining the changes in propensity to pay, with samples covering 
eighteen countries over the period 1989-2011.  
Chapter 3: Investor Incentives: Corporate Governance and Dividend policy. In this 
chapter, we examine the impact of shareholders, managers and board on both the 
cash dividend payout policy and stock dividend payout policy in China over the sample 
period 1999-2013. 
Chapter 4: Illiquidity, Variance Risk Premium and Stock Returns. In Chapter 4, we 
comprehensively investigate the interplay among (il)liquidity, variance risk premium 
and stock returns using monthly US data from Jan 1992 to Dec 2010. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion. In the final chapter we summarize the results of this study 
and suggest avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 What Drives the Disappearing 
Dividends Phenomenon?  
 
 
 
 
We study the determinants of dividend payout policy and examine the role of liquidity, 
risk and catering in explaining the changes in propensity to pay. Our results indicate 
that risk plays a major role in firms’ dividend policy. The evidence substantiates from 
a large sample of firms representing eighteen countries over the sample period from 
1989 to 2011. For firms in the US, France, UK and Other European markets, liquidity is 
additionally an important determinant of dividend policy. We find that, although 
catering incentives persist only among firms in common law countries and not in civil 
law countries, after adjusting for risk there is little support for catering theory even 
among firms incorporated in common law countries. Our results indicate that catering 
incentives reflect the risk-reward relationship in the changing propensity to pay 
dividends. 
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Chapter 2 What Drives the Disappearing 
Dividends Phenomenon? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“The harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with 
pieces that just do not fit together.” (Black, 1976, pp.8) 
  
Although research on dividends has proliferated over the last decade, dividend policy 
remains an open “puzzle” as stated in Black (1976). In fact, Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
put forward dividend irrelevance theory, which postulates that dividend policy does 
not matter when enhancing shareholders’ wealth in a frictionless market. Research 
has since followed with several possible explanations as to why some firms pay 
dividends and others do not in a market driven by imperfections. Most of the literature 
focuses on the determinants of dividend policy and the impact of dividend policy on 
stock price; few study the time-trends in dividend payments. Fama and French (2001) 
observe the incidence of dividend payments by firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ over the period 1926-1999 and find that the percentage of dividend payers 
declined significantly from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. They suggest that the 
swelling of newly listed small firms with low profitability and great investment 
opportunity during that period could explain the decreasing dividends. However, even 
after controlling for those firm characteristics such as size, profitability and investment 
opportunity, the percentage of dividend payers between 1978 and 1999 still presents 
a dramatic decline pattern. This phenomenon of unexplained percentage of declining 
dividend payers is termed the “disappearing dividends puzzle” by Fama and French 
(2001).  
 
Subsequently, a number of studies advance possible explanations for the disappearing 
dividends phenomenon. DeAngelo et al. (2006) provide a life-cycle explanation for the 
evidence observed by Fama and French (2001) and Grullon et al. (2002), whereby 
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mature firms (firms with a higher proportion of retained earnings to total equity) are 
more likely to pay dividends than young firms with high investment opportunities and 
limited resources. The existence of the life-cycle effect is empirically supported by 
Denis and Osobov (2008) and Ferris et al. (2009). Baker and Wurgler (2004a) advocate 
a possible behavioral explanation to the unexpected fall in the percentage of dividend 
payers, known as catering theory. Based on the theory of investment sentiment, Baker 
and Wurgler (2004a) suggest that managers execute the dividend policy that caters to 
irrational investors’ demand to boost their stock price above the fundamentals (see 
Baker and Kolb, 2009). They choose to pay dividends when investors prefer dividend 
payers; likewise, they omit dividends when investors put a discount on dividend payers.  
 
The empirical evidence for the presence of catering theory is rather inconclusive. With 
respect to US evidence, studies find that catering incentives explain the declining 
propensity to pay (Baker and Wurgler, 2004b; Hsieh and Wang, 2006; Neves et al., 2006; 
Ali and Urcan, 2012 and Kale et al., 2012). However, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find no evidence for the presence of catering incentives 
among US firms. For the UK market, Ferris et al. (2006) identify a remarkable decline 
in the portion of dividend payers, from 75.9% in 1988 to 54.5% in 2001, and report 
that after considering firm characteristic variables, catering incentives still hold 
significant explanatory power over the changes in propensity to pay. Contradictory to 
this, Denis and Osobov (2008) find that catering incentives are insignificantly 
associated with the declining dividend payouts among UK firms. The international 
evidence on the presence of catering theory is similarly mixed and inconclusive (see 
Savov and Weber, 2006; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2007; Eije and Megginson, 2008; 
Denis and Osobov, 2008; Ferris et al., 2009; among others). 
 
Meanwhile, liquidity and risk factors have been advanced recently as possible 
explanations of the puzzle in the US market. Banerjee et al. (2007) provide evidence 
for the link between liquidity and dividend policy using a large sample of firms from 
AMEX and NYSE over a 40-year period from 1963 to 2003. They adopt turnover ratio, 
illiquidity ratio, trading volume, and proportion of days with no trading as liquidity 
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measures and conclude that liquidity holds pronounced explanatory power in dividend 
payout policy after controlling for firm characteristics. This corroborates the evidence 
found by Bulan et al. (2007) that the incidence of dividend initiations is relatively 
higher for firms with higher illiquidity. However, they show that the change in illiquidity 
is not a significant predictor of firms’ dividend initiations. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) 
study the relationship between risk and dividend policy for US firms between 1963 
and 2004 and find that both systematic and idiosyncratic risks could explain the 
disappearing dividends puzzle. They report that risk could explain roughly 40% of the 
decreasing incidence in dividend payers observed. Moreover, they argue that, after 
accounting for risk, the explanatory power of catering incentives disappears for the US 
market. That is, the dividend premium, proxy for catering incentives, actually measures 
the risk difference between dividend payers and non-payers. Nevertheless, this 
argument contradicts Bulan et al.’s (2007) evidence that catering incentives are 
significantly associated with fluctuations in the idiosyncratic risk-adjusted propensity 
to pay.    
 
The presence of liquidity and risk-based explanations of dividend payout policy have 
only been examined (albeit separately) among US firms. Hence this study attempts to 
bridge a noticeable gap in the literature and examine the determinants of dividend 
payout policies across a large sample of firms representing 18 countries (amalgamated 
into 9 major financial markets), over the period 1989-2011. More specifically, we 
extend the literature by examining whether liquidity and/or risk can explain dividend 
policy across several financial markets. Further, this is the first study, to the best of our 
knowledge, that examines whether declining propensity to pay among firms can be 
explained by stock market liquidity. Banerjee et al. (2007) study the link between 
liquidity and dividend policy but do not test for the role of liquidity in explaining 
changes in the propensity to pay dividends. Furthermore, we explore the life-cycle, risk 
and catering explanations to the changes in propensity to pay. In this, we 
internationally substantiate the evidence from the US market for the risk-based 
explanation of catering, advocated by Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), as the initial 
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presence of catering among US firms is weak2. 
 
Theoretically, stock liquidity and the likelihood of firms paying dividends are negatively 
related. As rational investors prefer firms with high liquidity, they impose high discount 
rates when evaluating firms with low liquidity, thereby lowering their valuations on 
such firms. In order to raise their valuations, firms with low liquidity are more likely to 
pay dividends. To investigate this hypothesis, we employ several liquidity measures 
including turnover ratio, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, relative bid-ask spread and 
Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure, thereby capturing the different dimensions of liquidity. 
The turnover ratio captures the trading quantity dimension, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
ratio captures the price impact dimension, relative bid-ask spread captures the trading 
costs dimension, and Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure is constructed to capture the three 
dimensions of liquidity, namely trading quantity, trading cost and trading speed. Unlike 
evidence from the US (Banerjee et al., 2007), we find that the traditional liquidity 
measures - illiquidity ratio and relative bid-ask spread - do not explain the dividend 
payout policy in most markets. However, turnover ratio and Liu’s liquidity measure 
significantly explain the probability of a firm being a dividend payer, with turnover ratio 
highly significant for all nine financial markets. This means that the trading quantity 
dimension of liquidity significantly explains the propensity to pay dividends. When 
considering the liquidity effect along with risk, we find the effect of liquidity is 
significant in the case of US, France, UK and Other European markets. Hence for these 
markets, liquidity is additionally an important determinant of dividend policy, along 
with risk. Across the nine markets considered in our sample, the average marginal 
effects show that risk explains 14% to 33% and liquidity explains 4% to 11% of the firms’ 
probability of paying dividends. Thus risk is a primary determinant of dividend policy. 
Further, we test for the presence of the life-cycle effect (advocated by DeAngelo et al., 
2006) among firms in our sample of countries and find support for the life-cycle 
explanation across all markets. The firm-specific and market-driven risk variables 
                                                     
2 Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find that the significance of dividend premium (as a proxy for catering) is weak in 
several model specifications for the out-of-sample changes in propensity to pay dividends. Our results corroborate 
this phenomenon. 
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remain strongly significant, even after accounting for the effects of the firms’ life-cycle 
and liquidity. 
 
Finally, we reexamine the validity of the catering hypothesis after adjusting the 
propensity to pay with the key determinants such as risk, liquidity, and life-cycle effect. 
We find that catering incentives have a significantly positive impact on the changes in 
the unpredicted proportion of dividend payers for firms operating in common law 
countries including Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and UK in our sample. 
The result is insignificant for the case of firms operating in the US and in civil law 
countries including France, Germany and Other European. Our results corroborate 
with Ferris et al. (2009) in that countries with greater investor protection (common 
law countries) are more responsive to the changing investor preferences and therefore 
significant catering occurs in such countries. The existence of catering incentives is still 
significant when the changes in propensity to pay are adjusted for liquidity or life-cycle 
effect. However, when adjusting the propensity to pay for risk, we find little evidence 
for the existence of catering incentives, even among the common law countries. Our 
results indicate that the role of catering reflects the risk-reward relationship in the 
changing propensity to pay dividends. In other words, catering incentives actually 
capture the risk difference between firms that pay dividends and firms that do not. 
Our evidence corroborates Hoberg and Prabhala’s (2009) findings in the US market 
and reveals that the risk-based explanation of the catering phenomenon persists 
across several financial markets. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the sample 
selection and data description. In Section 3 we examine the role of liquidity, life-cycle 
effect and risk in explaining the probability of being a dividend payer. Section 4 
reexamines the validity of the catering hypothesis after accounting for the key 
determinants of dividend policy. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.2 Sample Selection and Data Description 
2.2.1 Sample Selection 
 
Our sample covers a large number of firms representing eighteen countries, clustered 
into nine major financial markets including Canada, US, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Australia, France, Germany, UK and Other European.3 The Other European market 
includes firms operating in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden pooled together. We pool these ten 
countries into a single European market group (similar to Eije and Megginson, 2008) 
since these markets have small numbers of firms and have historically been members 
of the European Union throughout the sample period. According to the legal regime 
classification of La Porta et al. (1998), six countries in our sample (Canada, US, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Australia and UK) belong to the common law regime, while the 
remaining twelve countries are identified as part of the civil law regime.4 
  
Our overall sample period extends from 1989 to 2011. We begin our sample period at 
1989, as prior to 1989, data for constructing the liquidity and life-cycle variables are 
sparse in many countries. Several international studies such as Denis and Osobov 
(2008) and Eije and Megginson (2008) consider firm-level information from 1989 for 
similar data unavailability reasons. We retrieve all annual firm-level financial and 
accounting information from Worldscope (except for the case of US firms). Specifically, 
we obtain annual financial information on dividends per share, market-to-book value, 
earnings per share, assets per share, net debt, total equity, ratio of retained earnings 
to book value of equity, total assets and market capitalization. We require the total 
assets figures to be available both in the current and in the preceding fiscal year. All 
the other items must be available in the current fiscal year. To compute the liquidity 
and risk measures, we acquire daily information on closing stock price, turnover by 
                                                     
3 Following Denis and Osobov (2008) and Ferris et al. (2009), we exclude Japan since the transitory earnings 
problems can be a significant factor causing the decline in the percentage of dividend payers. 
4 Future research could study the disappearing dividend puzzle with Klerman et al’s (2011) classification.  
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volume, number of shares outstanding, bid price and ask price. Analogous financial 
and accounting information for firms belonging to the US are obtained from the 
Compustat annual files and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Following 
the screening criteria used by Fama and French (2001), we restrict our US sample to 
publicly traded common securities on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchanges 
with the CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. The sample and variables construction for the 
US used in this paper are similar to that of Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Financial firms 
(SIC Codes 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC Codes 4900-4949) are excluded from the 
list of firms. To avoid any survivorship bias, we include both active and dead firms in 
our sample.  
 
2.2.2 Data Description 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 show the number of firms, number of dividend payers, and 
the percentage of dividend payers during the period from 1989 to 2011 for all the 
selected markets in this study. We can clearly observe two distinctive features in the 
dividend payout patterns among these markets. First, we see that the percentage of 
dividend payers decreases during the sample period 1989-2011 by between 30% and 
50% for most of the markets, while the percentage of dividend payers recovers in the 
case of Canada and US. It is notable that the percentage of dividend payers increases 
substantially from 2001 in the US market, although it is still 4% lower in 2011 than the 
1989 level. More specifically, the percentage of US dividend payers follows a significant 
upward trend during 2001-2011, rising from 22% in 2001 to 31% in 2011. A similar 
phenomenon is documented by Julio and Ikenberry (2004) for the US market during 
the period 2001-2004. The recovery in the proportion of dividend-paying groups is also 
observed in the Canadian market, which increases from 15% in 2001 to 22% in 2006. 
However, after 2006, it declines again and falls to a lower level of 19% in 2010. By 
contrast, the dividend payment patterns in the Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, 
France, Germany, UK and Other European show a generally downward trend with 
some fluctuations over our sample period of 23 years. 
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Table 2.1: Number of Dividend Payers (P), Non-Payers (NP) and Total Number of Firms (To) by Country, over the Period 1989-2011. The sample includes non-financial and 
non-utility firms in the Worldscope database for the financial markets Canada, US, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, France, Germany, UK and other European that satisfy the 
data availability requirements. The US sample includes firms on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with available information in Compustat annual files and CRSP. A firm is a dividend 
payer if it has a positive dividend per share; otherwise the firm is classified as a non-payer. 
Year 
Canada US Hong Kong Singapore Australia France Germany UK Other European 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
1989 1.87 2.66 -15.30 1.38 1.45 -4.68 1.42 2.57 -25.80 2.71 5.83 -33.19 1.55 1.77 -5.85 2.48 0.91 43.65 2.02 3.13 -18.97 1.88 2.94 -44.76 1.36 1.55 -5.51 
1990 1.86 2.12 -5.69 1.31 1.33 -1.75 2.19 1.83 7.70 2.72 5.46 -30.21 1.45 1.96 -13.17 1.79 2.21 -9.08 2.68 3.13 -6.69 1.56 2.52 -47.99 1.49 2.82 -27.67 
1991 1.68 2.50 -17.16 1.44 1.52 -5.00 1.60 1.65 -1.54 2.27 2.66 -6.85 1.33 8.94 -82.65 1.42 1.82 -10.77 2.08 3.02 -16.25 1.92 2.89 -41.15 0.98 1.11 -5.31 
1992 1.63 2.39 -16.61 1.49 1.55 -4.03 1.97 1.48 12.49 1.93 1.65 6.86 1.55 2.22 -15.54 1.43 1.04 13.84 1.91 2.74 -15.79 1.70 2.95 -55.37 0.75 0.87 -6.70 
1993 1.81 2.58 -15.50 1.53 1.67 -8.68 2.09 2.97 -15.14 2.28 2.95 -11.17 1.95 3.30 -22.97 1.51 1.07 15.10 1.83 3.56 -28.92 2.13 4.05 -64.15 1.21 0.85 15.14 
1994 1.80 2.76 -18.62 1.48 1.55 -4.13 2.02 5.36 -42.38 2.19 3.97 -25.77 2.04 4.28 -32.10 1.85 1.76 2.11 2.10 5.24 -39.72 2.21 3.34 -41.41 1.33 1.79 -13.00 
1995 2.18 2.65 -8.56 1.66 1.83 -9.56 1.33 1.73 -11.41 1.79 1.88 -2.09 1.67 2.78 -22.09 1.80 1.56 6.18 2.13 2.95 -14.30 2.35 4.29 -60.19 1.00 1.32 -11.96 
1996 1.95 2.81 -15.75 1.74 1.83 -4.66 1.14 1.30 -5.40 1.55 1.83 -7.37 1.74 4.94 -45.29 1.67 3.23 -28.62 2.12 2.16 -0.73 2.65 6.45 -89.03 1.09 1.18 -3.49 
1997 2.55 3.23 -10.25 1.97 1.96 0.28 1.70 2.89 -23.08 1.64 2.65 -20.81 2.03 3.83 -27.55 2.38 4.29 -25.51 2.87 3.17 -4.41 3.02 4.97 -49.74 1.85 1.10 22.66 
1998 2.31 2.72 -7.04 2.20 2.08 5.41 0.74 1.05 -14.81 0.69 0.99 -15.84 1.55 2.97 -28.35 3.02 3.01 0.12 3.34 3.31 0.45 2.93 4.06 -32.65 3.39 4.55 -12.79 
1999 2.62 2.77 -2.38 2.14 2.85 -28.58 1.18 1.02 6.26 1.50 2.31 -18.71 1.79 2.71 -17.98 2.92 2.17 12.79 2.81 5.16 -26.42 2.26 4.35 -65.61 3.06 2.88 2.59 
2000 3.52 4.41 -9.77 1.98 2.43 -20.48 0.99 1.42 -15.82 1.10 1.86 -22.72 1.54 2.45 -20.12 2.79 2.36 16.70 2.62 5.88 -35.08 2.34 5.33 -82.18 4.09 4.27 -1.82 
2001 2.29 2.31 -0.42 1.84 1.82 1.43 0.93 1.25 -13.05 1.12 0.94 7.57 1.32 1.27 1.73 2.87 2.33 9.13 1.93 1.45 12.28 2.21 1.82 19.30 2.67 2.59 1.35 
2002 2.01 2.00 0.09 1.64 1.54 6.35 0.79 0.86 -3.53 1.08 0.93 6.81 1.41 1.28 4.11 2.51 1.74 15.94 1.58 1.46 3.23 1.95 1.31 39.70 1.86 1.75 2.61 
2003 1.92 2.03 -2.38 1.74 1.76 -1.21 0.95 0.92 1.60 1.22 1.13 3.11 1.50 1.34 5.13 2.26 2.18 1.40 1.70 1.54 4.25 2.15 1.72 22.43 1.96 2.05 -2.06 
2004 2.06 2.41 -6.89 1.73 1.86 -7.04 1.18 1.22 -1.45 1.32 1.15 6.02 1.58 1.72 -3.72 2.23 2.49 -4.91 1.90 1.58 8.05 2.28 1.48 43.13 2.11 3.03 -15.73 
2005 2.49 2.36 2.36 1.68 1.94 -14.13 1.26 1.19 2.59 1.28 1.08 7.27 1.90 1.64 6.37 2.23 2.35 -2.34 1.81 1.46 9.36 2.59 2.89 -11.17 2.48 2.39 1.64 
2006 2.37 2.25 2.14 1.74 1.92 -9.70 1.26 1.21 1.60 1.26 1.07 7.08 1.74 1.73 0.26 2.08 2.39 -6.05 1.82 1.77 1.25 2.77 2.77 0.05 2.53 2.65 -1.94 
2007 2.67 2.55 1.95 1.81 1.81 -0.31 1.52 2.05 -12.80 1.68 1.73 -1.42 2.11 2.21 -2.03 2.49 2.35 2.52 2.44 2.40 0.72 2.71 2.47 9.36 3.34 3.10 3.22 
2008 2.33 2.08 5.02 1.50 1.36 9.47 1.09 1.24 -5.73 1.26 1.30 -1.66 1.44 1.93 -12.72 1.72 1.64 2.19 1.89 1.93 -1.12 2.07 2.02 2.85 2.19 2.51 -5.90 
2009 1.64 1.06 18.96 1.55 1.51 2.27 0.99 0.95 1.85 1.00 0.95 2.44 1.10 1.13 -1.11 1.44 0.74 28.99 1.36 1.31 1.62 2.05 1.52 30.04 1.89 1.65 5.99 
2010 1.76 1.55 5.66 1.60 1.67 -4.19 1.15 0.99 6.80 1.13 1.02 4.55 1.39 1.24 5.11 1.60 0.91 24.18 1.67 1.31 10.33 2.05 1.59 25.21 2.21 1.71 11.10 
2011 2.12 2.14 -0.58 1.57 1.59 -1.54 1.14 1.02 4.90 1.12 1.02 3.87 1.47 1.53 -1.91 1.66 1.43 6.54 1.87 1.97 -2.34 1.91 1.53 22.00 2.30 2.01 5.81 
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Figure 2.1: Time Series Plot of Number of Dividends Payers, Total Number of Firms, and the Percentage of Dividends 
Payers over the Period 1989-2011. In each figure, the solid line is the number of dividends payers, the dotted line is the 
total number of firms, and the dashed line is the percentage of dividends payers. The sample includes all non-financial and 
non-utility firms operating in Canada, US, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, France, Germany, UK and Other European 
markets that satisfy the data availability requirements. Firms classified as payers have positive dividends per share. The left 
vertical axis represents the number of firms and the right vertical axis represents the percentage of dividend payers. 
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Further, we observe that the average value of the percentage of dividend payers shows 
dramatic variations among these countries. Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 reveal that only 
15% of Canadian firms paid dividends in 2001, while in the same year, the percentage 
of dividend payers is still 61% in the Other European markets. Similar to Canada, the 
percentage of dividend payers in the US market consistently remains below 35%, with 
the lowest level of 22% being reached in 2001, followed by an upward trend. For 
Australia, the proportion of dividend payers is at a level between 48% in 1989 and 24% 
in 2011. For the other common law markets, namely Hong Kong, Singapore and UK, 
the dividend payers account for approximately 35% or more over our sample period. 
With respect to the UK, Table 1 and Figure 1 show that during the period from 1989 to 
2002, the percentage of dividend payers among UK firms fall sharply by 43%, with 
much of the decline being concentrated in the post-1996 period. This is consistent with 
Ferris et al.’s (2006) study. The figures also reveal that after 2003 the proportion of 
firms paying dividends continues to decrease and reaches a nadir of 42% in 2009, 
before increasing to 46% in 2011. A similar pattern can be observed for Hong Kong and 
Singapore but with a significant increase between 2002 and 2006. For the civil law 
countries, the proportion of dividend payers is even higher and consistently remains 
over 50% except in the case of Germany after 2000. Finally, it is worth noting that many 
of the markets display an increase in the proportion of dividend payers following the 
financial crisis of 2007, such as Canada, US, Hong Kong, Singapore, France, Germany 
and UK. 
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Table 2.2: Market-to-Book Ratio and Dividend Premium, over the Period 1989-2011. The MTB columns report the book-value weighted-average market-to-book ratio for payers (MTB(P)) 
and non-payers (MTB(NP)) across the sample of countries considered. The dividend premium (DP) is the difference between the log of the book-value weighted-average market-to-book 
ratio of payers and that of non-payers. 
 
Year 
Canada US Hong Kong Singapore Australia France Germany UK Other European 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
MTB
(P) 
MTB
(NP) 
DP 
1989 1.87 2.66 -15.30 1.38 1.45 -4.68 1.42 2.57 -25.80 2.71 5.83 -33.19 1.55 1.77 -5.85 2.48 0.91 43.65 2.02 3.13 -18.97 1.88 2.94 -44.76 1.36 1.55 -5.51 
1990 1.86 2.12 -5.69 1.31 1.33 -1.75 2.19 1.83 7.70 2.72 5.46 -30.21 1.45 1.96 -13.17 1.79 2.21 -9.08 2.68 3.13 -6.69 1.56 2.52 -47.99 1.49 2.82 -27.67 
1991 1.68 2.50 -17.16 1.44 1.52 -5.00 1.60 1.65 -1.54 2.27 2.66 -6.85 1.33 8.94 -82.65 1.42 1.82 -10.77 2.08 3.02 -16.25 1.92 2.89 -41.15 0.98 1.11 -5.31 
1992 1.63 2.39 -16.61 1.49 1.55 -4.03 1.97 1.48 12.49 1.93 1.65 6.86 1.55 2.22 -15.54 1.43 1.04 13.84 1.91 2.74 -15.79 1.70 2.95 -55.37 0.75 0.87 -6.70 
1993 1.81 2.58 -15.50 1.53 1.67 -8.68 2.09 2.97 -15.14 2.28 2.95 -11.17 1.95 3.30 -22.97 1.51 1.07 15.10 1.83 3.56 -28.92 2.13 4.05 -64.15 1.21 0.85 15.14 
1994 1.80 2.76 -18.62 1.48 1.55 -4.13 2.02 5.36 -42.38 2.19 3.97 -25.77 2.04 4.28 -32.10 1.85 1.76 2.11 2.10 5.24 -39.72 2.21 3.34 -41.41 1.33 1.79 -13.00 
1995 2.18 2.65 -8.56 1.66 1.83 -9.56 1.33 1.73 -11.41 1.79 1.88 -2.09 1.67 2.78 -22.09 1.80 1.56 6.18 2.13 2.95 -14.30 2.35 4.29 -60.19 1.00 1.32 -11.96 
1996 1.95 2.81 -15.75 1.74 1.83 -4.66 1.14 1.30 -5.40 1.55 1.83 -7.37 1.74 4.94 -45.29 1.67 3.23 -28.62 2.12 2.16 -0.73 2.65 6.45 -89.03 1.09 1.18 -3.49 
1997 2.55 3.23 -10.25 1.97 1.96 0.28 1.70 2.89 -23.08 1.64 2.65 -20.81 2.03 3.83 -27.55 2.38 4.29 -25.51 2.87 3.17 -4.41 3.02 4.97 -49.74 1.85 1.10 22.66 
1998 2.31 2.72 -7.04 2.20 2.08 5.41 0.74 1.05 -14.81 0.69 0.99 -15.84 1.55 2.97 -28.35 3.02 3.01 0.12 3.34 3.31 0.45 2.93 4.06 -32.65 3.39 4.55 -12.79 
1999 2.62 2.77 -2.38 2.14 2.85 -28.58 1.18 1.02 6.26 1.50 2.31 -18.71 1.79 2.71 -17.98 2.92 2.17 12.79 2.81 5.16 -26.42 2.26 4.35 -65.61 3.06 2.88 2.59 
2000 3.52 4.41 -9.77 1.98 2.43 -20.48 0.99 1.42 -15.82 1.10 1.86 -22.72 1.54 2.45 -20.12 2.79 2.36 16.70 2.62 5.88 -35.08 2.34 5.33 -82.18 4.09 4.27 -1.82 
2001 2.29 2.31 -0.42 1.84 1.82 1.43 0.93 1.25 -13.05 1.12 0.94 7.57 1.32 1.27 1.73 2.87 2.33 9.13 1.93 1.45 12.28 2.21 1.82 19.30 2.67 2.59 1.35 
2002 2.01 2.00 0.09 1.64 1.54 6.35 0.79 0.86 -3.53 1.08 0.93 6.81 1.41 1.28 4.11 2.51 1.74 15.94 1.58 1.46 3.23 1.95 1.31 39.70 1.86 1.75 2.61 
2003 1.92 2.03 -2.38 1.74 1.76 -1.21 0.95 0.92 1.60 1.22 1.13 3.11 1.50 1.34 5.13 2.26 2.18 1.40 1.70 1.54 4.25 2.15 1.72 22.43 1.96 2.05 -2.06 
2004 2.06 2.41 -6.89 1.73 1.86 -7.04 1.18 1.22 -1.45 1.32 1.15 6.02 1.58 1.72 -3.72 2.23 2.49 -4.91 1.90 1.58 8.05 2.28 1.48 43.13 2.11 3.03 -15.73 
2005 2.49 2.36 2.36 1.68 1.94 -14.13 1.26 1.19 2.59 1.28 1.08 7.27 1.90 1.64 6.37 2.23 2.35 -2.34 1.81 1.46 9.36 2.59 2.89 -11.17 2.48 2.39 1.64 
2006 2.37 2.25 2.14 1.74 1.92 -9.70 1.26 1.21 1.60 1.26 1.07 7.08 1.74 1.73 0.26 2.08 2.39 -6.05 1.82 1.77 1.25 2.77 2.77 0.05 2.53 2.65 -1.94 
2007 2.67 2.55 1.95 1.81 1.81 -0.31 1.52 2.05 -12.80 1.68 1.73 -1.42 2.11 2.21 -2.03 2.49 2.35 2.52 2.44 2.40 0.72 2.71 2.47 9.36 3.34 3.10 3.22 
2008 2.33 2.08 5.02 1.50 1.36 9.47 1.09 1.24 -5.73 1.26 1.30 -1.66 1.44 1.93 -12.72 1.72 1.64 2.19 1.89 1.93 -1.12 2.07 2.02 2.85 2.19 2.51 -5.90 
2009 1.64 1.06 18.96 1.55 1.51 2.27 0.99 0.95 1.85 1.00 0.95 2.44 1.10 1.13 -1.11 1.44 0.74 28.99 1.36 1.31 1.62 2.05 1.52 30.04 1.89 1.65 5.99 
2010 1.76 1.55 5.66 1.60 1.67 -4.19 1.15 0.99 6.80 1.13 1.02 4.55 1.39 1.24 5.11 1.60 0.91 24.18 1.67 1.31 10.33 2.05 1.59 25.21 2.21 1.71 11.10 
2011 2.12 2.14 -0.58 1.57 1.59 -1.54 1.14 1.02 4.90 1.12 1.02 3.87 1.47 1.53 -1.91 1.66 1.43 6.54 1.87 1.97 -2.34 1.91 1.53 22.00 2.30 2.01 5.81 
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Table 2.2 presents the book-value weighted-average market-to-book ratio for payers 
and non-payers as well as the corresponding dividend premium for each year from 
1989 to 2011 for the markets considered in this study. Following the definition given 
by Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b), dividend premium, estimated as the difference 
between the log of the book-value weighted-average market-to-book ratio for 
dividend payers and that of non-payers, can proxy investors’ preference for dividend 
payers and capture the presence of possible catering incentives. It is clear that the 
dividend premium fluctuates and contains a mixture of positive and negative values 
among all the sample countries. For most markets we see that, prior to 2001, the book-
value weighted-average market-to-book ratio for dividend payers is less than that of 
non-payers, with the spread noticeably decreasing after 2001 for the case of six out of 
nine markets. These six markets include the five common law countries (Canada, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Australia and UK) and Germany. Overall, for all markets, dividend 
premiums appear to become less negative after 2001. Before 2001, we observe the 
largest negative premium of -89.03 for the UK in 1996 (followed by -82.65 for Australia). 
The largest negative dividend premium after 2001 is -15.73 for Other European 
markets (followed by -14.13 for the US). For the case of US, we see that dividend 
premium is negative in most years (even though we observe, in Figure 1, an increase 
in the percentage of dividend payers after 2001). Denis and Osobov (2008) report 
similar negative values of dividend premium for the US. This reflects into the lack of 
catering effect we find in Section 4 (Table 2.6). Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) also find 
limited evidence of the catering hypothesis for the US. 
 
2.3 Determinants of Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Following Fama and French (2001), we employ a logit model to examine the role of 
liquidity and risk factors in explaining the probability of paying dividends. The logit 
regression takes the following form:  
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑎 + 𝑏
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑐
𝑑𝐴
𝐴 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑑
𝐸
𝐴𝑖𝑡
+  𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓
𝐷
𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑔
𝑅𝐸
𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ ℎ𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 +
𝑖𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑗𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                            (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is set to one when firm i pay dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficients of the model are estimated as time series averages of Fama and MacBeth’s 
(1973) annual cross-sectional regressions with Newey-West t statistics. The 
independent variables in this logit model can be categorized into four groups: a.) the 
Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables (market-to-book ratio (M/Bit), 
asset growth (dA/Ait), earnings-to-assets ratio (E/Ait), and size percentile (SIZEit)) and 
leverage proxied by the debt-to-equity ratio (D/Eit); b.) the life-cycle variable proxied 
by the ratio of retained earnings to book value of equity (RE/BEit); c.) the liquidity 
variable (Liqit) proxied by four different liquidity measures, namely turnover ratio 
(ToRit), illiquidity ratio (ILLIQit), relative bid-ask spread (PSit) and Liu’s (2006) liquidity 
measure (LMit); and d.) the risk variables including systematic risk (SYSit) and 
idiosyncratic risk (IDit). Below we explain the variables used in the logit regression. For 
the liquidity coefficients, we predict a negative sign for ToR and positive signs for ILLIQ, 
PS and LM. For the risk variables SYS and ID, we predict the slope coefficients to have 
negative signs.  
 
2.3.1 Firm Characteristic Variables and Leverage 
 
Fama and French (2001) point out a significant relation between dividend policy and 
firm characteristic variables including size, profitability, and investment opportunities. 
Larger and more profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends. Further, dividend 
payments are less likely to be made by firms with more investments. Thus, to investigate 
the determinants of the dividend payout trends, we include in our analysis size, 
profitability and investment opportunity variables, as defined in Fama and French 
(2001). Size characteristics are captured by the market capitalization percentile (SIZEit). 
This variable is calculated as the fraction of firms with equal or smaller market value 
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than firm i in a given year t.5 Earnings-to-assets ratio is considered as a proxy for 
profitability and the measure of a firm’s investment opportunity is constructed with 
market-to-book value and asset growth, which is the proportionate change in total 
assets for year t. Additional to the four basic Fama and French (2001) firm 
characteristic variables, since leverage ratio can impact a firm’s dividend policy (Neves 
et al., 2006), we include the debt-to-equity ratio, as a proxy for leverage, in our analysis. 
 
2.3.2 Life-cycle Variable 
 
DeAngelo et al. (2004) find that dividends in the US tend to be more concentrated 
among a small number of large payers. To explain this phenomenon, DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) advance the life-cycle theory, where firms adopt the optimal dividend policy in 
accordance with the evolution of their opportunity set. In the early years, firms pay 
fewer dividends as their investment opportunities exceed their internally generated 
capital. Conversely, in the later years, firms pay more dividends to mitigate the 
possibility of free cash flows being wasted due to internal funds exceeding investment 
opportunities. The life-cycle theory is empirically evidenced by DeAngelo et al. (2006), 
who use earned-to-contributed equity mix to proxy for a firm’s life-cycle stage. This 
proxy measures the proportion of the internally generated, to firm’s contributed, 
capital and is calculated as the ratio of retained earnings to the book value of equity 
(RE/BE). DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008) find a positive link 
between the propensity to pay dividends and the firms’ earned-to-contributed equity 
mix. Hence we incorporate this variable to study the corporate dividend payout 
practice.  
 
                                                     
5 For the ten countries pooled together to form the Other European market, the market capitalization percentile is 
computed for each country separately.  
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2.3.3 Liquidity Factor 
 
Banerjee et al. (2007) find that liquidity could in part account for the changes in 
dividend payers. In markets with low liquidity, high transaction costs influence 
investors to receive dividends rather than acquire the same amount of homemade 
dividends by selling their investment. Meanwhile, rational investors prefer liquid 
stocks and lower the valuation of illiquid stocks. Thus firms with low liquidity would 
more likely pay dividends to increase their valuation. This is empirically evidenced by 
Banerjee et al. (2007) with a large sample of US data over the period 1963-2003. Their 
findings are consistent with Bulan et al.’s (2007) observation that dividend initiations 
occur more frequently in illiquid markets.  
 
Thus, the liquidity variable is applied to test the prediction that stock liquidity is 
negatively related to dividend payment decisions. In this study, we adopt four proxies 
for liquidity. The first is turnover ratio (ToR), defined as the volume of shares traded 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding, and is an alternative widely-used proxy 
for liquidity which focuses on the trading quantity dimension of liquidity. The second 
liquidity measure is the illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) put forward by Amihud (2002). He uses 
this measure to proxy for price impact of a trade, which is defined as the average of 
the ratio of daily absolute return to the daily volume:  
 
                            𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖 =
1
𝐷𝑖
∑
|𝑅𝑖𝑑|
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑
𝐷𝑖
𝑑=1                          (2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑑 is the return on stock i on day d, 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑 is the corresponding daily trading 
value, and 𝐷𝑖  is the number of days with data available for stock i during the pre- and 
post-addition measurement periods. The third liquidity proxy is the relative bid-ask 
spread (PS), which is defined as the difference between the bid and ask price, and 
normalized by stock price. This proxy is first used by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
who state that an asset with higher relative bid-ask spread has a longer holding horizon, 
and thus less trading activity and lower liquidity.  
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The fourth measure of stock liquidity is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of 
zero daily trading volumes. This liquidity measure (LM) put forward by Liu (2006) is 
defined as the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes 
over the previous 12 months. Specifically, this liquidity measure is calculated using the 
following equation: 
 
𝐿𝑀 = [𝑁𝑜𝐷𝑉 +  
1
12_𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
] × 
21x12
𝑁𝑜𝑇𝐷
                    (3) 
 
where NoDV denotes the number of zero daily volumes in previous 12 months, 
12_month turnover is the sum of daily turnover over the previous 12 months, and 
NoTD is the total number of trading days in the market over the previous 12 months. 
The second term in the brackets is the turnover adjustment, which distinguishes two 
stocks with the same integer number of zero daily trading volumes. High values of LM 
are associated with illiquid stocks that tend to be small, value, low-turnover stocks 
with large bid-ask spreads and high return-to-volume ratios. As in Liu (2006), we 
multiply 21 x 12 /𝑁𝑜𝑇𝐷  in order to standardize the number of trading days in a 
month to 21 in order to make the liquidity measure comparable over time. Liu defines 
liquidity as the “ability to trade large quantities quickly with little price impact at low 
cost” (Liu, 2006). Thus compared with the other three liquidity measures, Liu’s liquidity 
proxy captures the multidimensional features of liquidity – trading quantity, trading 
speed and trading cost (see Liu, 2006 for details).  
 
In estimating ToR, ILLIQ and LM, we require an accurate measurement of trading 
volume. Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Anderson and Dyl (2005) suggest a correction factor 
to account for the over-counting of trading volume in dealer markets. Hence we adjust 
the trading volume for stocks trading on the NASDAQ in the US market and stocks from 
four countries included in the Other European market (namely, Denmark, Finland, Italy 
and Sweden) that are primarily dealer markets. For stocks listed on the NASDAQ, we 
estimate a correction factor of 0.62. This is calculated as the median decline in the 
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trading volume of stocks that switch from NASDAQ to NYSE/AMEX.6 For the Other 
European markets, we are unable to compute the correction factor using Atkin and 
Dyl’s (1997) method, since there is no stock switching information in these countries. 
Hence we apply the correction factor of 0.62 that is found from the US market.7 
 
2.3.4 Risk Factor 
 
Studies on the relationship between risk and dividend policy indicate a negative 
relationship between risk and dividend payments. One strand of literature builds on 
the maturity theory proposed by Venkatesh (1989), which finds firm maturity, 
characterized by less risk, is able to motivate firms to pay dividends. This theory is 
supported by Grullon et al.’s (2002) work. Through investigating announcements of 
dividend reductions and increases by NYSE and AMEX listed firms over the period 1982 
to 1993, Grullon et al. (2002) find that dividend changes are accompanied by changes 
in systematic risk, and increases in dividends lead to a decline in firms’ systematic risk. 
Similar results are reported by Koch and Sun (2004). Moreover, Fama and French (2001) 
suggest that the disappearing dividends puzzle over the period from 1978 to 1998 
could be partly explained by the changes in firm characteristics over that period, with 
one of the pronounced changes being the decrease in the profitability of newly listed 
small firms during the same period. Thus it could be inferred that the increase in the 
risk level of newly listed firms partly leads to the decrease in the incidence of dividend 
payers. Based on a large sample of US data from 1963 to 2000, Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003) argue that the increase in idiosyncratic risk prevailing in the 1990s is 
accompanied by the rise in cash flow risk, which is supposed to limit a firm’s dividend 
payments. Meanwhile, Malkiel and Xu (2003) posit that the increased firm-specific risk 
                                                     
6 In more detail, we calculate the percentage drop as the change in the overall average daily trading volume between 
the forty-day periods preceding and following the switching date (see Atkins and Dyl, 1997 for details). We identify 
that during our sample period 1989-2012, 485 of our sample firms switch from NASDAQ to NYSE and 290 of our 
sample firms switch from NASDAQ to AMEX. We find the median percentage drop for the 775 stocks that switched 
from NASDAQ to NYSE/AMEX to be 0.38, which corresponds to a correction factor of 0.62. 
7 For robustness, we reconsider all the empirical analysis in Sections 3.5 and 4 by removing NASDAQ firms from 
our US sample. Also, we consider using the unadjusted volume information for the Other European markets. The 
empirical results remain materially unchanged and hence the volume adjustments do not affect our results. 
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reflects a firm’s growth potential in the future, indicating that firms with increased 
idiosyncratic risk may decrease their dividend payments for the sake of future growth.  
 
In a recent paper, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) analyze a large sample of US data from 
1963 to 2004, pointing out that both systematic and idiosyncratic risks have significant 
explanatory power for the disappearing dividends puzzle. They find that risk factor, in 
the US, could explain roughly 40% of the decreasing incidence of dividend payers. In 
order to examine the role of risk factors in explaining dividend policy, our analysis 
includes systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk variables. Following Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009), the former is defined as the standard deviation of the predicted value from a 
CAPM regression while the latter is defined as the standard deviation of residuals from 
the above regression. 
 
2.3.5 Results of the Logit Regression 
 
To test whether liquidity can explain the likelihood of a firm paying dividends, we use 
logit regressions that include basic firm characteristic variables and various proxies for 
liquidity. Table 2.3 reports the estimated coefficients and Newey-West t-statistics for 
the logit regressions. The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm pays dividend 
that year and zero otherwise. In Panel A we present the estimates from the baseline 
regression with firm characteristic explanatory variables advanced by Fama and French 
(2001), while Panel B presents the results from regressions with the firm characteristic 
variables and the liquidity measures. We include each liquidity measure separately in 
the regressions as they are highly correlated with each other. For brevity, we report (in 
Panel B) only the coefficient estimates for the four liquidity variables ToR, ILLIQ, PS and 
LM.8  
                                                     
8 The (unreported) slope estimates for the Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables in Panel B are quite 
similar to those reported in Panel A. 
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Table 2.3: Logit Estimation with Different Liquidity Measures Explaining the Probability of being a Dividend Payer, 1989-2011. This table reports the logit regression results using Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) style estimation, with Newey-West t-statistics reported in parentheses over the period 1989-2011 for the nine financial markets. The regressions are based on the firm-year 
observations available in our sample that are reported in Table 1. The coefficient estimates from the logit regression with Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables are reported in 
Panel A (Model (1)), and coefficient estimates from the logit regressions with Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables and different proxies of liquidity are organized in Panel B 
(Models (2)-(5)). The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm pays dividends that year and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are market-to-book ratio (M/B), asset growth (dA/A), 
earnings-to-asset ratio (E/A), size percentile (Size), and liquidity measures including turnover ratio (ToR), illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ), relative bid-ask spread (PS) and standardized turnover adjusted 
number of zero trading days (LM). Liquidity measures of ToR, ILLIQ, PS and LM are included one at a time in Models (2)–(5) respectively. For brevity, in Models (2)-(5) we report only the 
coefficient estimates for the liquidity measures. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
  
Predicted 
sign 
Canada US Hong Kong Singapore Australia France Germany UK 
Other 
European 
 Panel A: Firm characteristics as independent variables 
(1) 
M/B 
 
- 
-0.476*** -0.435*** -0.210** -0.001 -0.197*** -0.062* -0.022* -0.026*** -0.002 
(-3.44) (-15.49) (-2.49) (-0.01) (-3.80) (-2.03) (-1.89) (-5.23) (-0.25) 
dA/A 
 
- 
-0.460*** -1.209*** -0.204 -0.882*** -0.524*** 0.760 0.422 -0.271*** 0.279 
(-4.62) (-13.44) (-0.53) (-3.20) (-3.65) (1.65) (1.37) (-5.70) (1.10) 
E/A 
 
+ 
2.363*** 3.755*** 9.555*** 5.881*** 7.203** 1.245** 4.034*** 6.602*** 0.371* 
(7.34) (11.57) (3.05) (3.20) (2.60) (2.46) (3.09) (3.51) (2.00) 
Size 
 
+ 
8.375** 4.314*** 3.917*** 4.293*** 6.270*** 3.498*** 3.185*** 5.342*** 2.476*** 
(2.36) (25.52) (14.61) (21.31) (13.77) (3.48) (7.11) (25.05) (11.10) 
            
 Panel B: Firm Characteristics and liquidity measure as independent variables 
(2) ToR 
 
- 
-1.010*** -0.216*** -0.079*** -0.303*** -0.209*** -0.327*** -0.516*** -0.150*** -0.099*** 
(-2.93) (-7.14) (-3.79) (-3.16) (-3.96) (-8.23) (-5.07) (-7.91) (-5.48) 
(3) ILLIQ 
 
+ 
0.026 0.230*** -0.449 -1.032 -0.020 -0.022 -0.039 -0.063 -0.009 
(0.47) (5.11) (-0.42) (-0.51) (-0.06) (-1.31) (-1.10) (-0.88) (-0.53) 
(4) PS 
 
+ 
-0.156 0.139*** 0.624 0.524 0.093 0.009 0.003 0.317 -0.066 
(-1.26) (5.12) (0.80) (0.26) (0.40) (0.55) (0.10) (1.31) (-1.09) 
(5) LM  
+ 
-0.519 0.015*** -0.250 0.591 0.202*** 0.012*** -0.030 0.016*** 0.011*** 
  (-1.51) (25.07) (-1.72) (1.33) (2.81) (4.49) (-0.53) (3.02) (6.04) 
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The results of Model (1) in Panel A show that slope coefficients associated with the 
firm characteristic variables largely depict the correct sign (except the insignificant 
slope on asset growth for France, Germany and Other European) and are mostly 
significant. That is, consistent with previous evidence, the probability of a firm paying 
dividends increases with the decrease in market-to-book value and asset growth, and 
the increase in earnings-to-assets ratio and size percentile. This confirms Fama and 
French’s (2001) hypothesis that larger, more profitable firms with less investment 
opportunity are more likely to pay dividends.   
 
The specification in Model (2) in Panel B reports the slope estimates for turnover ratio 
(ToR) as the liquidity measure, considered along with the firm characteristic 
explanatory variables. The results show that the ToR coefficient is negative and highly 
significant (at one percent level) for the case of all countries represented in our sample. 
Hence we see that turnover ratio, as a proxy for liquidity, can significantly predict a 
firm’s propensity to pay dividends. In Models (3) and (4) we see that the coefficients 
on Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio and the relative bid-ask spread are insignificant for 
all markets, except for the case of US.9 For the case of Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure 
LM, we find that the slope on LM is strongly significant (at one percent level) for five 
(out of nine) markets and hence its explanatory power is weaker than the turnover 
measure. The results indicate that only the trading quantity dimension of liquidity 
captured by both turnover ratio and LM explains firms’ dividend payout policy in most 
countries. The coefficients on turnover ratio and LM have opposite signs since LM is 
an illiquidity measure. The price impact dimension of liquidity captured by Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity ratio and the trading cost dimension of liquidity captured by relative 
bid-ask spreads cannot strongly predict the probability of a firm being a dividend payer 
in most countries (except for the US). In the case of US, we find that all four proxies of 
liquidity are strongly statistically significant at the one percent level. This result 
corroborates the evidence observed in the US market (among AMEX and NYSE firms) 
by Banerjee et al. (2007), that liquidity can explain the likelihood of a firm paying 
                                                     
9 The results remain similar when we use the bid-ask spread (the difference between bid and ask prices) instead of 
the relative bid-ask spread,. 
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dividends. Since the turnover ratio measure of liquidity is significantly related to the 
likelihood of firm paying dividends for all countries considered in the sample, we use 
the ToR measure to further examine the determinants of dividend policy.  
 
Table 2.4 reports the estimates of the logit regression in Equation (1), which predicts 
the probability of a firm being a dividend payer. We consider six model specifications 
where we include, along with the Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables, 
additional explanatory variables – debt-to-equity ratio as a proxy for leverage, ratio of 
retained earnings to book value of equity as a proxy for life-cycle, turnover ratio as a 
measure of liquidity, and systematic and idiosyncratic risks. For conciseness, in Table 4 
we report the slope estimates for all explanatory variables, except the firm 
characteristic variables.   
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Table 2.4: Logit Estimation Explaining the Probability of being a Dividend Payer, 1989-2011. This table reports the logit 
regression results using Fama and MacBeth (1973) style estimation, with Newey-West t-statistics reported in parentheses. 
The regressions are based on the firm-year observations available in our sample that are reported in Table 1. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the firm pays dividends that year and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables 
include the Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables (market-to-book ratio (M/B), asset growth (dA/A), 
earnings-to-asset ratio (E/A) and size percentile (Size)) and additional explanatory variables debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) as 
a proxy for leverage, ratio of retained earnings to book value of equity ratio (RE/BE), liquidity measure proxied by turnover 
ratio (ToR), systematic risk (SYS), and idiosyncratic risk (IDIO). Models (1)-(6) estimate the various logit regressions with 
Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables and other explanatory variables. For brevity, we report only the 
coefficient estimates for all explanatory variables except the firm characteristic variables. *** indicates significance at 
1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
    Canada US 
Hong 
Kong 
Singapore Australia France Germany UK 
Other 
European  
(1) D/E 
0.176*** -0.002** 0.001 -0.687** 0.136 -0.086** -0.126** -0.002 -0.124*** 
(2.85) (-2.30) (0.00) (-2.08) (1.72) (-2.13) (-2.70) (-0.28) (-3.57) 
(2) RE/BE 
0.007** 0.008** 0.008 0.005*** 0.004** 0.007** 0.007** 0.000*** 0.006*** 
(2.43) (2.14) (1.23) (3.35) (2.38) (2.34) (2.66) (3.65) (3.83) 
(3) 
D/E 
0.304*** 0.002 0.006 -0.323 0.502** -0.079 -0.522 0.158 -0.166* 
(4.04) (1.44) (0.08) (-1.00) (2.31) (-1.36) (-1.30) (1.35) (-1.88) 
RE/BE 
0.010** 0.013** 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.000* 0.013** 
(2.83) (2.26) (3.95) (3.22) (5.56) (2.36) (3.51) (1.96) (2.21) 
ToR 
-0.086** -0.217*** -0.057*** -0.092 -0.225*** -0.382*** -0.490*** -0.163*** -0.122*** 
(-2.63) (-7.15) (-6.17) (-0.76) (-2.86) (-8.47) (-4.92) (-8.36) (-6.87) 
(4) 
SYS 
-129.804*** -52.280*** -37.934** -107.648* -63.960*** -91.763*** -74.882*** -2.162 -63.440*** 
(-3.41) (-4.48) (-2.15) (-1.96) (-3.30) (-3.80) (-3.50) (-0.15) (-5.06) 
IDIO 
-122.802*** -82.306*** -75.258*** -72.452* -117.518*** -102.643*** -98.871*** -70.476*** -72.567*** 
(-11.50) (-15.32) (-7.36) (-2.06) (-9.83) (-9.14) (-12.14) (-15.51) (-12.29) 
(5) 
ToR 
-0.036 -0.119*** -0.012 -0.308** -0.949 -0.200*** -0.101 -0.069*** -0.048*** 
(-0.52) (-4.95) (-1.58) (-2.29) (-1.14) (-5.45) (-1.57) (-5.97) (-4.28) 
SYS 
-146.347*** -24.005*** -58.965*** -45.405 -74.177*** -39.920* -36.007 1.751 -39.003*** 
(-3.10) (-3.09) (-4.35) (-0.68) (-2.93) (-1.91) (-1.18) (0.10) (-3.73) 
IDIO 
-142.347*** -75.962*** -76.491*** -122.146** -144.919*** -117.377*** -143.705*** -63.246*** -92.248*** 
(-11.02) (-13.24) (-8.30) (-2.22) (-6.67) (-9.15) (-4.41) (-12.12) (-8.08) 
(6) 
D/E 
0.287*** 0.002 0.021 0.550 0.245 -0.086 -0.030 0.048*** -0.098** 
(3.78) (1.16) (0.33) (0.57) (0.83) (-1.37) (-0.53) (3.07) (-2.22) 
RE/BE 
0.009** 0.012** 0.005*** 0.016** 0.145** 0.005* 0.007** 0.000** 0.007*** 
(2.77) (2.60) (4.01) (2.16) (2.35) (1.84) (2.63) (2.73) (3.71) 
ToR 
-0.025 -0.120*** -0.011 0.190 -0.1110 -0.240*** -0.033 -0.075*** -0.071*** 
(-0.37) (-4.97) (-1.24) (0.38) (-0.77) (-4.14) (-0.72) (-6.19) (-5.39) 
SYS 
-141.590** -23.519*** -42.062** -13.743 -69.574*** -38.679* -43.075 11.716 -9.181 
(-2.79) (-3.05) (-2.30) (-0.59) (-2.89) (-1.74) (-1.31) (0.63) (-0.87) 
IDIO 
-140.712*** -76.064*** -74.622*** -100.492** -120.163*** -128.177*** -154.392*** -66.129*** -99.001*** 
(-9.93) (-13.27) (-7.76) (-2.78) (-3.59) (-8.74) (-4.29) (-10.96) (-10.02) 
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Models (1) and (2) report the results when leverage ratio and earned-to-contributed 
equity mix variables are respectively added to the baseline model with the Fama and 
French (2001) firm characteristic variables. The results in Model (1) show significant 
slope on leverage at the one and five percent levels for firms in two-thirds of the 
countries in the sample, including Canada, US, Singapore, France, Germany and Other 
European. Consistent with Neves et al. (2006), the results indicate that a firm’s 
leverage has an impact on its dividend payout policy. However, when we consider the 
overall model with all the key explanatory variables (Model (6)), we find that the slope 
on leverage is insignificant for most markets. In Model (2), we see that the earned-to-
contributed equity mix variable is positive and significantly predicts dividend policy in 
all countries in the sample, except for Hong Kong. This shows that the life-cycle effect 
advanced by DeAngelo et al. (2006) features systematically in the sample of countries 
considered. Our result corroborates the evidence found by DeAngelo et al. (2006) and 
Denis and Osobov (2008) whereby firms with high earned/contributed equity tend to 
have the smallest reductions in the probability of being a dividend payer. In Model (3) 
we include leverage ratio, earned-to-contributed equity mix and turnover ratio, along 
with the firm characteristic variables. We see that the earned-to-contributed equity 
mix variable is now statistically significant for all countries, and turnover ratio as a 
liquidity measure is still significant (as in Table 2) for all the countries except for 
Singapore. This shows that life-cycle theory and liquidity are important determinants 
of a firm’s dividend payout practice, consistent with the findings of DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) and Banerjee et al. (2007). 
 
In Models (4), (5) and (6) we investigate whether risk variables, when considered along 
with the other important explanatory variables, can explain a firm’s dividend policy. 
When incorporating risk variables into the baseline regression in Model (4), we find 
that both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk have strong explanatory power for firms 
in most countries. The significantly negative coefficients for the risk variables are in 
line with Hoberg and Prabhala’s (2009) findings in the US, whereby firm-specific and 
market-driven risks have a negative impact on the probability of a firm being a dividend 
payer. These findings suggest that, as in the case of the US, both market-driven and 
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firm-specific risks inversely affect the probability of firms paying dividends and the 
evidence is found across most markets considered.  
 
In Model (5) we include both risk and liquidity measures along with the Fama and 
French (2001) firm characteristic variables and find that the systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk variables still hold significant explanatory power for most countries. 
The liquidity variable is significant for the case of five out of nine markets, namely US, 
Singapore, France, UK and Other European. When we consider the model specification 
with all explanatory variables (in Model 6), we find overall strong significance in most 
countries for the case of firm-specific and systematic risk variables, followed by the 
earned-to-contributed equity mix variable. However, the magnitude of the coefficients 
associated to the earned-to-contributed equity mix variable is small. The turnover 
ratio variable as a proxy for liquidity shows significance for the case of US, France, UK 
and Other European markets. The results indicate that the firm-specific and market-
driven risk variables are the key drivers of firms paying dividends. For firms in US, 
France, UK and Other European markets, liquidity is additionally an important 
determinant of dividend policy. 
 
Based on the estimation results in Model (6), we compute average marginal logit 
effects to investigate the economic significance of the main explanatory variables. For 
the case of all markets, we consistently find that risk (mainly the idiosyncratic part) is 
economically more important than liquidity. We find that a one standard deviation 
shift in the idiosyncratic risk will significantly reduce the firms’ probability of paying 
dividends by 33% in Canada, 14% in US, 31% in Hong Kong, 28% in Singapore, 32% in 
Australia, 17% in France, 24% in Germany, 15% in UK and 28% in Other European 
markets. For the case of US, France, UK and Other European markets, we see that a 
one standard deviation shift in liquidity will decrease the probability of firms paying 
dividends by 4%, 11%, 6% and 7% respectively. 
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2.4 Propensity to Pay and Catering Theory 
2.4.1 Propensity to Pay 
 
To examine the unexplained proportion of declining dividend payers, we estimate the 
propensity to pay (PTPt), which is measured as the actual percentage of dividend 
payers minus the expected percentage of dividend payers in year t. The expected 
percentage of dividend payers is computed using logit regressions with the basic firm 
characteristic proxies as the independent variables during the base period 1989-
200010. To compare the propensity to pay after accounting for key variables such as 
life-cycle, liquidity and risk, we also estimate the expected probability, using the logit 
regressions embedded with these key variables, along with the basic firm 
characteristic variables.  
 
Figure 2.2 plots the propensity to pay estimated with and without the key variables 
(life-cycle, liquidity and risk adjustments) for the sample period from 1989 to 2011. 
The solid line in the plots reveals a declining trend in the propensity to pay for most 
countries, when considering the expected proportion of dividend payers using only 
firm characteristic variables. We observe a noticeable upward trend in the propensity 
to pay towards the end of the sample period 2008-2011 in most countries (except for 
France). This shows that firms continue to pay dividends during the global financial 
crisis. This evidence supports the signaling hypothesis, where firms are reluctant to cut 
dividend payments, as they provide an indication of the financial health of the firm. 
Similar evidence of improved dividend payments during the financial crisis is reported 
by Acharya et al. (2013). 
                                                     
10 In choosing the base period, we allow for a similar time span over both the base and out-of-sample periods. 
Considering the out-of-sample period from 2001, we are able to study the (out-of-sample) evidence over a few 
business cycles and also ensure that the results are not driven by the financial crisis period. The results of this section 
remain unchanged when we extend the base period up to 2001.  
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Figure 2.2: Propensity to Pay with and without Risk and Liquidity Adjustments, 1989-2011. The solid 
line is the unadjusted propensity to pay before accounting for life-cycle, liquidity or risk effects. The 
propensity to pay is measured as the difference between actual and predicted percentage of dividend 
payers, the latter is derived from the logit model with explanatory variables of market-to-book ratio, 
asset growth, earnings-to-assets ratio and size percentile. The dashed grey line is the life-cycle-adjusted 
propensity to pay, dotted line is the liquidity-adjusted propensity to pay, and the dashed line is the risk-
adjusted propensity to pay. 
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When we account for the effect of firms’ life-cycle on the propensity to pay (dashed 
grey line), we see that in most markets the unadjusted propensity to pay and the life-
cycle-adjusted propensity to pay lines are almost overlapping (except for Hong Kong). 
This shows that life-cycle has little influence on the firms’ propensity to pay. When we 
examine the effect of liquidity on the propensity to pay (dotted line), we find that the 
liquidity-adjusted and the unadjusted propensity to pay lines are very close to each 
other and also overlap for most markets (the exceptions being US, Hong Kong and 
Other European). For US, the distinct spread between the liquidity-adjusted and the 
unadjusted propensity to pay reveals that firms’ liquidity explains a portion of the 
propensity to pay for US firms. However, when the propensity to pay is adjusted for 
risk (dashed line), we obtain a consistent picture across all markets. We find that the 
risk-adjusted propensity to pay is less negative and closer to the x-axis. The evidence 
suggests that risk is increasingly an important factor in explaining the declining 
proportion of dividend payers across the world. This conclusion is in line with Hoberg 
and Prabhala’s (2009) findings for the US market. Furthermore, we notice that in all 
markets, the propensity to pay remains negative in most periods even after accounting 
for the key variable such as risk. 
 
Next, in order to quantitatively measure the extent to which propensity to pay is 
explained by life-cycle, liquidity and risk variables, we calculate the average propensity 
to pay for three out-of-sample time periods: 2001-2011 (whole out-of-sample period), 
2001-2006 (pre-crisis period) and 2007-2011 (crisis period). In calculating this measure, 
we first estimate the propensity to pay from logit regressions based on firm 
characteristic variables and other key variables of interest (life-cycle, liquidity, and risk) 
from the 1989-2000 base period. The difference in the average (out-of-sample) 
propensity to pay with and without the key variables provides an indication of the 
impact of those variables on the propensity to pay. 
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Table 2.5: The Average Propensity to Pay Explained by Key Variables (Life-cycle, Liquidity and/or Risk). This table 
reports the average propensity to pay based on the Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables (in Row (1)) 
and the average propensity to pay based on propensities adjusted for life-cycle effect (in Row (2)), liquidity measure 
proxied by turnover ratio (in Row (3)), risk (in Row (4)), and all key variables including life-cycle, liquidity and risk (in 
Row (5)). The average propensities are based on the fitted logit regressions from the 1989-2000 base period. The 
average propensity to pay over the period 2001-2011are reported in Panel A, the average propensities over the 2001-
2006 sub-period are reported in Panel B, and the average propensities over the sub-period 2007-2011 are reported in 
Panel C. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Countries 
Canada US 
Hong 
Kong Singapore Australia France Germany UK 
Other 
European 
Panel A: 2001-2011 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size -39.642 -3.606 -28.990 -31.379 -15.744 -31.600 -34.306 -31.552 -26.238 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Life-cycle -35.621 -3.525 -35.705 -32.959 -12.217 -31.816 -31.195 -31.664 -23.176 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Liquidity -39.203 6.978 -34.173 -30.762 -17.974 -30.390 -35.797 -30.255 -29.599 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Risk -1.677 -1.929 -24.317 -20.460 -5.683 -18.802 -10.080 -20.681 -17.615 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Life-cycle,  
20.276 2.741 -16.076 -19.180 -5.423 -19.258 -15.856 -26.318 -24.443 
Liquidity, Risk 
          
Panel B: 2001-2006 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size -42.053 -4.260 -31.508 -33.155 -15.411 -29.726 -33.980 -28.831 -23.218 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Life-cycle -37.253 -4.180 -36.491 -34.418 -11.797 -29.948 -29.293 -28.895 -20.371 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Liquidity -41.606 2.183 -37.269 -31.205 -18.221 -28.534 -34.680 -27.478 -26.398 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Risk -6.853 -6.810 -28.453 -25.213 -9.536 -15.633 -11.283 -19.642 -17.273 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Life-cycle,  
20.312 -2.476 -20.812 -22.803 -9.138 -15.646 -15.620 -25.231 -22.340 
Liquidity,Risk 
          
Panel C: 2007-2011 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size -36.748 -2.820 -25.968 -29.249 -16.143 -33.849 -34.696 -34.816 -29.862 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size,Life-cycle -33.664 -2.740 -34.762 -31.209 -12.719 -34.057 -33.478 -34.987 -26.542 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size,Liquidity -36.320 12.120 -30.457 -30.231 -17.678 -32.617 -37.138 -33.588 -33.439 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size,Risk 4.535 3.928 -19.353 -14.757 -1.059 -22.605 -8.636 -21.928 -18.027 
M/B, dA/A , E/A, Size, Life-cycle,  
20.234 7.457 -10.393 -14.832 -0.966 -23.593 -16.138 -27.622 -26.966 
Liquidity, Risk 
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Table 2.5 reports the average (out-of-sample) propensity to pay based on the Fama 
and French (2001) firm characteristic variables (in Row (1)) and the average propensity 
to pay based on propensities adjusted for life-cycle effect (in Row (2)), liquidity 
measure proxied by turnover ratio (in Row (3)), risk (in Row (4)), and all three key 
variables, namely life-cycle, liquidity and risk (in Row (5)). From the results in Panel A, 
it is apparent that in most markets the impact on the average propensity is largest 
when adjusted for risk. When we consider the impact of life-cycle (in Row (2)) and 
liquidity (in Row (3)), we find that the average propensities adjusted for life-cycle effect 
and liquidity are closer to the average propensities adjusted for firm characteristic 
variables alone (in Row (1)). Moreover, the absolute value of the average propensities 
adjusted for all three variables combined (in Row (5)) are very close to or even larger 
than those adjusted for risk alone (in Row (4)) for all markets except Hong Kong. This 
reflects the evidence from Table 2.4 that for most markets the coefficients associated 
with turnover ratio are insignificant and the coefficients associated to the life cycle 
variable are very small. For the case of Canada, US, France, Germany, UK, and Other 
European markets, we see that the average propensity to pay is explained more by risk 
alone, rather than all three variables (life-cycle, liquidity and risk) together. In 
Singapore 39% (a decline from -31.379 to -19.18) and in Australia 66% (a decline from 
-15.744 to -5.423) of the average propensity to pay is explained by life cycle, liquidity 
and risk combined, within which 35% (a decline from -31.379 to -20.46) and 64% (a 
decline from -15.744 to -5.683) of the average propensity to pay is explained by risk 
alone.  
 
For robustness, we examine whether the propensity to pay results are driven by the 
financial crisis. Hence we calculate the average out-of-sample propensity to pay for the 
two sub-periods 2001-2006 and 2007-2011. The results are reported in Panels B and 
C respectively. Similar to Panel A, for Canada, France, Germany, UK and Other 
European markets, we find that the average propensities adjusted for risk (in Rows (4)) 
are the smallest. For Singapore and Australia, the average propensities adjusted for 
risk are very close to those adjusted for the three key variables combined (in Rows (5)). 
Overall, the results in Table 5 confirm that risk has the largest explanatory power for 
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the propensity to pay. 
 
2.4.2 Catering Incentives 
 
In this section, we examine whether catering incentives advocated by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) can explain the unexpectedly low percentage of dividend 
payers observed in the markets. According to the catering hypothesis, market prices 
of dividend-paying firms and non-dividend-paying firms with similar characteristics are 
driven by investor sentiment. Investors place a premium or a discount on dividend 
payers or non-payers according to their preference for dividends. This premium 
(discount) will draw firms to cater to the prevailing demand by altering their dividend 
policy. Moreover, the change in dividend payment policy caused by investment 
sentiment is not captured by firm characteristics. Thus, the change in the unexpected 
proportion of dividend payers is suggested to be positively related to the premium 
(discount) at the beginning of the period. Thus, to capture the changes in the 
propensity to pay, Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) define dividend premium as a 
proxy for catering incentives. Dividend premium refers to the difference between the 
log of the equally- or value-weighted market-to-book ratio for dividend payers and that 
of non-payers 11 . Baker and Wurgler (2004b) show that dividend premium can 
substantially explain the declining propensity to pay in the US market. 
                                                     
11 Following Baker and Wurgler (2004b), we use the book-value weighted-average dividend premium for our 
analysis. The equally-weighted dividend premium is also considered for robustness (but not reported here) leading 
to similar conclusions. 
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Figure 2.3: Lagged Dividend Premium and Changes in Propensity to Pay Dividends with and without Risk and 
Liquidity Adjustments, 1989-2011. The figures illustrate the relationship between book-value-weighted dividend 
premium (one lagged, the solid line) and the changes in propensity to pay dividends (the dashed line) when 
unadjusted for liquidity or risk (in Column 1), when adjusted for liquidity (in Column 2) and when adjusted for 
risk (in Column 3) for the nine financial markets in our sample. 
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In Figure 2.3 we visually depict whether dividend premium (capturing catering 
incentives) in the preceding year can predict the changes in propensity to pay for a 
firm in the current year. Column (1) in Figure 2.3 plots the lagged dividend premium 
and the annual changes in propensity to pay without risk and liquidity controls for the 
nine markets in our sample. We see that the evolution patterns of the two series 
(though non-overlapping each other) exhibit some degree of consistency, for most 
countries. This provides preliminary evidence that dividend premium does influence 
the dividend decisions made by firms. Overall a similar picture emerges when 
adjusting the changes in propensity to pay for liquidity (see figures in Column (2)). 
When we adjust for liquidity, for most countries, the dynamics of changes in propensity 
to pay (dashed line) remains similar to those seen in Column (1), but scaled upwards 
or downwards. However, the risk-adjusted changes in propensity to pay in Column (3) 
present a different picture. Once we adjust for risk, the evolution pattern of the 
changes in propensity to pay (dashed line) alters, as compared to those in Columns (1) 
and (2). For all countries in our sample, we see the relationship between lagged 
dividend premium and the changes in propensity to pay has weakened considerably 
after adjusting for risk. Hence, a visual conclusion we can draw is that the catering 
hypothesis is weakened once the changes in propensity to pay are adjusted for the risk 
element in dividend policy.  
 
Next, we statistically test for the presence of the catering hypothesis by regressing the 
changes in propensity to pay against the lagged dividend premium. More specifically, 
the regression is defined as follows: 
 
                       ∆𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                     (5) 
 
where ∆𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑡 represents the changes in propensity to pay and 𝑃𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 is the lagged 
dividend premium (capturing catering incentives). We include the financial crisis 
dummy variable (𝐹𝐶), which is equal to one in the years from 2007 to 2011 and zero 
otherwise. The 𝐹𝐶 variable captures the potential impact of the financial crisis on the  
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dividend payout decisions of firms12.  
 
Table 2.6 presents the regression results of Equation (5) for the sample period 2001-
2011 and is organized in various panels. We consider two model specifications within 
each panel - Model (1) without the FC variable and Model (2) with the FC variable. 
Panel A reports the estimates of the regressions, where the propensity to pay is based 
on the fitted logit regression with Fama and French’s (2001) firm characteristic 
variables. The results in Panel A indicate that before adjusting for liquidity and/or risk, 
catering incentive has a significantly positive impact on the changes in the unpredicted 
proportion of dividend payers. This result is only significant for the case of common 
law countries (as opposed to civil law countries) in our sample – Canada, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Australia and UK. Our results are in line with the evidence found by Ferris 
et al. (2009) that countries’ legal systems have a significant impact on the level of 
dividends paid by the firms located in those countries. Our results corroborate with 
Ferris et al. (2009) in that countries with greater investor protection (common law 
countries) are more responsive to the changing investor preferences and therefore 
significant catering occurs in such countries. The evidence for the presence of catering 
is not found in the US13 or any of the civil law markets considered in our sample, 
namely France, Germany and Other European. 
                                                     
12 Supporting the signaling hypothesis, Acharya et al. (2013) report a significant positive influence of the global 
financial crisis on firms’ dividend payout practice. 
13 Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) similarly report limited evidence for catering theory in the US when using the out-
of-sample test of Fama and French (2001) as in this paper. They find that dividend premium remains mostly 
insignificant in several model specifications for the changes in propensity to pay. Further, they report that even the 
trace of significance found is entirely eliminated when controlling for risk. 
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Table 2.6: Testing for Catering Effect in Changes in Propensity to Pay. This table reports the estimates of the time-series regression 
during 2001-2011 (Equation 5) with the explanatory variables including lagged dividend premium (Catering) and 2007-11 financial 
crisis period dummy (FC). The dependent variable is the change in propensity to pay, which is the difference between propensity 
to pay in the current year and the preceding year. The propensity to pay (PTP) is the difference between actual and predicted 
percentage of dividend payers, the latter is calculated with mean estimates of annual logit regressions for the base period 1989-
2000. The regressions are based on the firm-year observations available in our sample that is reported in Table 1. The results for 
unadjusted PTP based on annual logit regressions with Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables is reported in Panel A 
and Panels B-E report the results based on logit regressions with additional variables life-cycle, liquidity, risk and all of the above 
(life-cycle, liquidity and risk combined) respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  Group A: markets with catering effect  Group B: markets without catering effect 
    Canada 
Hong 
Kong 
Singapore Australia UK 
 
US France Germany 
Other 
European 
Panel A: Unadjusted PTP        
(1) Catering 
0.005 0.224*** 0.232** 0.236* 0.072***  0.087 0.043 -0.219 0.009 
(0.09) (3.37) (2.64) (1.96) (3.89)  (0.65) (0.74) (-1.80) (0.22) 
            
(2) 
Catering  
0.203*** 0.263** 0.238*** 0.230* 0.068***  0.114 0.127 -0.099 0.004 
(3.79) (3.05) (3.49) (2.19) (3.80)  (0.78) (0.92) (-0.88) (0.11) 
FC 
-4.209* -2.423 -2.137 -1.332 2.092  -1.475 -3.897 2.360 0.496 
(-2.29) (-1.21) (-1.14) (-0.88) (0.86)  (-0.62) (-0.85) (1.80) (0.38) 
            
 Panel B: PTP adjusted for Life-cycle  
(1) Catering 
-0.017 0.19** 0.240** 0.031 0.088***      
(-0.23) (2.27) (2.96) (0.21) (4.52)      
            
(2) 
Catering  
0.032 0.220* 0.025*** 0.021 0.083***      
(0.40) (2.03) (3.97) (0.18) (4.72)      
FC 
-1.030 -1.861 -1.815 -2.574 2.269      
(-0.78) (-0.81) (-1.32) (-1.53) (0.98)      
            
 Panel C: PTP adjusted for Liquidity 
(1) Catering 
0.003 0.355** 0.227* 0.342* 0.089***      
(0.07) (3.04) (2.19) (2.03) (4.14)      
            
(2) 
Catering  
0.188*** 0.391** 0.235** 0.337* 0.086***      
(3.68) (2.83) (3.17) (2.19) (4.24)      
FC 
-3.925** -2.281 -2.649 -1.354 1.623      
(-2.39) (-0.74) (-1.40) (-0.56) (0.82)      
            
 Panel D: PTP adjusted for Risk 
(1) Catering -0.410 0.291 0.194 0.030 0.049      
  (-1.01) (0.89) (1.09) (0.46) (1.28)      
            
(2) 
Catering  -0.748 0.026 0.194 0.028 0.039      
 (-1.26) (0.86) (1.06) (0.42) (1.26)      
FC 7.155 1.872 -0.068 -0.567 4.981      
  (0.65) (0.37) (-0.01) (-0.28) (1.04)      
            
 Panel E: PTP adjusted for Life-cycle,Liquidity and Risk 
(1) Catering -0.317 0.354 0.176 0.015 0.050      
  (-1.15) (1.46) (1.76) (0.33) (1.52)      
            
(2) 
Catering  -0.564 0.345 0.179 0.014 0.045      
 (-1.30) (1.52) (1.58) (0.31) (1.30)      
FC 5.230 0.578 -0.777 -0.222 1.788      
  (0.69) (0.14) (-0.15) (-0.16) (0.67)      
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To explore the dividend catering hypothesis among common law countries further, we 
examine the relationship between changes in propensity to pay and lagged dividend 
premium, after adjusting the propensity to pay for effects of life-cycle, liquidity and 
risk. Panels B-E present the regression results where the propensity to pay is adjusted 
for life-cycle theory, liquidity, risk, and all the above (life-cycle, liquidity and risk 
combined) respectively. From the results in Panel B we find that after accounting for 
the presence of the life-cycle influence on the propensity to pay, we see the catering 
variable is still significant for three of the five markets (Hong Kong, Singapore and UK). 
This is in line with evidence found by Ferris et al. (2009) that catering incentives persist 
even after accounting for the effect of a firm’s life-cycle. For the case of Canada and 
Australia, we find that life-cycle theory explains the catering phenomenon observed in 
those markets. Further, after accounting for liquidity effects in Panel C, the coefficient 
on catering incentives still remains significant in explaining the adjusted propensity to 
pay. Hence liquidity cannot explain why firms “cater”.  
 
However, once the propensity to pay has been adjusted for risk, the results in Panel D 
show that catering incentives no longer explain the changes in propensity to pay, for 
the case of all common law countries considered in our sample. Hence we do not find 
evidence of a catering effect once we control for risk. Our results indicate that the role 
of catering reflects the risk-reward relationship in the changing propensity to pay 
dividends. Our evidence corroborates Hoberg and Prabhala’s (2009) findings in the US 
market and reveals that a risk-based explanation of the catering phenomenon is 
prevalent across all countries. In Panel E, we test the significance of catering incentives 
after controlling for the combined effects of life-cycle theory, liquidity and risk, thereby 
confirming the conclusion drawn from the previous panel. Overall, the results show 
that risk is significant in explaining the changes in propensity of dividend payments. 
Moreover, once we adjust the propensity to pay for risk, we see that dividend premium 
loses its explanatory power and hence we find no support for the presence of catering 
incentives among firms across countries. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the empirical determinants of dividend payout policy among 
firms operating in eighteen different countries, amalgamated into nine major financial 
markets – Canada, US, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, France, Germany, UK and 
Other European. Using an extended sample period from 1989 to 2011, we test to what 
extent key variables such as life-cycle, liquidity and risk can explain a firm’s probability 
of paying dividends. We find that risk plays a key role in explaining a firm’s dividend 
policy across all markets. For the case of firms in the US, France, UK and Other 
European markets, liquidity is additionally an important determinant of dividend policy, 
along with risk. Across the nine markets considered in our sample, the average 
marginal effects show that risk explains 14% to 33% and liquidity explains 4% to 11% 
of the firms’ probability of paying dividends. Further, we also find significance for the 
life-cycle variable (earned-to-contributed equity mix) advanced by DeAngelo et al. 
(2006), but the explanatory power for the life-cycle effect is small as compared to risk. 
The firm-specific and market-driven risk variables remain strongly significant in 
explaining dividend payout policy, even after accounting for the effects of the firms’ 
life-cycle and liquidity. 
 
Further, we study the changes in the propensity to pay and test whether catering 
theory can explain the disappearing dividends puzzle observed in financial markets. 
We find that catering incentives have a significantly positive impact on the changes in 
the unpredicted proportion of dividend payers for firms operating in common law 
countries (Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and UK in our sample). The result 
is insignificant for the case of firms operating in the US and in civil law markets (France, 
Germany and Other European in our sample). Our results corroborate with Ferris et al. 
(2009) in that countries with greater investor protection (common law countries) are 
more responsive to changing investor preferences and therefore significant catering 
occurs in such countries. When considering effects of liquidity, we find that liquidity 
fails to replace catering incentives in explaining the changes in propensity to pay across 
markets. For Canada and Australia, we find that life-cycle theory provides an 
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explanation for the catering phenomenon observed in those markets. However, when 
the propensity to pay is adjusted for risk, we obtain a consistent picture across all 
markets. Once we adjust for risk, we see that dividend premium (capturing the 
catering incentives) can no longer explain changes in propensity to pay, even among 
the common law countries. Our results indicate that the role of catering reflects the 
risk-reward relationship in the changing propensity to pay dividends. Our evidence 
corroborates Hoberg and Prabhala’s (2009) findings in the US market and reveals that 
the risk-based explanation of the catering phenomenon persists across several 
financial markets.  
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Chapter 3 Investor Incentives: Corporate 
Governance and Dividend Policy 
 
We study the impact of investors, managers and board on both of the cash and stock 
dividend policy in China. First, our results suggest that lifecycle, risk and liquidity are 
important determinates of firms’ cash/stock dividend policy. Second, we find that 
managerial stake could not significantly impact firms’ cash/stock dividend payout 
policies. Third, the results show that firms with larger board size and less annual board 
meetings are more likely to pay cash dividends, and less likely to pay stock dividends. 
Finally, we find little support for the catering theory in China with regards to both cash 
and stock dividend payouts. Absent liquidity or risk controls, catering incentive matters, 
but it is insignificant once we control for liquidity or risk. Our result indicate that board, 
rather than managers or investors influences firms’ cash/stock dividend payout 
policies in China. 
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Chapter 3 Investor Incentives: Corporate 
Governance and Dividend policy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Ever since Fama and French (2001) establish that the percentage of dividend payers 
dropped dramatically over the period 1978-1999, the “disappearing dividends” puzzle 
has been studied widely. Investigating firm-level data of UK companies, Benito and 
Young (2003) find that the portion of firms which do not pay dividends increased from 
14.3% to 25.2% during the period 1974-1995. Examining dividend payments between 
1989-2002 in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, Denis and Osobov (2008) note that, although the magnitude of the decline in 
the propensity to pay dividends differs in the six countries, the fraction of dividend 
payers in all countries falls during this period. Similarly, Kuo et al. (2013) find evidence 
for the disappearing dividend phenomenon in both common law and civil law 
countries.   
 
Attempts to explain the disappearing dividend puzzle draw on a number of theories. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004b) advance a catering theory to explain the phenomenon. 
According to catering theory, managers cater to prevailing investors’ demand for 
dividends by paying dividends when investors are putting a premium on dividend 
payers, and not paying when the dividend premium is negative. Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) find that dividend premium could explain the actual magnitude of the post-
1977 disappearance in the percentage of dividend payers documented by Fama and 
French (2001) in the U.S. The catering theory is also empirically supported by Ferris et 
al. (2006) with U.K. evidence, Denis and Osobov (2008) with worldwide evidence and 
Kuo et al. (2013) with evidence in common law countries. However, some studies find 
no evidence for the presence of catering theory such as Julio and Ikenberry (2004). 
Julio and Ikenberry (2004) claim that catering incentive is poor in explaining the 
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declining percentage of dividends payers after controlling age and size for U.S firms.  
Similar evidence is reported by Savovy and Weber (2006) with international data. 
 
In addition, liquidity and risk factors have also been proposed as possible explanations 
of the puzzle. Banerjee et al. (2007) study dividend payments among U.S. firms. They 
use several liquidity proxies and find that liquidity matters in explaining dividend 
payments after controlling for firm characteristics. Kuo et al. (2013) also find that 
liquidity is an important determinant of dividend payout policy. However, their 
research finds evidence that catering incentives still matter, even after controlling for 
liquidity. With respect to risk, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find that both systematic 
and idiosyncratic risks significantly impact on the dividends paying status of U.S. firms. 
Further, they find that after controlling for risk, the explanatory power of the catering 
incentive disappears. Thus, they suggest that the dividend premium matters in Baker 
and Wurgler (2004a) not because it reflects investors’ preference but rather because 
it acts as a proxy for risk.  This argument is supported by Kuo et al. (2013) with 
worldwide evidence. They find that the relationship between dividend premium and 
changes in propensity to pay vanishes, once they control for risk. In contrast, Bulan et 
al. (2007) find evidence that the catering incentive still helps to explain the 
idiosyncratic risk adjusted propensity to pay dividend of the U.S. firms. 
 
While the inconsistencies in prior empirical research are likely to be at least partially 
related to the use of different models and estimation methods, they also point towards 
the possibility that country specific idiosyncrasies impact on the factors which drive 
dividend pay-put policies. Unlike the other markets that have been previously used to 
explore the disappearing dividend puzzle, China is a fast-growing economy with some 
specific characteristics, such as complicated corporate ownership structures. Such 
difference may lead to different results from those for the other markets. Investment 
in listed companies is a comparatively new phenomenon in China. However, since the 
inception of the Shanghai (SHSE) and the Shenzhen (SZSE) Stock Exchange, the Chinese 
stock market has experienced a rapid expansion. Between 1991 and August 2014, the 
number of companies listed on the SHSE increased from 6 to 969, and the number of 
companies listed on the SZSE from 9 to 1589. During the same period the total market 
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capitalization of the SHSE grew from RMB 2.94 billion to RMB 16.33 trillion, while that 
of the SZSE increased from RMB 7.98 billion to RMB 10.54 trillion. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of regulation the Chinese capital market lags far behind that of 
countries such as the USA or UK. In particular with regard to information disclosure 
and corporate governance standards are considerably lower (Anderson et al., 2011). 
Further, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies is often more 
complicated than that of companies domiciled in developed financial markets. In line 
with the objective to develop a socialist market economy, many listed firms had both 
tradable (A-, B- and H-shares) and non-tradable shares (state-owned and legal-person 
shares). 14  Between 1994 and 2004, only about 30 per cent of shares of listed 
companies were tradable (Lin et al., 2010). Moreover, until 2001/02 only domestic 
investors were permitted to trade in A-shares, whereas only foreign (or Hong Kong) 
investors were permitted to trade in B- or H-shares (Chen et al., 2013). In this context 
Ahlgren et al. (2009) note that, although segmentation between domestic and foreign 
investors itself is not unusual, they found that in China domestic investors’ A shares 
were sold at a premium over foreign B shares, whereas in other countries the reverse 
tends to be true, and that A- and B-share markets appeared to have independent 
pricing dynamics. Although the price discount for H- and B-shares has fallen in recent 
years as both domestic and foreign investors were given increasing access to the 
different markets, some degree of price differentiation persists (Ahlgren et al., 2009; 
Arquette et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2011). 
 
Only slowly, due to an increase in the number of private firms listing on stock 
exchanges and the 2005 stock-split reform, which enabled state-owned shares to be 
traded, did the proportion of state controlled listed companies in China fall from 73% 
in 2000 to 21% in 2010 (Conyon and He, 2012). 
 
                                                     
14 Legally both tradable and non-tradable shares have the same cash-flow and voting rights. 
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These specific characteristics of Chinese listed companies and the Chinese stock 
markets might lead to different financial behaviours and dividend policies than those 
observed in other countries, which make the setting worthy of exploration. 
 
Moreover, given the degree of state ownership in listed firms in China, it is worthwhile 
to consider the potential impact of the existence of controlling government 
blockownership on firms’ propensity to pay dividends. If government blockholders 
effectively contribute to the supervision and control of managers, the presence of 
controlling government blockholders is likely to improve corporate governance (Chen 
et al., 2009) and increase the pressure on managers to pay dividends. However, 
alternatively, there is a risk that, due to a lack of personal economic incentives, 
government representatives contribute little to corporate governance (Chen et al., 
2009), or they might indeed collude with managers to exploit other shareholders in 
order to pursue government objectives, such as economic growth and employment 
(Firth et al., 2010). In this case firms might be less likely to pay dividends. 
 
Since the early 1980s, a great number of literature have found that managerial 
ownership and board characteristics play important role in the decision making 
process concerning corporate dividend policy (Baker et al. 2003). Recent 
developments in financial literature suggest that the propensity to pay dividends seem 
to vary over time and the time varying preferences of investors are the main driver 
behind this. While previous research considered the impact either of board 
characteristics (Anderson et al., 2011) or managerial ownership (Nam et al., 2010) or 
investors’ preference (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) on firms’ dividend payout policy, this 
research considers all three aspects jointly.  This paper considers the impact of 
shareholders, managers and board on the dividend payout decisions. We find that for 
both stock dividend and cash dividend, managerial stake contributes little toward 
explaining firms’ dividend decision. Our results also show that firms with larger board 
size and less annual board meetings are more likely to pay cash dividend to mitigate 
the conflict between firms and investors. And such firms are less likely to pay stock 
dividend. Further, this paper finds that after controlling for risk/liquidity, catering 
incentives are insignificantly related with propensity to pay cash/stock dividend policy. 
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Therefore, board rather than investors or managers impact cash/stock dividend payout 
policies in China. 
 
This study further makes the second contribution, which is to study the time series 
cash dividend payout pattern in China, to explore changes in the cash dividend 
payment pattern. We observe significant decline in the percentage of dividend payers 
over the period 2002-2006 and recovery after that. Further, we find that catering 
incentive matters for explaining the unexpected percentage of dividend payouts, if we 
do not control for risk or liquidity. However, once we control the propensity with risk 
or liquidity, the significant explanatory power of dividend premium disappear. This 
indicates that the catering proxy measures the risk/liquidity difference between 
dividend payers and non-dividend payers. That is, the significance of the dividend 
premium is because it acts as a proxy for risk, not because it captures investors’ 
demand for dividends. 
 
Finally, the third contribution of this study is that we examine stock dividend payment 
pattern and the determinants of stock dividend payments. This is the first study, to the 
best of our knowledge, to investigate stock dividend payment pattern. Also, this is the 
first paper that adopts stock dividend premiums to test the catering theory for stock 
dividends. The stock dividend payments has long been one of the least understood 
phenomena in equity markets (Al-Yahyaee, 2014). Although stock dividend does not 
change firms’ value, many firms still engage in these transactions and even more there 
is a positive market reaction when these transactions are announced. (McNichols and 
Dravid, 1990) . Especially in Chinese stock market, research finds that public investors 
appear to favour stock dividends over cash dividends (Anderson et al., 2011; Cheng et 
al., 2009; Wei and Xiao, 2009). We find that the percentage of stock-dividend payers 
in China decreased dramatically from 13.82% in 1999 to 2.36% in 2013. Also, our 
results show that state-owned firms are less likely to pay stock dividends. This is 
consistent with the dividend preference theory, which suggest that the state 
shareholders do not favour stock dividend as they could not benefit from capital gains 
arising from share price changes in the secondary market.  Meanwhile, we find that 
risk is negatively related with the probability of being a stock dividend payer, while 
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liquidity measured by stock turnover positively correlated with stock dividend 
payments in China over our sample period. Further, we test the applicability of catering 
theory to stock dividend payouts in China. We find little support for the hypothesis 
that changes in stock dividend payment pattern reflects firms’ catering to investors’ 
preference for stock dividend payments in China. Absent liquidity or risk controls, 
proxy for the investors’ preference matters in explaining the disappearing stock 
dividends, but the proxy is insignificant once we control for liquidity or risk. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. 
Data selection and methodology are described in Section 3 while Section 4 reports the 
empirical results. Section 5 provides results for stock dividend payments. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
 
3.2 Literature review  
 
3.2.1 Dividend Payout Patterns  
 
Using a large sample of Compustat and CRSP data from 1926 to 1999, Fama and French 
(2001) analyse the time trends in dividend policy and recognize that the proportion of 
firms paying dividends declines from 66.5% in 1978 to only 20.8% in 1999. They initially 
assumed that the increase in small listed companies with low profitability and great 
investment opportunities during this period might explain the declined percentage of 
dividends payers. However, even after controlling for relevant firms’ characteristics 
such as size, profitability and investment opportunities, they still found a reduction in 
the percentage of dividends payers between 1978 and 1999. This phenomenon of the 
unexplained decline in dividends payers has been named the “disappearing dividends 
puzzle” by Fama and French (2001).  
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Unlike in the United States, the UK provides tax credits to compensate for firms’ tax 
payments. Thus, shareholders in UK are supposed to have a stronger preference for 
dividends payers. However, the disappearing propensity to pay dividends was also 
observed in the UK by Benito and Young (2003), who investigated firm-level data of UK 
companies and documented that the portion of dividends omission firms increased 
from 14.3% to 25.2% during the period 1974-1995. A similar phenomenon in the UK 
was also identified by Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005), and Ferris et al. (2006).  
 
Denis and Osobov (2008) examined the dividends payment over 1989-2002 in Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States and reported that, 
although the magnitude of the decline in the propensity to pay differs in the six 
countries, the proportion of dividends payers falls in all of the countries during this 
period. 
 
3.2.2 Dividend Payout Policy in China 
 
As previously discussed, China has a unique economic and financial environment, 
which might affect how investors and corporate governance impact on dividend 
payment patterns.  
 
Firstly, unlike the U.S. equity market, which is a dealer market and is dominated by 
institutional investors, the Chinese equity markets follow a purely order-driven trading 
mechanism that is mainly dominated by individual investors (Nguyen and Wang, 2013). 
According to the 2013 China Securities Depository and Clearing Statistical Yearbook, 
the total number of stock accounts in China rose from 58 million in 2000 to 175 million 
in 2013. Nguyen and Wang (2013) report that more than 99% of these accounts are 
opened by retail investors. In 2002 individual investors were responsible for 
approximately 99% of the total number of trades and 95% of the total trade value in 
542 A-shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Ng and Wu, 2006). Given the 
dominance of retail investors in China, it might be reasonable to assume that firms’ 
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managers choose dividend policy that caters to these individual investors. However, 
most Chinese investors are small, unsophisticated, or noise-trading investors, whose 
interests are poorly protected (Nguyen and Wang, 2013). This raises the question to 
which degree managers are actually under pressure from the capital market to cater 
to investors’ interests, and to reduce agency costs, e.g. by engaging in dividend 
payments to reduce their managerial discretion over the use of free cash flows.  
 
Secondly, government ownership is still comparatively wide spread in listed companies. 
While the 2005 stock-split reform has enabled government agencies to sell shares 
more easily, in general state owned shares tend to have limited tradability. State 
blockholders are therefore expected to have long investment horizons and to be less 
interested in short-term dividend signals to boost the current prices. Moreover, the 
rewards for managers in the state-owned firms are often determined by the managers’ 
political connections and their relationship with government officials. Thus managers 
may act to meet government objectives rather than maximize shareholders’ value. In 
both instances it is likely that managers’ dividend decisions are driven mainly by the 
desire to meet the interests of the government blockholders rather than that of 
portfolio investors. 
 
However, critics of state ownership point out that, as the state needs representatives 
to act on its behalf, state ownership might indeed create a control vacuum, as the 
bureaucrats who are charged with protecting the government’s and the public’s 
interests lack the incentives or qualifications to do so (Dong and Li, 2011). In this case 
managers might pursue a dividend policy which serves their own interests rather than 
that of portfolio retailers or the government. 
 
Thirdly, stock dividend payment is a significant feature of Chinese firms’ dividend 
policy (Chen and Yuan, 2004). Wei and Xiao (2009) suggest that on average 34.46 per 
cent of listed Chinese firms pay stock dividends over the period 1993-2006. They argue 
that the listed companies in China would like to pay stock dividends for two reasons. 
One the one hand, since stock splits are prohibited by the corporate law in China, stock 
splits could not be used as a substitute for stock dividend and therefore listed Chinese 
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firms would like to pay stock dividends; On the other hand, listed companies in China 
could raise more capital by paying stock dividends before a rights issue.15 Additionally, 
prior studies document significant increase in stock prices on both the stock dividend 
ex-date (Yuan, 1999) and the stock dividends announcement date (Wei, 1998). Firms 
take advantage of this positive announcement reaction when they are cash poor or 
have lower profitability (Anderson et al., 2011). Research also finds that public 
investors in China favour stock dividends over cash dividends (Chen and Yuan, 2004; 
Cheng et al., 2009). Cheng et al. (2009)  find that listed Chinese firms with a higher 
fraction of A-share are more likely to pay stock dividends. Thus they conclude that 
public investors in China prefer stock dividend, which serves as signal of higher 
profitability. Chen and Yuan (2004) argue that the rapid expansion of Chinese stock 
market in terms of market capitalization and number of listed companies implies 
strong public demand for stock shares. This is mainly because that there have been 
limited investment opportunities in China for individuals. Until 1998, the real estate 
market and mutual funds did not exist in China. Also, before the foundation of the 
Shanghai Gold Exchange in 2002, the transactions on precious metals such as gold and 
silver are controlled by the governments. Before the inception of the Shanghai (SHSE) 
and the Shenzhen (SZSE) Stock Exchange in 1990, limited government bonds and bank 
deposits are individuals’ only investment opportunities in China (Wei and Xiao, 2009). 
In addition, in China, the return on equity is generally high. Zhang (1998) reports that 
the average premium on initial public offerings is about 90 per cent. Furthermore, as 
the capital gains from stock investments are tax free, both individuals and institutional 
investors would like to invest in the stock market.   
                                                     
15 In China, the board directors normally propose a rights issue at the shareholders’ annual 
general meeting (AGM) to be held around two months after the end of the fiscal year. If the 
proposal is approved, the firm need to get the final approval from CRSC. The process takes 
about one month. Then if approved, the company could prepare a rights issue prospectus, in 
which the rights issue price will be fixed. The price for the rights issue is based on the average 
stock prices over the 20-day period before the publication of the prospectus. Meanwhile, listed 
firm proposes a dividend payout plan in its annual report, then the proposal need to be approved 
at the AGM. This indicates that the rights issue price is determined far after the disclosure of 
the dividend payout proposal. Since the stock price will significantly increase after the stock 
dividends payment proposal, the rights issue price would be higher than if the firm decide to 
pay cash dividend. 
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We therefore set our study in a Chinese context to study both the cash dividend and 
stock dividend payment patterns in China.16  
 
3.2.3 Possible Determinants of Cash Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Since the advance of the disappearing dividend puzzle by Fama and French (2001), a 
number of studies take on the challenge to explain the disappearing dividends puzzle. 
For instance, Grullon and Michaely (2002) attribute the disappearing dividends to the 
prevailing shares repurchase during that period. Alternatively, Amihud and Li (2006) 
employ dividends signalling theory to explain the decreasing percentage of dividends 
payers. In their study, the increased proportion of well-informed institutional investors 
leads to a decrease in the information contents of dividends announcement, which 
accounted for the decreasing incidence of dividends payment.  This study focuses on 
the following three possible explanations: (1) Catering theory, which indicates that 
managers choose dividend policy under investors’ pressure; (2) Managerial ownership, 
which implies that managers choose dividend policy for their own interest; (3) Board 
characteristics, which indicates that the dividend policy is decided by the board.  
 
3.2.3.1 Catering Theory and Cash Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2004b) put forward the catering theory that sheds light on the 
disappearing dividends puzzle. According to this theory, managers execute the 
dividend policy that caters to irrational investors’ demand to boost their stock price 
above the fundamentals. They would choose to pay dividends when investors prefer 
dividends payers, likewise, they would omit dividends when investors put a discount 
on dividends payers. They construct the dividend premium to measure the prevailing 
                                                     
16 In China, the corporation law prohibits listed firms from buy-back their shares with some 
exceptions from 1993.  As a result, seldom firms in China engage in the share repurchase. 
Therefore, the share repurchase in China is not studied in this paper. 
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investor demand for dividend payers. The dividend premium is defined as the 
difference between the book-value-weighted market-to-book ratios of dividend payers 
and nonpayers. When the dividend premium is positive, there exists a general stock 
market incentive to pay dividends, and an incentive not to pay when it is negative. Also, 
they note that this measure of investor demand for dividend payers would reflect both 
rational clientele demands as well as any investor sentiment for payers. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) examine several alternative reasons such as asymmetric, dividends 
clienteles, and catering incentives and claimed that dividends premium, the proxy for 
catering incentives, holds the best explanatory power for the time-series fluctuations 
in the propensity to pay dividends.  
 
A number of studies empirically test the catering theory in different markets and 
report mixed evidence toward this behavioural finance theory. The following 
summarizes key research into the applicability of catering theory.  
 
Catering theory finds support in some studies such as Baker and Wurgler (2004a) and 
Ferris et al. (2006). Based on the 1776 U.S. firm-level observations during 1963-1977 
and 3793 observations during 1978-2000, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) recognize four 
trends in the propensity to pay over the period 1963-2000 with Fama and French 
(2001)’s method and find that the four trends in propensity to pay coincide with the 
changes in catering incentive. The positive dividends premium is observed to line up 
with increasing propensity to pay and the negative premium corresponds to a 
declining propensity to pay. Further, they suggest that the estimated coefficient of 
catering incentives in the regression of fluctuations in propensity to pay is significantly 
positive, indicating that catering incentive plays an important role in explaining the 
variance in the unexplained portion of dividends payers. In line with Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a)’s evidence, Kale et al. (2012) analyse several dividends theories such as 
signalling, agency cost and catering theory with the Compustat data of 5875 U.S. firms 
over the period 1979-1998 and concluded that dividends premium, the proxy for 
catering incentive, is positively related to dividends initiations. As to the evidence in 
other countries, Ferris et al. (2006) study the dividend policy in UK and identify a 
remarkable decline in the portion of dividends payers from 75.9% in 1988 to 54.5% in 
68 
 
2002 and proved that after firms’ characteristics controls, catering incentive still hold 
a significant explanatory power over the changes in propensity to pay. Studies by Ali 
and Urcan (2012), Hsieh and Wang (2006) and Twu and Shen (2006) on dividends 
payment also find evidence for catering. 
 
However, some scholars cast doubt on catering theory such as Savovy and Weber 
(2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008). Julio and Ikenberry (2004) identify a considerable 
decline in the incidence of dividends payers with US firm-level observations during the 
period 1984-1999 and claim that catering incentive is poor in explaining the declining 
percentage of dividends payers after controlling for age and size.  Similar evidence is 
reported with international data. Savovy and Weber (2006) select German firm data 
over the period 1982-2003 and find no evidence that support catering theory even 
after controls for current growth rate to avoid multicollinearity. Ferris et al. (2006)’s 
conclusion is criticized by Denis and Osobov (2008) that the dividends premium 
documented in Ferris et al. (2006) varies inconsistently with the fluctuations in 
propensity to pay during the period 1995-2000 only with the exception of 2001 and 
2002 where its decline accords with the reduction in propensity to pay. Thus, Denis 
and Osobov (2008) argue that the significant explanatory power of catering incentives 
reported in Ferris et al. (2006) is driven by the coincidence that occurred only in the 
last two years of their full sample period. 
 
Meanwhile, there are others who argue that the effectiveness of catering theory 
depends on some external factors such as the government regime. With a large 
dataset of firm-level observations from 23 countries over the period 1995-2003, Ferris 
et al. (2009) suggest that firms cater to investors’ sentiment in common law countries 
but not in civil law countries. The authors point out the difference in results garnered 
from the different levels of investors’ protection.  Compared with those in civil law 
countries, shareholders in common law countries hold more protection and have more 
right to force managers to cater to their demand. Whereas, this finding is inconsistent 
with that of Denis and Osobov (2008), who document that the estimated coefficients 
of catering incentive are insignificant in common law countries and significantly 
negative in civil law countries. By contrast, the estimates reported in Denis and Osobov 
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(2008) are in line with the agency-cost explanation of dividends payment. Alternatively, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006) document the application of catering theory in Dutch-
listed companies due to their special structure and mechanisms. 
 
Thus, it could be inferred that the current literature on catering theory have not come 
to an agreement, and the robustness of catering theory is still in doubt. 
 
3.2.3.2 Managerial Stake and Cash Dividend Payout Policy  
 
Since the early 1980s, there are extensive theoretical and empirical studies 
investigating how the managerial stake influences the corporate dividend payment 
policy. (Weisbenner, 2000; Bettis et al., 2001; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002; Hu 
and Kumar, 2004; and Brown et al., 2007) The signalling model for dividends payment 
suggests that managers choose dividend policy to convey private information to 
investors (John and Williams 1985).  
 
The traditional agency cost theory of dividend payouts, introduced by Rozeff (1992), 
states that companies with more managerial participation pay fewer dividend. He 
argues that higher concentration of managerial stake could curtail and impede the 
agency cost by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Meanwhile, 
dividend payouts also serve as a partial remedy to the manager-shareholder conflicts. 
One the one hand, paying excessive funds to shareholders through cash dividends or 
share repurchase could reduce the amount of free cash flows that managers could 
otherwise spend on low profit projects. (Jensen, 1986; Neves, 2014). On the other 
hand, distributing funds to shreholders via dividends payouts forces managers to raise 
external funds for new projects and, consequently, to undergo the scrutiny and 
disciplining effects of fund providers more frequently (Easterbrook, 1984). Thus, 
managerial ownership and dividend policy are viewed as substitutive mechanisms that 
reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. That 
is, the increase in dividend payouts would reduce the need for managerial ownership 
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to control agency conflicts and thus it is expected that the managerial stake is inversely 
related with dividend policy. Furthermore, in fact, managers with high level of 
managerial stake would try to accumulate more funds by lowering cash dividend 
payments to increase private consumption (Ehsan et al, 2013). Grossman and Hart 
(1988) document that large insiders may have a preference for retained earnings over 
dividends for rent extraction. Hence, firms with higher managerial ownership is 
supposed to pay few dividends. This negative association between managerial 
ownership and dividend payouts is empirically supported by Agrawal and Jayoraman 
(1994). They find that management in the firms with high level of managerial stake 
prefers not to declare more dividends. Similar results are found in Chen and Steiner 
(1999), Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Holder et al. (1998), and Truong and Heaney 
(2007).  
 
Different from conclusions drawn from the agency theory for dividend payouts, 
another strand of literature states that managerial ownership is positively associated 
with dividend payouts, as managerial ownership could reduce the agency costs of free 
cash flow. Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that managerial ownership is associated with 
higher dividend payouts by firms with high agency costs (low managerial ownership, 
and low investment opportunities and high free cash flow). They claim that managerial 
ownership helps align the interests of management and shareholders, this could help 
mitigate free cash flow problem and result in a higher dividend payouts. In a similar 
vein, White (1996) finds that firms with low level of managerial ownership are more 
likely to use the dividend-related compensation, and that this policy tends to cause 
higher dividend payments. This indicates the positive relation between managerial 
ownership and cash dividend payments. 
 
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis states that the impact of managerial stake 
on dividend policy depends on the level of managerial stake. (Weston, 1979; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; and Demsetz, 1983) When the level of managerial ownership is 
relatively low, managerial ownership could be used for the alignment of interests 
between shareholders and managers. Thus, in this case, managerial ownership and 
dividend payments are substitute mechanisms to relieve agency conflicts between 
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managers and shareholders, and are therefore expected to be negatively correlated. 
(Neves, 2014)  When the level of managerial ownership is relatively high, the 
augmentation of managerial ownership provides the managers more power and 
opportunities to pursue their personal interests, as it contributes to the reduction of 
the strict control imposed by shareholders. Hence, in this case, the additional agency 
costs associated with the managerial entrenchment (more power to managers) would 
be incurred and then the managerial ownership will positively related with dividend 
payment policy. In this vein of research, Schooley and Barney (1994) claim a significant 
non-linear relationship between dividend payments and managerial stake in US firms. 
Also, Short et al. (2002) and Farinha (2003) observe a U-shaped relationship between 
managerial stake and dividend payments among UK firms.  
 
The research on the relation between managerial ownership and dividend payments 
among Chinese firms is limited. Liao and Fang (2004) examine how the managerial 
ownership reduces the company's internal agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. They find that managerial ownership positively impacts on dividend 
payments among firms with high agency cost, however, the relation is insignificant 
among firms with low agency cost. They also observe a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and cash dividend payments among firms with high levels of 
state ownership. In addition, using a two-step least square method to analyse the 
relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payments in China, Yang 
(2008) find evidence which suggests that the cash dividend payout ratio is positively 
correlated with managerial stake. Chen and Ma (2005) study the relationship between 
cash dividend payments and managerial stake, they argue that managerial ownership 
should have a positive impact on dividend payments. However, adopting multiple 
research methods, they find that managerial ownership and cash dividend payments 
are not significantly correlated. 
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3.2.3.3 Board Structure and Cash Dividend Payout Policy  
 
Current literature on the relation between board structure and dividend payouts offer 
two competing hypothesis. The substitution hypothesis advanced by La Porta et al. 
(2000a) states that firms with weaker board structure tend to pay more dividends. That 
is, firms with poor legal protections for minority shareholders will maintain high 
dividend payout ratio to compensate for the minority shareholders and increase their 
reputation. This hypothesis is supported by Jiraporn and Ning (2006), who find 
negative association between the strength of shareholder rights and dividend payouts. 
In a similar vein, Knyazeva (2008) observes that managers in weakly governed firms 
have fewer dividends cuts.  
 
Another strand of literature states that better board structure could provide more 
protection for shareholders’ interests and thus would more likely to pay dividends. The  
outcome hypothesis, proposed by La Porta et al. (2000a), asserts that better board 
structure tends to pay more dividends to reduce the managers’ expropriation. Their 
empirical results support the outcome hypothesis by finding that countries with better 
board structure show higher level dividend payouts. This theory is in line with the 
agency cost theory of dividend payouts.  
 
The agency cost theory of dividend payouts states that board of directors have 
substantial influence on the dividend payout policy (Farinha, 2003; Hu and Kumar, 
2004). Board of directors is the ultimate internal governance mechanism in respect of 
protecting shareholders’ interest. So the board should help alleviate agency problem 
between shareholders and managers. Meanwhile, one important area where the 
conflicts between shareholders and managers occurs is the dividend policy. 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986)  
 
Board of directors should serve as the guardian for shareholders. They are essential in 
monitoring the dividend policy as management need the approval of the board before 
making the final dividends payment decisions. The board should consider various 
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factors such as long-term development before approving the dividend policy. So the 
board of directors is supposed to curtail the conflicts between management and 
shareholders over the dividends payment policy. Thus, firm with a powerful board 
(large board size) and greater board ownership (high board ownership) is more likely 
to pay dividend. However, the board may also be self-serving or join with the 
management to pursue their private wealth in expense of shareholders’ interest, 
especially minority shareholders’ interest. 
 
Independent directors are in an essential position to monitor the management over 
dividend policy and thus alleviate conflicts between managers and shareholders. In 
the full glare of shareholders, directorial market and the public, independent directors 
need to serve for the interest of shareholders and the firm to enhance their reputation 
and managerial competence to the market. (Linck et al., 2009) Thus, independent 
directors would exercise judgment independently and free of management influence 
when deciding dividend payout policy. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) suggest that the 
board members in dividend reducing firms have reduced opportunity to serve on 
additional board seats.  
 
Independent directors can effectively restrain the managers’ opportunistic dividend 
payout policy in their own favour at the expense of shareholders. In recent years, in 
order to protect shareholders against management abuse and maximize firm value, 
the independence of the board is increasing (Linck et al., 2009). Therefore, it is 
expected that higher percentage of independent director on board improves internal 
supervision, facilitates management discipline. Hence, propensity to pay dividends is 
supposed to be positively associated with the proportion of independent directors. 
This is empirically supported by Sharma (2011), who studies the relationship between 
independent directors and propensity to pay dividends after controlling for the impact 
of managerial characteristics. The author finds that propensity to pay and board 
independence is positively related.  
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3.2.3.4 Risk and Cash Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Studies on the relationship between risk and dividend policy indicate a negative 
relationship between risk and dividend payments. One strand of literature builds on 
the maturity theory proposed by Venkatesh (1989), which suggests that firm maturity, 
characterized by less risk, is able to motivate firms to pay dividends. This theory is 
supported by Grullon et al. (2002) work. Through investigating announcements of 
dividend reductions and increases by NYSE and AMEX listed firms over the period 1982 
to 1993, Grullon et al. (2002) find that dividend changes are accompanied by the 
changes in systematic risk, and the increase in dividends leads to a decline in firm’s 
systematic risk. Similar results are reported by Koch and Sun (2004).  
 
Moreover, Fama and French (2001) suggest that the disappearing dividends puzzle 
over the period from 1978 to 1998 could be partly explained by the changes in firm 
characteristics over that period, and one of the pronounced changes is the decrease 
in the profitability of newly listed small firms during the same period. Thus it could be 
inferred that the increase in the risk level of newly listed firms partly leads to the 
decrease in the incidence of dividend payers.  
 
Based on a large sample of US data from 1963 to 2000, Pástor and Pietro (2003) 
advocate that the increase in idiosyncratic risk prevailing in the 1990s is accompanied 
by the rise in cash flow risk, which is supposed to limit a firm’s dividend payments. 
Meanwhile, Xu and Malkiel (2003) argue that the increased firm-specific risk reflects a 
firm’s growth potential in the future; indicating that firms with increased idiosyncratic 
risk may decrease their dividend payments for the sake of future growth.  
 
In a recent paper, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) study the relationship between risk and 
dividend policy for US firms between 1963 and 2004 and find that both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risks could explain the disappearing dividends puzzle. They report that 
risk could explain roughly 40% of the decreasing incidence in dividend payers observed. 
Moreover, they argue that after accounting for risk, the explanatory power of catering 
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incentive disappears for the US market. That is, the dividend premium, proxy for 
catering incentives, actually measures the risk difference between dividend-payers 
and non-dividend-payers. Nevertheless, this argument contradicts Bulan et al. (2007)’s 
evidence that catering incentive is significantly associated with fluctuations in the 
idiosyncratic adjusted propensity to pay. Kuo et al. (2013) adopt a large sample of 
world-wide data and  report that risk has a negative impact on the probability of a firm 
being a dividend-payer. They conclude that catering incentives actually capture the risk 
difference between dividend payers and non-dividend payers. 
 
3.2.3.5 Liquidity and Cash Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Liquidity factors are also advanced recently to explain the puzzle in the US market. 
Banerjee et al. (2007) find that the liquidity could in part account for the changes in 
dividend payers. In markets with low liquidity, the high transaction costs influence 
investors to receive dividends rather than acquire the same amount of homemade 
dividends by selling their investment. Meanwhile, rational investors prefer liquid 
stocks and lower the valuation of illiquid stocks. Thus firms with low liquidity would 
more likely pay dividends to increase their valuation. This is empirically evidenced by 
Banerjee et al. (2007) with a large sample of US data over the period 1963-2003. Their 
findings are consistent with Bulan et al. (2007)’s observation that dividend initiations 
occur more frequently in illiquidity markets.  
 
Thus, the liquidity variable is applied to test the prediction that stock liquidity is 
negatively related to dividend payment decisions. In this study, we adopt the turnover 
ratio (ToR), defined as the number of shares traded scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding, and is a widely-used proxy for liquidity. 
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3.2.3.6 Other Possible Determinants of Cash Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Barclay et al. (1997) point out the significant relation between dividend policy and firm 
characteristic variables including size, profitability, and investment opportunities. 
These variables are significant in explaining the disappearing dividends in the US (Fama 
and French, 2001). Meanwhile, one of the specific characteristics of Chinese firms is 
the existence of state-owned enterprises. State-owned firms are supposed to be less 
likely to pay cash dividend (Wei and Xiao, 2009). Also, as in Jensen (1986), the optimal 
dividend policy is driven by motivation to distribute the firms’ free cash flow.  
 
It is widely argued that debt and dividends serve as the control mechanisms for 
agency-cost. (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 1982) Debt and 
dividends could mitigate the information asymmetries between investors and firms, 
and also alleviate the conflict of interest between owner and managers. However, 
there are two opposing argument about the relation between debt and dividends. On 
the one hand, Jensen (1989) and Neves and Torre (2006) argue that debt and dividends 
are complementary mechanisms. In other words, both of debt and dividends should 
be used to solve the firm’s inefficiency. This indicates that firms with higher leverage 
are more likely to pay dividend. On the other hand, the substitution hypothesis 
suggests that the dividend payments of firms with higher leverage is less valuable. 
(López Iturriaga and Rodríguez Sanz, 1999; Lozano et al., 2002; Moh'd et al., 1998). 
Also, the debt could potentially restrict firms’ dividend payments, especially the cash 
dividend payouts. (Kalay, 1982) This is emprically supported by Wei and Xiao (2009)’s 
finding that debt is negatively related with cash dividend payouts in China. This implies 
that firms with lower leverage are more likely to pay cash dividend.  
 
DeAngelo et al. (2004) find that dividends in the US tend to be more concentrated 
among a small number of large payers. To explain this phenomenon, DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) advance the life-cycle theory, where firms adopt the optimal dividend policy in 
accordance with the evolution of their opportunity set. In the early years, firms pay 
fewer dividends as their investment opportunities exceed their internally generated 
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capital. Conversely, in the later years, firms pay more dividends to mitigate the 
possibility of free cash flows being wasted due to internal funds exceeding investment 
opportunities. The life-cycle theory is empirically evidenced by DeAngelo et al. (2006) 
and Denis and Osobov (2008), who find a positive link between the propensity to pay 
dividends and the firms’ earned-to-contributed equity mix.  
 
3.2.4 Possible Determinants of Stock Dividend Payout Policy 
 
The stock dividend payment has long been of the least understood phenomena in 
equity markets. The stock dividend simply increases the total number of shares 
without changing the proportionate shareholdings of investors or the firms’ values.  In 
a perfect market, stock dividend should not incur any economic consequences. 
However, although stock dividend does not change firms’ value, it is still favourable 
among investor. Especially in Chinese stock market, research finds that stock dividend 
are more favourable over cash dividends. (Anderson et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2009; 
Wei and Xiao, 2009). According to the dividend preference hypothesis advanced by 
Wei and Xiao (2009), state-owned shareholders prefer cash dividends to stock 
dividends for two reasons. First, state-owned shares could not be publicly traded and 
thus state-owned shareholders can’t earn capital gains from trading stock dividends. 
Second, state-owned shareholders are always cash-thirsty and large and thus have the 
incentives and power to expropriate cash dividend to support their not-for-profit units. 
However, the facts that many firms under the control of a cash-preferring government 
are still paying stock dividends necessitate and investigation of the Chinese stock 
dividends payment. Numerous studies provide hypotheses to explain the mysteries of 
stock dividends payment including signalling, price range hypothesis. Most of the 
hypotheses try to explain the stock dividend payments from the perspective of 
managers or firms, limit studies try to explain the stock dividend payments from 
perspective of investors. So we study the relations between investors’ preference for 
stock dividend with catering incentives for stock dividend. Also, we add to the Chinese 
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stock dividends literature by extensively examining the time series of Chinese stock 
dividends. 
 
3.2.4.1 Firms’ Characteristics and Stock Dividend Payout Policy 
 
The main hypothesis to explain the role of stock dividends is signaling hypothesis 
(Adaoglu and Lasfer, 2011; Desai and Jain, 1997; Ikenberry et al., 1996; Kunz and Rosa-
Majhensek, 2008). According to signaling hypothesis, managers use stock dividends to 
convey a signal regarding their optimistic expectations to the investors. (Brennan and 
Copeland, 1988) Similarly, Foster III and Vickrey (1978) suggest that stock dividend 
announcements signal that they have insider information and are confident about 
firms’ prospect. Specifically, McNichols and Dravid (1990) find that manager set 
distribution factor using private information, and that investors can infer the insider 
information from the observed distribution factor. Also, Elgers and Murray (1985) 
suggest that managers would not convey favorable information about future 
profitability unless there a sound basis for the optimism, and that the favorable 
expectation will eventually be reflected in earnings.17 Therefore, it could be inferred 
from signaling hypothesis that firms with more profitability are more likely to pay stock 
dividend to signal favorable information. This is consistent with Anderson et al. 
(2011)’s finding that profitable firms tend to pay more stock dividend and cash 
dividend as returns to investors.  However, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) document 
that the positive excess stock return following stock dividends announcement is 
caused by market under-reaction. Particularly, they suggest that analysts tend to 
underestimate the values of firms that pay stock dividends and that the 
underestimation will gradually revert when the firms announce the actual earnings. 
                                                     
17 For the signalling equilibrium to be valid, there should exist a penalty for low-value firms to 
imitate the signalling decisions of high-value firms. For stock dividend, the retained earnings 
hypothesis is proposed to provide the penalty for false signalling (Grinblatt et al., 1984). The 
stock dividend payment will transfer the value of newly distributed shares from retained 
earnings to firms’ capital account.  And accounting principles require that firms must maintain a 
certain level of retained earnings before paying out cash dividends. Thus, the additional shares 
could further restrict the firms’ cash dividend payment. Therefore, low-value firms that do not 
expect increased earnings will expect the restriction to be binding and thus find it costly to mimic 
the signals of high-value firms. 
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Nguyen and Wang (2013) find limited evidence that stock dividend in China convey 
positive information about future prospect.  
 
Another motivation of stock dividend issuance is political costs. (Elgers and Murray, 
1985) The large EPS would cause more attacks by labor or government, and thus 
managers may choose stock distribution to reduce these political costs. As it is 
assumed that these political costs are more likely and more severe for larger firms, 
managers of larger firms would be more likely to pay stock dividend to reduce these 
political costs.  Lakonishok and Lev (1987) observe that firms distributing stock are 
much larger than firms not involving in stock distribution.  However, Desai et al. (1998) 
argue that larger firms are less likely to distribute stocks as the larger firms prefer to 
maintain higher stock prices.  
 
Further, cash substitution hypothesis states that firms may use stock dividend instead 
of cash dividend to conserve cash. (Anderson et al., 2011) The firms need to conserve 
cash for profitable investment opportunities, or the firms may see the deterioration in 
free cash flow. If the firms expect more investment opportunities, the firm would 
choose stock dividend instead of cash dividend to conserve cash. Thus, the positive 
relations between stock distribution and investment opportunities could be implied. 
Also, firms that lack of free cash flow would choose stock dividend payouts to conserve 
cash. Thus, it could be inferred that stock distribution and free cash flow are negatively 
related.   
 
Meanwhile, retained earnings hypothesis states that accounting principles require 
that stock dividend paying firms to transfer an amount equal to the market value of 
distributed stock dividend from retained earnings to shareholder’s equity in the 
financial statements. (Grinblatt et al., 1984) This results in the high cost on the firms. 
For example, creditors require that firms maintain a certain level of retained earnings. 
Thus, it is more costly for firms with less retained earnings to pay stock dividends. This 
could imply that firms with high retained earnings thus with high retained earnings to 
book value of equity are more likely to pay stock dividends.  
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For the relation between state ownership and stock dividend, state represents Chinese 
central or local governance, they prefer cash dividend over stock dividend as they can’t 
earn capital gains from trading stock dividends, and also, they need cash to support 
their non-profit units. Cheng et al. (2009) find that firms with lower state ownership 
are more likely to pay stock dividend instead of cash dividend. It is suggested that firms 
with lower state ownership are more independent and thus more likely to conserve 
profit for future development. Thus, we could imply that state-owned firms are less 
likely to pay stock dividend.  
 
3.2.4.2 Liquidity and Stock Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Prior studies on the liquidity and stock dividend present different views on the 
implication of liquidity for companies’ dividends payment decisions. Brennan and 
Tamarowski (2000) argue that higher liquidity could cause higher stock price, as 
increase in liquidity could decreases investors’ required rate of return and further 
increases stock price. The direct evidence of the impact of liquidity on stock prices is 
given by Amihud et al. (1997). They investigate the price appreciation of 120 stocks on 
Tel Aviv Stock Exchanges, which were transferred from a daily “call auction” to the 
“variable price method” during the period 1987-1994. The “variable price method” is 
a mechanism where the iterated continuous trading sessions follows an open daily call 
auction. They find that the improved liquidity caused by this technical change in 
trading protocols is associated with a positive and permanent price appreciation. 
Meanwhile, according to the trading range hypothesis, the main purpose of stock 
dividends is to realign stock price into preferred price ranges. It is argued that stock 
trading in an optimal range could attract a wide array of interested investors and thus 
ease the possibility of the acquisition via equity financing. (Elgers and Murray, 1985) 
McNichols and Dravid (1990) higher stock distribution occurred in firms with higher 
stock price, indicating that managers select their stock distribution ratio to bring the 
price to its normal or optimal price range. In a similar vein, Nguyen and Wang (2013) 
study the stock dividends payment among Chinese firms and find that firms with 
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higher stock prices are more likely to pay stock dividends. Thus, firms with higher 
liquidity are more likely to pay stock dividends in order to bring their shares prices into 
preferred range.  
 
Also, stock dividends payment will increase the total number of shares outstanding. 
Holding everything else constant, the increase in the total number of shares 
outstanding will dilute some financial ratio, such as EPS, turnover in the long run. 
Anderson et al. (2011) find that total number of shares outstanding and stock dividend 
per share is negatively related and conclude that firms with large number of shares 
outstanding will avoid stock distribution.  This indicates that firms with lower liquidity 
are less likely to pay stock dividends to avoid the increase in the total number of shares 
outstanding.  
 
On the other hand, liquidity hypothesis postulates that the reduction in stock price 
after stock dividends would attract more small investors and thus enhance trading 
volume.  (Copeland, 1979) However, the empirical evidence on the impact of stock 
dividends on liquidity is mixed and inconclusive. Dyl and Elliott (2006), Lipson and 
Mortal (2006) and Weld et al. (2009) report increased trading activities after stock 
distribution, which support the liquidity-based hypothesis on stock dividend. Lin et al. 
(2009) find the reduction in the incidence of no trading after stock distribution. 
Meanwhile, Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Conroy et al. (1990) and Desai et al. (1998) 
find that stock distribution significantly increase the proportional bid-ask spread, 
indicating that stock dividends payment decrease liquidity. Bechmann and Raaballe 
(2007) examine the stock distribution on stocks traded in Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
and find weak evidence that stock dividends could improve liquidity. Similarly, Adaoglu 
and Lasfer (2011) study the stock dividends payment in Turkey from 1986 to 2007 and 
report weak evidence for the liquidity effect. If stock dividend payments could increase 
firms’ dividend, mangers in firms with low liquidity are likely to use stock dividends to 
enhance their liquidity. Thus, we would expect low-liquidity firms to be associated with 
higher likelihood of stock dividend payments. Thus, the relation between stock 
distribution and liquidity is inconclusive. 
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3.2.4.3 Corporate Governance and Stock Dividend Payout Policy 
 
China, a fast-growing emerging market, establish Shanghai stock exchange in Dec 1989, 
and Shenzhen stock exchange in Apr 1991. Compared with other stock markets in 
developed countries, the Chinese stock market is relatively new and immature. 
Specifically, the corporate governance and investor protection in China is relatively 
weak than that in other developed countries. (Anderson et al, 2009) In Aug 2001, China 
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) issues “Guides on Establishing the 
Independent Director System in Listed Companies”, which require the percentage of 
independent board members in the board to be larger than 1/3. This policy provides 
better protections for shareholders, and thus enhances the corporate governance in 
the company. As stock dividend is mainly caused by the lack of cash or used to 
stimulate stock returns without increase firms’ value, we would expect that stock 
dividend to be negatively related with the percentage of independent board and board 
size. However, Anderson et al. (2011) find that the independent director dummy is not 
significantly related with the stock dividend payouts in China. And they argue that the 
independent board in China as required by the policy may be more of a formality and 
thus could not impact the dividend payment policy.  
 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Description 
 
Our sample consists of annual observations from 1999 to 2013 for all listed firms that 
meet the selection criteria. All ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial, accounting and corporate 
governance information are obtained from Worldscope and CSMAR. Speciﬁcally, we 
obtain annual ﬁnancial information on dividends per share, market-to-book value, 
earnings per share, assets per share, free cash flow, net debt, total equity, ratio of 
retained earnings to book value of equity, total assets, and market capitalization. We 
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require the total assets ﬁgures to be available both in the current and in the preceding 
ﬁscal year. All the other items must be available in the current ﬁscal year. To compute 
the risk measures, we acquire daily information on closing stock price, market index 
price and risk-free rate. For the corporate governance information, we obtain the 
annual observations of ultimate controller, shareholdings of senior managers, number 
of board, shareholdings of board, duality, number of independent board, number of 
board meetings. Financial firms are excluded from the sample to avoid the possibility 
that these firms’ dividend payment decisions may be restricted by regulations. (Fama 
and French, 2001) Utility firms are not excluded from our sample as there is no 
particular restriction on dividends payment for utility firms in China.18 
 
We further exclude firms listed in the Small-and-Medium Section of the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, as the listing requirement for these firms are different from those for 
the main board. Also, we exclude firm with dual listing of H-shares, as the dividends 
decisions of these firms may be influenced by Hong Kong market practice.19 
 
Our overall sample period extends from 1999 through 2013. Our sample period starts 
from 1999 and the corporate governance variables are not available before 1999. The 
5-year data between 1999 and 2003 serves as the base period, while those 10-year 
data between 2004 and 2013 are used as out-of-sample period. Table 1 shows the 
summary statistics of all the variables used in the empirical tests. Table 1 shows that 
the average percentage of independent board in our sample is 32%. Meanwhile, the 
average board size for Chinese firms is around 9 and the average number of board 
meetings in a year is 8.50. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for these variables. 
It illustrates the high correlation between ownership of senior managers and 
ownership of board.  
 
 
                                                     
18 The results are qualitatively the same if we exclude utility firms from our sample. 
19 The firms with dual listing of B-shares are not excluded from our sample since the listing 
requirement, and regulations are similar for the A-share and B-share markets. The results are 
similar when we exclude firms with B-share from our sample. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistic. The table reports the summary statistics for market-to-book ratio (M/B), 
assets growth (dA/A), earnings-to-asset ratio (E/A), firms size (SIZE), whether  a firm is state owned 
(STATE), free cash flow (FCF), debt-to-equity ratio (D/E), retained earnings-to-book equity ratio (RE/BE), 
systematic risk (SYS), idiosyncratic risk (IDIO), turnover ratio (ToR), percentage of shares held by senior 
managers (SEN_OWN), number of board members (BD_SIZE), percentage of shares held by board 
members (BD_OWN), percentage of independent board (IND_PER), yearly number of board meetings 
(BD_MEETING) for all Chinese non-financial companies. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
M/B 18437 4.21 6.98 -19.78 78.73 
dA/A 18437 0.05 0.47 -2.77 4.17 
E/A 18437 0.05 0.09 -0.72 0.36 
SIZE 18437 0.53 0.27 0.00 1.00 
FCF 17880 3.61 15.56 -34.20 148.17 
D/E 18437 1.29 2.03 -7.61 17.79 
RE/BE 18094 0.00 1.44 -16.71 0.75 
SYS 18077 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 
IDIO 18077 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.15 
ToR 18437 1.86 1.82 0.08 14.94 
SEN_OWN 18293 0.26 0.79 0.00 4.38 
BD_SIZE 18293 9.31 2.05 3.00 19.00 
BD_OWN 18363 0.41 1.06 0.00 4.50 
IND_PER 18282 0.32 0.12 0.00 0.80 
BD_MEETING 18400 8.50 3.39 1.00 57.00 
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Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix. The table reports the correlation matrix for market-to-book ratio (M/B), assets growth (dA/A), earnings-to-asset ratio (E/A), firms size (SIZE), 
whether  a firm is state owned (STATE), free cash flow (FCF), debt-to-equity ratio (D/E), retained earnings-to-book equity ratio (RE/BE), systematic risk (SYS), idiosyncratic risk 
(IDIO), turnover ratio (ToR), percentage of shares held by senior managers (SEN_OWN), number of board members (BD_SIZE), percentage of shares held by board members 
(BD_OWN), percentage of independent board (IND_PER), yearly number of board meetings (BD_MEETING) for all Chinese non-financial companies. 
  M/B dA/A E/A SIZE FCF D/E RE/BE SYS IDIO ToR SEN_OWN BD_SIZE BD_OWN IND_PER BD_MEETING 
M/B 1.00               
dA/A -0.11 1.00              
E/A -0.12 0.24 1.00             
SIZE -0.11 0.05 0.30 1.00            
FCF -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.26 1.00           
D/E 0.49 -0.10 -0.28 -0.06 0.07 1.00          
RE/BE -0.40 0.06 0.01 0.18 0.06 -0.31 1.00         
SYS -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.03 1.00        
IDIO 0.12 0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.37 1.00       
ToR 0.00 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.12 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.39 1.00      
SEN_OWN -0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.21 -0.05 -0.11 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.11 1.00     
BD_SIZE -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 1.00    
BD_OWN -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.22 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.85 -0.13 1.00   
IND_PER -0.12 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.15 -0.15 0.17 1.00  
BD_MEETING 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.13 1.00 
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Table 3.3: Number Of Cash-Dividend-Paying Firms, Non-Cash-Dividend-Paying Firms and the Total 
Sample of Chinese Firms, 1999-2013. The sample includes all the Chinese non-financial companies over 
the period 1999-2013 that satisfy the data availability requirements. A firm is a dividend-payer if it has 
a positive dividend per share and otherwise it is a non-payer. 
Year  Payers Non-payers Total 
1999 298 317 615 
2000 391 313 704 
2001 556 268 824 
2002 679 219 898 
2003 736 261 997 
2004 535 530 1065 
2005 537 630 1167 
2006 520 658 1178 
2007 641 609 1250 
2008 701 655 1356 
2009 705 703 1408 
2010 780 723 1503 
2011 1018 707 1725 
2012 1152 688 1840 
2013 1316 591 1907 
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Figure 3.1: Number of Dividend-Paying Firms, Number of Total Firms, and Percentage of Dividend-
Paying Firms among Chinese Firms, 1999-2013. The sample includes all the Chinese non-financial 
companies over the period 1999-2013 that satisfy the data availability requirements. Firms classified as 
payers have positive dividends per share.  
 
 
 
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1 present the percentage of cash dividends payers in China from 
1999 to 2013. It shows that during the period 1999 to 2002, the percentage of cash-
dividend-payers among Chinese firms increase substantially from 48.46% in 1999 to 
75.61% in 2002, then falls sharply to the nadir of 44.14% in 2006. The figure also 
depicts that the proportion of firms paying dividends fluctuates around 51% during 
the period 2007-2010, before increasing to then 69.01% in 2013. 
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Table 3.4: Number of Stock-Dividend-Paying Firms, Non-Stock-Dividend-Paying Firms and the Total Sample Of 
Chinese Firms, 1999-2013. The sample includes all the Chinese non-financial companies over the period 
1999-2013 that satisfy the data availability requirements. A firm is a stock-dividend-payer if it has a 
positive stock dividend per share and otherwise it is a non-payer. 
Year Payers Non-Payers Total 
1999 85 530 615 
2000 86 618 704 
2001 67 757 824 
2002 44 854 898 
2003 79 918 997 
2004 48 1017 1065 
2005 55 1112 1167 
2006 77 1101 1178 
2007 114 1136 1250 
2008 67 1289 1356 
2009 93 1315 1408 
2010 97 1406 1503 
2011 61 1664 1725 
2012 43 1797 1840 
2013 45 1862 1907 
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Figure 3.2: Number of Stock-Dividend-Paying Firms, Number of Total Firms, and Percentage of Stock-
Dividend-Paying Firms among Chinese Firms, 1999-2013. The sample includes all the Chinese non-
financial companies over the period 1999-2013 that satisfy the data availability requirements. Firms 
classified as stock-dividend-payers have positive stock dividends per share. 
 
 
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2 illustrate the stock dividends payment in China over our 
sample period 1999-2013. Overall, the percentage of stock dividend payers shows 
dramatically decreasing trend from 13.82% in 1999 to 2.36% in 2013. Specifically, the 
proportion of stock dividends payers decreases from 13.82% in 1999 to 4.90% in 2002, 
then it fluctuates around 5% until 2010. After that, it declines to 2.34% in 2012 and 
2.36% in 2013.  
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Table 3.5: Cash Dividend Premium, 1999-2013. A firm is a dividend-payer if it has a positive dividend 
per share and otherwise it is a non-payer. The dividend premium is the log difference between the book-
value-weighted market-to-book ratio of payers and that of non-payers. 
Year Payers Non-Payers DP 
1999 4.07 4.70 -0.15 
2000 4.44 4.66 -0.05 
2001 4.67 5.29 -0.13 
2002 3.55 4.71 -0.28 
2003 2.74 3.58 -0.27 
2004 2.30 2.71 -0.16 
2005 1.63 1.66 -0.02 
2006 2.17 2.32 -0.07 
2007 4.21 4.05 0.04 
2008 3.09 3.15 -0.02 
2009 3.32 3.31 0.00 
2010 2.78 2.88 -0.04 
2011 3.32 3.58 -0.08 
2012 2.40 2.56 -0.06 
2013 2.05 2.28 -0.11 
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Table 3.6: Stock Dividend Premium, 1999-2013. A firm is a stock-dividend-payer if it has a positive 
dividend per share and otherwise it is a non-payer. The stock dividend premium is the log difference 
between the book-value-weighted market-to-book ratio of payers and that of non-payers. 
Year Payers Non-Payers SDP 
1999 5.56 4.62 0.19 
2000 5.98 5.13 0.15 
2001 5.10 5.39 -0.06 
2002 4.10 3.91 0.05 
2003 3.27 2.95 0.10 
2004 2.71 2.47 0.09 
2005 1.79 1.59 0.12 
2006 2.33 2.17 0.07 
2007 4.76 4.26 0.11 
2008 4.04 3.14 0.25 
2009 3.95 3.55 0.11 
2010 2.93 2.59 0.12 
2011 3.79 3.13 0.19 
2012 2.92 2.54 0.14 
2013 3.13 2.27 0.32 
 
 
Table 3.5 presents book-value weighted market-to-book ratio for cash-dividend-payers 
and non-payers as well as the corresponding cash dividend premium each year from 
1999 through 2013. Dividend premium, estimated as the difference between the 
market values of dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers, can proxy investors’ 
preference for dividend-payers and capture the presence of possible catering 
incentives (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a, b). From Table 3.5 we see that the cash dividend 
premium takes negative values before 1995, and then it fluctuates around zero until 
2009. After that, the cash dividend premium tends to be negative again. In our sample 
period, the cash dividends premium is generally negative. Table 3.6 presents the stock 
dividend premium over the period 1999-2013. Unlike the cash dividend premium, 
stock dividends premium is positive throughout most of our sample period. This 
indicates that investor prefer stock dividend payers to non-stock-dividend payers in 
Chinese stock market.  
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3.3.2 Methodology 
 
Following Fama and French (2001), we employ logit models to examine the role of 
various factors in explaining the probability of paying cash dividends and stock 
dividends. The logit regressions takes the following form:  
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𝐸𝑖𝑡
+
𝑖
𝑅𝐸
𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑗𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑆𝐸𝑁_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑛𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
0𝐵𝐷_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝐵𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑞𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑟𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  (2)  
 
where 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 is set to one when firm i pays cash dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. 
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 is set to one if the firm i pays stock dividends in year t, otherwise, it equals to 0. 
The coefficients of the models are estimated as time series averages of Fama and 
MacBeth (1973)’s annual cross-sectional regressions with Newey-West t statistics. The 
independent variables in this logit model can be categorized into four groups: a.) the 
Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables (market-to-book ratio (M/Bit), 
asset growth (dA/Ait), earnings-to-assets ratio (E/Ait), and size percentile (SIZEit)), 
leverage proxied by the debt-to-equity ratio (D/Eit) and free cash flow(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); b.) the 
state variable (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); c.) the life-cycle variable proxied by the ratio of retained 
earnings to book value of total equity (RE/BEit); d.) liquidity proxied by the stock 
turnover ratio ( 𝑇𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑡 ); d.) risk variables including systematic risk (SYSit) and 
idiosyncratic risk (IDIOit); e.) the percentage of shares held by senior managers 
( 𝑆𝐸𝑁_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 ); and f.) the board variables including number of board members 
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(𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡), percentage of shares held by board members (𝐵𝐷_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡), number of 
board meetings in a year ( 𝐵𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  ), percentage of independent board 
(𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡) and duality (𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡). Below we explain the variables used in the logit 
regression. 
 
To investigate the determinants of the dividend payout trends, we include in our 
analysis size, profitability and investment opportunity variables, as defined in Fama 
and French (2001). Size characteristics are captured by the market capitalization 
percentile (SIZEit). This variable is calculated as the fraction of firms with equal or 
smaller market value than firm i in a given year t. Earnings-to-assets ratio is considered 
as a proxy for profitability and the measure of a firm’s investment opportunity is 
constructed with market-to-book value and asset growth. The latter is measures as, 
the proportionate change in total assets for year t. Meanwhile, one of the specific 
characteristics of Chinese firms is the existence of state-owned enterprises. Thus, we 
include state as a dummy variable coded 1 if ultimate shareholder is the government 
and 0 otherwise. We include free cash flow (FCF) to test the impact of free cash flow 
on Chinese firms’ dividends payout policy. Additionally, since leverage can impact a 
firm’s dividend policy (Neves and Torre, 2006), we include the debt-to-equity ratio in 
our analysis. Also, we adopt earned-to-contributed equity mix to proxy for a firm’s life-
cycle stage. This proxy measures the proportion of the internally generated to firm’s 
contributed capital, and calculated as the ratio of retained earnings to the book value 
of total equity (RE/BE). 
 
In order to examine the role of risk factors in explaining dividend policy, our analysis 
includes systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk variables. Following Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009), the former is defined as the standard deviation of the predicted value from a 
CAPM regression while the latter is defined as the standard deviation of residuals from 
the above regression. Meanwhile, the liquidity variable is applied to test the prediction 
that stock liquidity is negatively related to dividend payment decisions. In this study, 
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we adopt the turnover ratio (ToR), defined as the number of shares traded scaled by 
the number of shares outstanding, and is a widely-used proxy for liquidity. 
 
To test the relation between dividend payment decisions and senior managerial 
ownership, we include the percentage of shares held by senior managers (SEN_OWN). 
Also, as board characteristics are important determinants of cash dividend payments, 
we incorporate the size of board (BD_SIZE), board independence (IND_PER), stock 
ownership of board members (BD_OWN), whether the CEO and the chairman 
positions are occupied by the same or two different individuals (Duality), and the 
number of board meetings in a year (BD_MEETING).  
 
Then we estimate the propensity to pay to pay cash dividends (PTPC) and stock 
dividends (PTPS) based on the logit regressions. We statistically test for the presence 
of catering hypothesis by regressing the changes in propensity to pay against the 
lagged dividend premium and relevant control variables. The regression is defined as 
follows: 
 
∆𝑃𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑃𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (3) 
∆𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (4) 
 
where  ∆𝑃𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑡 is the changes in propensity to pay cash dividends,  ∆𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑆𝑡 is the 
changes in propensity to pay stock dividends, 𝐶𝑃𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 is the lagged cash dividend 
premium (capturing catering incentives),  𝑆𝑃𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷  is the lagged stock dividend 
premium and 𝐹𝐶𝑡denotes the 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy variable. The financial 
crisis dummy is equal to one in the years from 2007 and captures the impact of the 
unexpected economic recession initiating in 2007 on a firm’s dividend policy. In Figure 
3.2, we notice an upward trend in the propensity to pay cash dividends as firms prefer 
to pay cash dividends to increase the confidence of investors during the financial crisis. 
Thus, the financial crisis dummy is expected to have a positive influence on the cash 
dividend payout decisions. 
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3.4 Empirical Results for Cash Dividend Payouts 
3.4.1 Results of the Logit Regression for Cash Dividends Payouts 
Table 3.7 presents the estimated coefficients and Newey-West t-statistics for the logit 
regression in Equation (1) that predicts the probability of a firm being a dividend-payer. 
The tables including 9 columns, with each column covering one specification with 
different explanatory variables included in the regression. Column (1) of Table 3.7 
reports the estimates from the baseline regression with firm characteristic explanatory 
variables advanced by Fama and French (2001) and state variable. In the sample period 
considered, all the firm characteristic variables are significant. That is, the probability 
for a firm paying dividends increases with the decrease in market-to-book value and 
asset growth, and the increase in earnings-to-assets ratio and size percentile. This 
confirms Fama and French (2001)’s hypothesis that larger, more profitable firms with 
less investment opportunity are more likely to pay dividends. Also, it shows that the 
state variable could not significantly affect the dividend payments in our sample period.  
 
Columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 3.7 report the results when the free cash flow, 
leverage ratio and earned-to-contributed equity mix are respectively added to the 
baseline model. The results in Column (2) and Column (3) of Table 3.7 show 
insignificant coefficient for free cash flow and leverage in our sample period. This 
means that the leverage of firms does impact cash dividend payout policy among 
Chinese firms. This means that free cash flow and leverage ratio provide no 
independent impact on the dividend practice among Chinese firms. This is different 
from Neves and Torre (2006) evidence from the US market that debt-to-equity ratio, 
proxy for leverage, predicts firms’ cash dividend payout pattern. Further, in Column (5) 
of Table 4, we see that the earned-to-contributed equity mix variable has significance 
effect at 1% in predicting dividend policy. This means that the life-cycle theory 
advanced by DeAngelo et al. (2006) explains some of the variations in dividend 
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payment decisions among Chinese companies. This suggests that more mature firms 
are more likely to pay dividends. This supports DeAngelo et al. (2006)’s and Denis and 
Osobov (2008)’s prediction that the life-cycle proxy should be positively related to the 
dividend payouts. Therefore we conclude that life-cycle can explain the dividend 
payment decisions among Chinese firms. However, we find no evidence of explanatory 
power of free cash flow and leverage in dividend payment decisions in the China. 
 
The specification in Column (5) reports the estimates for stock liquidity measure stock 
turnover, firm characteristics, and state explanatory variables. The results show that 
turnover is negative and significant after controlling for firm characteristic variables in 
the sample period considered. This means that in for the whole sample period stock 
liquidity is negatively associated with a firm’s probability of being a dividend payer. 
This confirms the evidence observed in the US market by Banerjee et al. (2007) that 
liquidity as proxied by turnover ratio can explain the likelihood of a firm paying 
dividends in AMEX/NYSE.  
 
In Column (6), we examine whether risk can explain the probability of being a dividend 
payer in the Chinese market. When incorporating risk variables into the regression we 
find that idiosyncratic risk has strong explanatory power. Those significantly negative 
coefficients on risks are in line with Kuo et al. (2013)’s finding in the world-wide 
markets that firm-specific risk has a negative impact on the probability of a firm being 
a dividend-payer. Furthermore, for our sample period considered, the risk variables do 
not reduce the significance of the standard firm characteristics variables, indicating 
that firm characteristics and risk are important variables in explaining dividend 
payments. Therefore, the findings suggest that as in the case of the other markets, 
risks inversely affect the probability of Chinese firms being dividend-payers. 
 
In Column (7), we find that in our sample period considered the senior manager 
variable is insignificant. This means that proportions of shares held by senior managers 
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is not an important determinant of being a dividend payer, this is inconsistent with 
Fenn and Liang (2001) findings. 
 
The specification in Column (8) reports the estimates for baseline explanatory 
variables and board’s characteristics variables including number of directors on the 
board, the percentage of shares held by the board members, number of board 
meetings held in a year, percentage of independent board and duality. The results 
show that board size and percentage of board ownership are positive and significant 
after controlling for firm characteristic variables in the sample period, and they do not 
alter the significance of the firm characteristic variables of Fama and French (2001). 
Meanwhile, number of board meetings is negatively related to the firms’ dividend 
payment decisions. Further, this indicates that firm with a powerful board 
(BOARD_SIZE) and greater board ownership (BOARD_OWN) is more likely to pay 
dividend. Meanwhile, duality and percentage of independent board is not significantly 
related to the dividend payments in our sample period.  
 
In Column (9) of Table 3.7, we include free cash flow, leverage, lifecycle, risk, liquidity, 
senior variable and board variables along with the baseline variables and find that life-
cycle, risk, liquidity and board variables still hold significant explanatory power in the 
sample period considered, even after including firm characteristic variables. Therefore, 
lifecycle, risk, liquidity and board variables provide additional information to the basic 
firm characteristic variables in explaining the probability of being a dividend payer, and 
hence are important determinants of dividend policy.  
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Table 3.7: Logit Estimation Explaining the Probability of Being a Cash-Dividend-Payer, 1999-2013. This 
table reports the logit regression results using Fama and MacBeth (1973) style estimation, with Newey–
West t statistics reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm pays 
dividend that year and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are market-to-book ratio (M/B), assets 
growth (dA/A), earnings-to-asset ratio (E/A), size percentile (SIZE), whether a firm is state owned (STATE), 
free cash flow (FCF), leverage ratio (D/E), retained earnings-to-book equity ratio (RE/BE), liquidity 
measure proxied by turnover ratio (ToR), systematic risk (SYS), idiosyncratic risk (IDIO), percentage of 
shares held by senior managers (SEN_OWN), number of board members (BD_SIZE), percentage of 
shares held by board members (BD_OWN), percentage of independent board (IND_PER), yearly number 
of board meetings (BD_MEETING) and whether the CEO and the chair of the board of directors are the 
same person (DUALITY). Columns (1) - (9) report the estimates of the various logit regressions with Fama 
and French (2001) firm characteristic variables, state owner proxy and other explanatory variables. *** 
indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 10%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
M/B -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.065*** -0.089*** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.065*** 
  (-4.35) (-4.29) (-4.21) (-6.89) (-3.95) (-4.22) (-4.14) (-4.40) (-6.00) 
dA/A -0.551*** -0.549*** -0.539*** -0.868*** -0.562*** -0.552*** -0.525*** -0.508*** -0.818*** 
  (-4.63) (-4.66) (-4.68) (-4.63) (-4.62) (-4.70) (-4.60) (-4.18) (-4.26) 
E/A 7.986*** 8.110*** 7.866*** 5.469*** 8.582*** 8.027*** 7.605*** 7.592*** 4.792*** 
  (6.18) (6.28) (6.22) (4.42) (6.25) (6.26) (6.15) (6.13) (3.92) 
SIZE 1.660*** 1.595*** 1.673*** 1.044*** 1.553*** 1.658*** 1.815*** 1.819*** 1.068*** 
  (10.52) (10.83) (10.56) (8.87) (9.89) (10.79) (10.51) (10.33) (10.90) 
STATE -0.022 -0.028 -0.013 0.000 -0.050 -0.044 0.130* 0.147** 0.105 
  (-0.30) (-0.38) (-0.19) (0.01) (-0.65) (-0.59) (2.11) (2.59) (1.73) 
FCF  0.001       -0.002 
   (0.18)       (-0.68) 
D/E   -0.037      -0.083*** 
    (-1.64)      (-3.27) 
RE/BE    2.631***     2.596*** 
     (4.95)     (4.87) 
SYS     15.846    -17.000* 
      (1.60)    (-2.11) 
IDIO     -51.131***    -30.843*** 
      (-6.52)    (-4.45) 
ToR      -0.079**   -0.071** 
       (-2.79)   (-2.72) 
SEN_OWN       2.801  2.525 
        (1.31)  (1.24) 
BD_SIZE        0.052*** 0.047*** 
         (4.42) (3.67) 
BD_OWN        0.292*** -0.041 
         (3.69) (-0.32) 
BD_MEETING        -0.031*** -0.013** 
         (-4.82) (-2.26) 
IND_PER        -0.378 -0.108 
         (-1.20) (-0.27) 
DUALITY        -0.072 -0.103 
         (-1.23) (-1.76) 
CONS -0.691*** -0.665** -0.666** -0.720*** 0.021 -0.584** -0.944*** -1.029** -0.069 
  (-2.98) (-2.91) (-2.84) (-3.44) (0.07) (-2.39) (-3.91) (-2.95) (-0.18) 
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3.4.2 Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends and Catering Theory 
 
To examine the unexplained proportion of declining dividend-payers in the China, we 
estimate the propensity to pay (PTPt), which is measured as the actual percentage of 
dividend-payers minus expected percentage of dividend-payers in year t. The expected 
percentage of dividend payers is computed using baseline logit regression with the 
basic firm characteristic and state proxies as the independent variables during the base 
period 1999-2003. To compare the propensity to pay after accounting for free cash 
flow, leverage, lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior and board, we also estimate the expected 
probability using the logit regressions embedded with these control variables.  
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Figure 3.3: Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends, 1999-2013. Panel A reports the unadjsusted propensity 
to pay and propensity to pay with free cash flow, leverage, lifecycle and risk adjustments.  The solid line 
is the propensity to pay without adjustment. It is derived from the logit model with explanatory 
variables of market-to-book ratio, asset growth, earnings-to-assets ratio, size percentile and state proxy. 
The grey dotted-dashed line is the free cash flow adjusted propensity to pay. The short-dashed line is 
the leverage adjusted propensity to pay. The dotted line is the lifecycle adjusted propensity to pay, the 
long-dashed line is the risk adjusted propensity to pay. Panel B reports the unadjsusted propensity to 
pay and propensity to pay with liquidity, senior, board, all control variabls adjustments. The solid line is 
the propensity to pay without adjustment. The grey dotted-dashed line is the liquidity adjusted 
propensity to pay. The short-dashed line is the senior adjusted propensity to pay. The dotted line is the 
board adjusted propensity to pay, the long-dashed line is the all control variables adjusted propensity 
to pay. 
Panel A: Unadjusted PTPC and PTPC adjusted for FCF,Leverage, Lifecycle and Risk.  
 
 
Panel B: Unadjusted PTPC and PTPC adjusted for Liquidity, Senior, Board and All.  
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Panel A of Figure 3.3 plots the propensity to pay with and without free cash flow, 
leverage, lifecycle, and risk adjustments for our sample period from 1999 to 2013. The 
solid line in the figure reveals the changes in propensity to pay when considering the 
expected proportion of dividend-payers using only the standard firm characteristics 
variables. It increases significantly from -19.30% in 1999 to 9.58% in 2002. Then a 
pronounced decline from 9.58% in 2002 to -23.45% in 2006 is observed in the sample 
period. After 2007 the unexpected portion of payers fluctuates around -15% and then 
reverses to 3.62% in 2013. During 2007-2009, we observe an upward trend in the 
propensity to pay. This shows that firms continue to pay dividends during the global 
financial crisis. This supports the signalling hypothesis, where firms are reluctant to cut 
dividend payments as they provide an indication of the financial health of the firm. 
Similar evidence of improved dividend payments during the financial crisis is reported 
by Acharya et al. (2011). 
 
When we examine the effect of free cash flow, leverage, lifecycle and risk on the 
propensity to pay, we find that free cash flow, leverage and lifecycle do not explain the 
changes in propensity to pay. However, when the propensity to pay is adjusted for risk 
(dashed line), we obtain a different picture. We find that the propensity to pay 
decreases to the nadir of -14.44% in 2005, with a subsequent increase until 2007 and 
a sharp decrease during the period 2007-2009. After that, it shows significant upward 
trend from 2010 to 2013. Comparing the spread between the propensity to pay with 
and without risk adjustments, we observe that the spread has widened after 2004 and 
increased during period 2006-2010, suggesting that risk is an important factor in 
explaining the declining proportion of dividend-payers in China. This conclusion is in 
line with Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)’s findings for the US market and Kuo et al. 
(2013)’s finding for the world-wide markets.  
 
Panel B of Figure 2 depicts the propensity to pay with and without liquidity, managerial 
stake, board variables and all the control variables adjustment during our sample 
period 1999-2013. The propensity to pay adjusted for liquidity (dashed-dotted line) 
102 
 
 
 
shows different fluctuation with unadjusted propensity to pay. It reduces to from 8.72 
in 2002 to -20.15 in 2005, then increases to -3.81 in 2007. After that, it fluctuates 
around -5 until 2011 and then increases to 6.08 in 2013. Compared with the 
unadjusted propensity to pay, the propensity to pay adjusted with turnover is much 
closer to the X-axis, especially after 2004, indicating that liquidity could explain portion 
of the movement of propensity to pay. However, even after controlling for liquidity, we 
still could observe the substantial downward trend from 2002-2005, suggesting that 
changes in dividends payment could only partly explained by liquidity. Also, it shows 
that both the senior and board variable could not alter the trends in the unadjusted 
propensity to pay. However, after incorporating all the variables, the propensity to pay 
moves more close to the zero axis.  
 
Next, in order to quantitatively measure the extent to which disappearing dividends 
could be explained by these control variables, we adopt the three methods used by 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). The first method is the difference in difference method, 
where the percentage of propensity to pay explained by these control variables is 
measured as the difference between propensity to pay between 2004 and 2013, based 
on the fitted logit regressions from the 1999-2003 base period with and without these 
controls. The second method measures the rate of changes in dividends payment, 
which is defined as the difference in the slope coefficients of the regression of 
propensities (estimated from fitted logit regressions with and without these controls) 
on the time-trend. The difference in the slope coefficients captures the percentage of 
changes in dividend payments explained by these controls. The third method is the 
integrated propensity to pay, which is equal to the average propensity to pay. Under 
this method, the percentage of changes in dividend payments explained by these 
control variables is measured through the difference between the average 
propensities based on fitted logit regressions with and without these controls.  
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Table 3.8: The Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends Explained by Key Variables. Panel A reports the 
dividends payment changes explained by basic variables (in Row (1)), free cash flow (in Row (2)), 
leverage (in Row (3)), lifecycle (in Row(4)), risk (in Row (5)), liquidity (in Row (6)), senior (in Row (7)), 
board (in Row(8)), and both all control variables (in Row (9)) during the period 2004-2013 using three 
methods. Column (2) models the dividends payment changes as the propensity to pay dividends in 2013 
minus the 2004 propensity. Column (3) represents dividends payment changes as the rate of decline in 
propensity to pay, or the estimated coefficients of the regression of the propensity on time-trend. And 
Column (4) represents dividends payment changes as the average propensity to pay between 2004 and 
2013. Panel B reports the percentage of dividends changes explained by free cash flow (in Row (1)), 
leverage (in Row (2)), lifecycle (in Row(3)), risk (in Row (4)), liquidity (in Row (5)), senior (in Row (6)), 
board (in Row(7)), and both all control variables (in Row (8)) during the period 2004-2013 using three 
methods. Column (2) reports the percentage of propensity to pay explained by key variables with the 
difference in difference measure, which is the difference between the 2009 and 1998 propensity to pay 
based on the logit regressions with and without key variables controls. Column (3) presents explained 
percentage of propensity to pay by key variables based on the estimated coefficients of the regression 
of the propensity on time-trend. 
Panel A: Dividends changes explained by key variables. 
 Dividends changes defined as 
Explanatory Variables 
Difference in 
Propensity 
Coefficient for 
Trend Line 
Average 
Propensity 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE -13.497 -1.954 13.880 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,FCF -12.054 -1.925 13.475 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,LEVERAGE -12.513 -1.885 13.551 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,LIFECYCLE -14.431 -2.080 14.312 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,RISK -3.280 -0.978 7.535 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,LIQUIDITY -10.637 -1.691 9.673 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,SENIOR -9.916 -1.113 17.994 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,BOARD -14.769 -2.046 13.966 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,ALL -14.311 -1.401 7.785 
 
Panel B: Percentage of dividends changes explained by key variables.  
 Disappearing dividends defined as 
Explanatory Variables 
Difference in 
Propensity 
Coefficient 
for Trend Line 
Average 
Propensity 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,FCF -0.107 -0.015 -0.029 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,LEVERAGE -0.073 -0.035 -0.024 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,LIFECYCLE 0.069 0.064 0.031 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,RISK -0.757 -0.499 -0.457 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,LIQUIDITY -0.212 -0.134 -0.303 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,SENIOR -0.265 -0.430 0.296 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,BOARD 0.094 0.047 0.006 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE,ALL 0.060 -0.283 -0.439 
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Panel A of Table 3.8 presents the results of the three methods discussed above over 
the sample period. Panel B of Table 3.8 shows the percentage of changes in dividends 
payment explained by these control variables. Rows (1)-Row (8) report the percentage 
of changes in dividend payments explained respectively by free cash flow, leverage, 
lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior, board and all these variables using the three methods. 
Using the average propensity approach, we find that the risk alone is able to explain 
45% of the movement in propensity to pay, liquidity alone could explain 30% of the 
movement in propensity to pay, while all these control variables taken together 
explains around 43%. This result is similar to the evidence found in the US market, 
where risk explains around 40% of disappearing dividends (Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009). Overall from the test results, we conclude that firm specific risk plays a much 
more important role than the other control variables in explaining the fluctuation in 
propensity to pay observed in the China, and this confirms the conclusions drawn from 
Figure 3.3. 
 
3.4.3 Catering Incentives and Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends 
 
In this section, we examine whether catering incentives (Baker and Wurgler (2004b) 
can explain the disappearing dividend puzzle in the China. According to the catering 
hypothesis, market prices of dividend-paying firms and non-dividend-paying firms with 
similar characteristics are driven by investor sentiment. If investors place a premium 
(or a discount) on dividend-payers relative to non-payers according to their preference 
for dividends, this premium (or discount) will incentivise firms to cater to the prevailing 
demand by altering their dividend policy. This suggests that Moreover, the change in 
dividend payment policy caused by investment sentiment and not related to firm 
characteristics. Thus, the change in the unexpected proportion of dividend-payers is 
suggested to be positively related to the premium (discount) at the beginning of the 
period. To capture the changes in the propensity to pay due firms’ response to investor 
preferences, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) define several proxies for the catering 
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incentives (premium or discount). The most widely used proxy is the dividend 
premium, which measures the differences in the market values of dividend-payers and 
non-dividend-payers and is defined as the difference between log of the value-
weighted market-to-book ratio for dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers. Baker 
and Wurgler's (2004a) research suggests that the dividend premium can substantially 
explain the changes in propensity to pay in the US market during 1963-2000. 
 
In Figure 3.4 we visually depict whether dividend premium (capturing catering 
incentives) in year t-1 can predict the changes in the propensity to pay for a firm in 
year t. Figure 3 (A) plots the lagged dividend premium and the annual changes in the 
unadjusted propensity to pay over our sample period. We see that the movements of 
the two series exhibit a high degree of consistency. This indicates that dividend 
premium does influence the dividend decision made by firms. Overall a similar picture 
emerges when adjusting changes in the propensity to pay for free cash flow in Figure 
3 (B), for leverage in Figure 3(C), for lifecycle in Figure 3(D), for senior in Figure 3(G) 
and for board in Figure 3(H). However, risk adjusted changes in the propensity to pay 
in Figure 3 (E) presents a different picture. We see the relationship between lagged 
dividend premium and the changes in the propensity to pay has weakened 
considerably after adjusting for risk. Meanwhile, Figure 3(F) shows that the high 
degree of consistency between the changes in propensity to pay and lagged dividend 
premium disappears once we adjust the propensity to pay with liquidity. In Figure 3(I), 
the movements of all variables controlled changes in propensity present pronounced 
difference with that of the lagged dividend premium. Hence, a visual conclusion we 
can draw is that the catering hypothesis is weakened once changes in the propensity 
to pay are adjusted for the risk and liquidity elements in dividend policy.  
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Figure 3.4: Lagged Cash Dividend Premium and Changes in Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends with and without 
Adjustments, 2000-2013. Figure (A) illustrates the relationship between dividend premium (one lagged, the solid line) and 
the changes in propensity to pay dividends (the dashed line) when unadjusted for key variables. Figures (B) – (I) plot the lagged 
dividend premium and the adjusted changes in propensity to pay derived from logit regressions adjusted for free cash flow, 
leverage, lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior, board and all control variables respectively. 
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   (G)                                                                                    (H) 
 
   (I)                                                                                    
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Table 3.9: Test of catering Incentives in Explaining Changes in Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends, 2004 -2013. 
This table reports the estimates of the time-series regression during 1998-2009 (Equation 2) with the explanatory variables 
including lagged dividend premium (Catering), and 2007-09 financial crisis dummy. The dependent variable is the change in 
propensity to pay, which is the difference between propensity to pay in year t and that in year t-1. The propensity to pay (PTP) 
is the difference between actual and predicted percentage of dividend-payers, the latter is calculated with mean estimates of 
annual logit regressions for the base period 1999-2003 (The explanatory variables in the logit regression are reported in the 
Column “Logit regression variables”). The numbers in parentheses are the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics. The last column 
reports the adjusted r-square.  *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 10%. 
Dependent Variable=Change in Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends 
Row Logit Regression Variables Catering FC Cons Adj. R2 
(A) 
 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE 76.126**  4.807 0.431 
 (2.33)  (1.63)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE 79.805* -1.733 5.577 0.358 
  (2.16) (-0.27) (1.49)   
(B) 
 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, FCF 75.623**  4.885 0.424 
 (2.31)  (1.65)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, FCF 79.388* -1.773 5.673 0.350 
  (2.14) (-0.28) (1.49)   
(C) 
 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Leverage 75.363**  4.779 0.430 
 (2.32)  (1.64)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Leverage 79.262* -1.836 5.595 0.358 
  (2.16) (-0.29) (1.49)   
(D) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Lifecycle 77.473*  4.921 0.421 
 (2.29)  (1.58)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Lifecycle 80.795* -1.565 5.617 0.345 
  (2.13) (-0.23) (1.52)   
(E) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Risk 53.311  3.900 0.117 
 (1.44)  (1.07)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Risk 53.659 -0.164 3.973 -0.010 
  (1.21) (-0.02) (1.00)   
(F) 
 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Liquidity 63.597  4.260 0.213 
 (1.51)  (1.05)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Liquidity 59.541 1.910 3.412 0.109 
  (1.28) (0.23) (0.85)   
(G) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Senior 73.647*  3.511 0.441 
 (2.30)  (1.25)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Senior 76.265* -1.233 4.059 0.365 
  (2.12) (-0.20) (1.21)   
(H) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Board 76.825**  4.835 0.427 
 (2.34)  (1.61)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Board 80.308* -1.640 5.564 0.353 
  (2.16) (-0.24) (1.52)   
(I) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, All 45.804  2.443 0.028 
 (1.09)  (0.57)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, All 38.666 3.361 0.949 -0.087 
  (0.75) (0.30) (0.22)   
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We statistically test for the presence of catering hypothesis by regressing the changes 
in propensity to pay cash dividends with equation (3). Table 3.9 presents the results of 
regression Equation (2) for the sample period 2004-2013 and is organized in eight 
panels. Panel A reports the estimates of the regression where the propensity to pay is 
based on the fitted logit regression, with Fama and French (2001)’s firm characteristics 
and state variables as independent variables. Panel B- Panel H present the regression 
results where the above propensity to pay is adjusted for free cash flow, leverage, 
lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior, and board respectively. Panel I presents the estimation 
of the regression with all control variables adjusted propensity. The results in Panel A 
indicate that before adjusting for these control variables, catering incentive has a 
significantly positive impact on the changes in the unpredicted proportion of dividend-
payers.  
 
From the results in Panel B, Panel C, Panel D, Panel G and Panel H, we find that, even 
after accounting for free cash flow, leverage, lifecycle, senior and board, the coefficient 
on catering incentives still remains significant in explaining the adjusted propensity to 
pay. Noticeably, it could be implied from Panel D and Panel G that lifecycle and 
managerial stake could weaken the significant explanatory power of catering on the 
changes in propensity. However, once the propensity to pay has been adjusted for risk, 
the results in Panel E show that catering incentives no longer explains the changes in 
propensity to pay. Hence we do not find evidence of firms’ catering to investors’ 
dividend preferences once we control for risk. Our results corroborate Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009)’s finding in the US market and Kuo et al. (2013)’s finding in world-wide 
markets regarding the lack of applicability of catering theory. Meanwhile, Panel F 
shows that catering proxy could not significantly explain the liquidity-adjusted changes 
in propensity to pay, indicating that significant explanatory power of catering 
incentives also disappear once we control the propensity to pay for liquidity. This is 
different from Kuo et al. (2013)’s evidence for world-wide markets which suggested 
that liquidity could not eliminate the significant explanatory power of catering 
incentives. In Panel H, we test the significance of catering incentives after controlling 
for all the control variables and confirm the conclusion drawn from the previous panel 
that once propensity is adjusted for risk or liquidity, catering theory cannot explain the 
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disappearing dividends puzzle in the Chinese market. Meanwhile, the insignificance of 
financial crisis dummy in all regressions considered indicates that there has not been 
a significant change in dividend payouts among Chinese firms during the 2007-2009 
financial crisis.  
 
Overall, the results show that risk and liquidity are significant in explaining the changes 
in propensity of dividend payments in China. Once we adjust the propensity to pay for 
risk or liquidity, we see that dividend premium loses its explanatory power and hence 
we find no support for the presence of catering incentives among Chinese firms. 
Further, we find that the senior and board variables could not explain the unexpected 
proportion in dividend payments.  
 
3.5 Empirical Results for Stock Dividend Payouts 
3.5.1 Results of the Logit Regression for Stock Dividend Payouts 
For the stock dividends, we first study the determinants of stock dividend payments 
among Chinese firms during the sample period 1999-2013 with equation (2). Table 
3.10 reports the estimates coefficients and Newey-West t-statistics for the logit 
regression in Equation (2) that predicts the probability of a firm being a stock-dividend-
payer. Similar to Table 3.7 which reports the determinate of cash dividend payments, 
Table 3.10 also includes 9 columns and illustrate the logit regressions with different 
explanatory variables in these columns.  
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Table 3.10: Logit Estimation Explaining the Probability of Being a Stock-Dividend-Payer, 1999-2013. This table 
reports the logit regression results using Fama and MacBeth (1973) style estimation, with Newey–West t statistics 
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm pays stock dividend that year and 
zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are market-to-book ratio (M/B), assets growth (dA/A), earnings-to-
asset ratio (E/A), size percentile (SIZE), whether a firm is state owned (STATE), free cash flow (FCF), leverage ratio 
(D/E), retained earnings-to-book equity ratio (RE/BE), liquidity measure proxied by turnover ratio (ToR), 
systematic risk (SYS), idiosyncratic risk (IDIO), percentage of shares held by senior managers (SEN_OWN), number 
of board members (BD_SIZE), percentage of shares held by board members (BD_OWN), percentage of 
independent board (IND_PER), yearly number of board meetings (BD_MEETING) and whether the CEO and the 
chair of the board of directors are the same person (DUALITY). Columns (1) - (9) report the estimates of the 
various logit regressions with Fama and French (2001) firm characteristic variables, state owner proxy and other 
explanatory variables. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 
10%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
M/B 0.007 0.007 0.032 0.049 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.006 
  (0.97) (0.81) (0.88) (1.62) (0.11) (0.76) (1.11) (1.08) (0.22) 
dA/A -0.156 -0.234* -0.159 -0.059 -0.134 -0.145 -0.157 -0.143 -0.191 
  (-1.26) (-1.78) (-1.30) (-0.45) (-1.17) (-1.14) (-1.24) (-1.17) (-1.29) 
E/A 9.760*** 10.368*** 10.026*** 5.635*** 9.448*** 9.788*** 9.686*** 9.793*** 6.516*** 
  (12.31) (12.79) (13.36) (7.11) (14.50) (12.93) (12.22) (11.50) (9.09) 
SIZE 1.506*** 1.633*** 1.496*** 0.792*** 1.260*** 1.638*** 1.552*** 1.595*** 0.767*** 
  (12.53) (11.67) (12.58) (6.05) (8.41) (11.58) (12.71) (12.84) (5.33) 
STATE -0.387*** -0.336*** -0.396*** -0.322*** -0.346*** -0.264*** -0.360*** -0.293*** -0.163* 
  (-5.21) (-4.31) (-5.34) (-4.17) (-4.45) (-3.71) (-4.39) (-3.54) (-1.81) 
FCF  -0.025***       -0.029*** 
   (-4.21)       (-4.40) 
D/E   0.031      0.169*** 
    (1.18)      (4.00) 
RE/BE    3.396***     3.698*** 
     (15.81)     (14.28) 
SYS     -40.035*    -69.393*** 
      (-2.07)    (-3.58) 
IDIO     3.228    -9.989 
      (0.41)    (-0.81) 
ToR      0.273***   0.337*** 
       (7.59)   (6.92) 
SEN_OWN       0.430  2.334* 
        (1.19)  (2.04) 
BD_SIZE        -0.046** -0.028 
         (-2.21) (-1.14) 
BD_OWN        -0.204 -1.851 
         (-0.52) (-1.48) 
BD_MEETING        0.021** 0.019* 
         (2.18) (1.86) 
IND_PER        -1.304* -0.878 
         (-1.86) (-1.52) 
DUALITY        -0.023 -0.193 
         (-0.18) (-1.50) 
CONS -4.119*** -4.214*** -4.152*** -4.615*** -3.527*** -4.778*** -4.194*** -3.613*** -3.886*** 
  (-23.69) (-22.97) (-23.14) (-24.81) (-9.54) (-21.27) (-23.02) (-12.65) (-7.86) 
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The results in Column (1) shows that profitability and size proxies are positive related 
with the probability of being a stock dividend payer. This implies that larger firms with 
more profitability are more likely to pay stock dividend. The result is consistent with 
the signaling hypothesis that more profitable firms are more likely to pay stock 
dividend to signal favorable information. Also, the result support Elgers and Murray 
(1985)’s political costs theory. However, the investment opportunity proxies including 
market-to-book ratio and asset growth ratio is not significantly related to stock 
dividend payments in China over our sample period. 
 
Column (1) of Table 3.10 suggests that controlling blockownership by government 
institutions is negatively and significantly related with the probability of being a stock 
dividend payer. This in line with Wei and Xiao (2009)’s finding that state ownership is 
negatively related with stock dividend payments. Columns (2)-(5) presents the results 
when the free cash flow, leverage ratio, earned-to-contributed equity mix and risk are 
added to the baseline models. It shows that free cash flow has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient with the probability of being a stock dividend payer. 
This is in line with the cash substitution theory that firms with deterioration in cash 
flow would choose stock dividend payouts. Also, the result suggests a significant and 
positive association between lifecycle and stock dividend payments. This is consistent 
with implication of Grinblatt et al.’s (1984) retained earnings hypothesis that firms 
with higher lifecycle proxy are likely to pay stock dividends. Column (5) of Table 3.10 
shows that systematic risk is significantly negatively related with stock distribution. 
This indicates that risk could negatively influence the stock dividend payments.  
 
The logit model used in Column (6) is designed to test the impact of liquidity on the 
stock distribution when the effect of firms’ characteristic variables and state shares are 
controlled for. It shows that the estimated coefficient on stock turnover is positive and 
statistically significant. Furthermore, for our sample period considered, the inclusion 
of the liquidity variable does not affect the significance of the standard those firm 
characteristics variables and the state ownership proxy, indicating that firm 
characteristics, state proxy and liquidity are important variables in explaining stock 
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distribution in China. Our result support the price range theory that more liquid firms 
are more likely to pay stock dividend to bring their share prices into preferred range.  
 
Column (7) and Column (8) report the relation between corporate governance and 
stock distribution. Column (7) shows that ownership of senior managers is not related 
with stock dividend payments. This indicates that managers could not significantly 
influence the stock distribution. Meanwhile, Column (8) of Table 3.10 shows that 
board size and percentage of independent board are negatively and significantly 
associated with the probability of being a stock dividend payer. This implies that, firms 
with better corporate governance are less likely to pay stock dividend as stock 
distribution could not increase firms’ value. Also, the result shows that number of 
annual board meetings could positively and significantly impact stock dividend 
payments. 
 
In Column (9) of Table 3.10, we include state control proxy, free cash flow, leverage, 
lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior variable and board variables along with the baseline 
variables and find that state proxy, free cash flow, lifecycle, risk, liquidity and board 
variables still hold significant explanatory power in the sample period considered, even 
after including firm characteristic variables. Thus, state proxy, free cash flow, lifecycle, 
risk, liquidity, board and firms characteristic variables are important determinants of 
stock dividend payouts among Chinese firms over our sample period. However, the 
statistical significance of board size and board independence disappears. Only board 
meeting frequency stays significant. Also, the managerial stake becomes significant in 
explaining the stock dividend payouts. These changes may be caused by the higher 
correlation between managerial ownership and board characteristics.  
 
3.5.2 Catering Incentives and Propensity to Pay Stock Dividends  
Further, we consider whether catering incentives affect the propensity to pay stock 
dividends by testing whether the unexpected proportion of stock dividend payments 
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might be explained by a stock dividend premium. Figure 3.5 illustrates the patterns of 
the stock dividend premium and changes in the propensity to pay stock dividend. The 
propensity to pay stock dividend is measured as the actual percentage of stock-
dividend-payers minus expected percentage of stock-dividend-payers in year t. The 
expected percentage of dividend payers is computed using baseline logit regression 
with the basic firm characteristic and state proxies as the independent variables during 
the base period 1999-2003. We also estimate the expected probability while free cash 
flow, leverage, lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior and board are controlled for Figure 3.5(A) 
shows that the movements of stock dividend premium and changes in propensity to 
pay shows high degree of consistency. Even after adjusting the propensity for free cash 
flow, leverage, lifecycle, senior or board variables, the two lines still exhibit high degree 
of consistency. However, once the propensity to pay stock dividend is adjusted for risk 
or liquidity, the close relation between the two lines is weakened.  Figure 3.5(I) depicts 
the lagged stock dividend premium and the changes in the propensity with the 
adjustment of all the control variables. The two lines in Figure 3.5(I) shows different 
trends over the sample period. 
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Figure 3.5: Lagged Stock Dividend Premium and Changes in Propensity to Pay Stock Dividends with and without 
Adjustment, 2000-2013. Figure (A) illustrates the relationship between stock dividend premium (one lagged, the 
solid line) and the changes in propensity to pay dividends (the dashed line) when unadjusted for key variables. 
Figures (B) – (I) plot the lagged stock dividend premium and the adjusted changes in propensity to pay derived 
from logit regressions adjusted for free cash flow, leverage, lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior, board and all control 
variables respectively. 
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Table 3.11: Test of Catering Incentives in Explaining the Changes in Propensity to Pay Stock Dividends, 2004-
2013. This table reports the estimates of the time-series regression during 1998-2009 (Equation 2) with the 
explanatory variables including lagged stock dividend premium (Catering), and 2007-09 financial crisis dummy. 
The dependent variable is the change in propensity to pay, which is the difference between propensity to pay in 
year t and that in year t-1. The propensity to pay (PTP) is the difference between actual and predicted percentage 
of stock-dividend-payers, the latter is calculated with mean estimates of annual logit regressions for the base 
period 1999-2003 (The explanatory variables in the logit regression are reported in the Column “Logit regression 
variables”). The numbers in parentheses are the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics. The last column reports the 
adjusted r-square.  *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 
10%. 
Dependent variable=change in propensity to pay stock dividends 
Row Logit Regression Variables Catering FC Cons Adj. R2 
(A) 
 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE 18.795**  -3.185* 0.176 
 (2.52)  (-2.20)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE 18.155* 0.377 -3.215* 0.070 
  (2.28) (0.30) (-2.19)   
(B) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, FCF 18.273**  -3.049* 0.187 
 (2.57)  (-2.20)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, FCF 17.918* 0.210 -3.066* 0.074 
  (2.29) (0.17) (-2.13)   
(C) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Leverage 18.981**  -3.207* 0.185 
 (2.61)  (-2.26)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Leverage 18.392** 0.348 -3.235* 0.078 
  (2.37) (0.28) (-2.23)   
(D) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Lifecycle 18.276**  -3.502** 0.176 
 (2.74)  (-2.80)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Lifecycle 18.749** -0.280 -3.479** 0.065 
  (2.46) (-0.25) (-2.55)   
(E) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Risk -13.628  1.203 -0.034 
 (-0.98)  (0.49)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Risk -17.930 2.539 1.001 0.106 
  (-1.28) (1.43) (0.54)   
(F) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Liquidity -7.487  0.021 -0.116 
 (-0.25)  (0.00)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Liquidity -4.612 -1.697 0.156 -0.232 
  (-0.16) (-0.37) (0.04)   
(H) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Senior 16.354*  -2.903* 0.127 
 (2.19)  (-2.06)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Senior 15.626* 0.429 -2.937* 0.019 
  (2.09) (0.35) (-2.08)   
(I) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Board 21.877**  -3.877** 0.230 
 (3.00)  (-2.71)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, Board 21.405** 0.278 -3.899** 0.125 
  (2.70) (0.21) (-2.65)   
(J) 
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, All -59.675  6.802 0.257 
 (-1.84)  (1.67)  
M/B, AG, EA, SIZE, STATE, All -60.315 0.378 6.772 0.152 
  (-1.61) (0.09) (1.55)   
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Then, we statistically test for the presence of catering hypothesis for stock dividend 
payouts with equation (4). Table 3.11 reports the estimated coefficients and Newey-
West t-statistics for equation (4) over the sample period 2004-2013. The results in 
Table 3.11 are organized into eight panels. Panel A reports the estimates of the 
regression using changes in the unadjusted propensity as dependent variable. Panel 
B- Panel H present the regression results where the effects free cash flow, leverage, 
lifecycle, risk, liquidity, senior, and board are controlled for, respectively. Panel I 
presents the estimation of the regression with all control variables adjusted propensity. 
Panel A shows that estimated coefficient of catering incentive is positive and 
significant, which implies that managers choose stock dividend policy to cater 
investors preference for stock dividend. Panel B, Panel C, Panel D, Panel G and Panel H 
show that stock dividend premium could still significantly impact firms’ stock dividend 
policy even after controlling the propensity for free cash flow, leverage, lifecycle, senior 
or board. However, the results in Panel E and Panel F show that the explanatory power 
of catering incentive disappear once we adjust the propensity with liquidity or risk. 
This indicates that the stock dividend premium actually captures the risk/liquidity 
difference between stock-dividend payers and non-stock-dividend payers. That is, the 
stock dividend premium, capturing investors’ preference for stock dividends, actually 
acts as the proxy for the risk/liquidity. Panel I reports that dividend premium could not 
significantly influence changes the propensity to pay when the propensity is adjusted 
with all the control variables. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the cash/stock dividend payment patterns in China over the 
sample period 1999-2013 to explore the determinants of Chinese firms’ cash/stock 
dividend payout policies. First, we study cash dividend payout pattern and observe 
significant decline in the percentage of cash dividend payers from 2002 to 2006 and a 
recovery after that. We use logit regression to test the determinants of being a 
dividend payer. The results show that, in line with Fama and French (2001), larger and 
more profitable firms with less investment opportunities are more likely to pay cash 
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dividend. Moreover, we also find evidence that lifecycle theory (DeAngelo et al., 2004) 
appears to be applicable as its proxy appears to be positively related to the probability 
of being a dividend payer. Further, cash dividend payment is negatively related with 
risk and stock liquidity. Further, we find that managers could not determine firms’ cash 
dividend payments, while board could influence firms’ cash dividend payouts. 
 
Then we test catering theory for cash dividend payments. It shows that catering 
incentive is positive associated with the changes in the unadjusted propensity to pay 
cash dividends, even after controlling the financial crisis dummy.  This indicates that 
managers choose the cash dividend payment policy to cater to investors’ preference 
for dividends. Further, when we adjusted the propensity with free cash flow, leverage, 
senior or board proxy, catering incentive is still significantly and positively related with 
unexpected cash dividend payouts. However, the significantly explanatory power of 
dividend premium disappear once we control the propensity for liquidity or risk. This 
means that the catering incentive actually measures the difference in firms’ liquidity 
or risk between cash-dividend payers and non-cash-dividend payers. 
 
Furthermore, this paper considers the stock dividend payment pattern in China. The 
percentage of stock-dividend payers in China decreased dramatically from 13.82% in 
1999 to 2.36% in 2013. We use a logit model to explore the determinants of being a 
stock dividend payer. The results indicate that larger firms with more profitability are 
more likely to pay stock dividend. Also, state-owned enterprises are less likely to pay 
stock dividend, this is consistent with Cheng et al. (2009)’s dividend preference theory. 
Meanwhile, we find that stock dividend payouts are negatively associated with free 
cash flow and positively related with lifecycle proxy. Further, it shows that risk could 
negatively impact the probability of being a stock dividend payer, while liquidity 
measured by turnover could positively influence stock dividend payments in China 
over our sample period. In addition, senior managers could not affect firms’ stock 
dividend payments, and firms with better corporate governance are less likely to pay 
stock dividend.  
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Finally, we test the catering theory for stock dividend payouts in China. The results 
illustrate that dividend premium matters for the changes in unadjusted propensity, and 
the propensity adjusted for free cash flow, leverage, lifecycle, senior and board. 
However, once we controlled the propensity with liquidity or risk, the catering 
incentive is insignificant and contribute little toward explaining the changes in 
propensity to pay stock dividend. This implies that stock dividend premium captures 
the different characteristics (risk and liquidity) of the firms. That is, stock dividend 
premium matters only if we do not control for liquidity or risk.  
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Chapter 4 Illiquidity, Variance Risk Premium and 
Stock Market Returns  
 
Previous studies show that market liquidity risk and volatility risk are essential 
indicators of expected excess stock returns. However, it is still unclear whether these 
risk factors trigger the stock returns. This study comprehensively investigates the 
interplay among illiquidity, variance risk premium, and stock returns using monthly US 
data from January 1992 to December 2010. We find that the variance risk premium 
reflecting investors’ risk aversion to volatility risk causes variations in stock returns, and 
in turn causes market illiquidity, rather than vice versa. Our results further show that 
the variance risk premium has a strong predictive power for excess stock market 
returns, while illiquidity does not. Finally, we find that the variance risk premium affects 
equity returns by acting on the systematic risk factors, namely market risk premium, 
value factor and momentum factor.  
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Chapter 4 Illiquidity, Variance Risk Premium and 
Stock Market Returns 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Market risk plays a prominent role in modern financial theory and is closely related to 
future stock returns (Merton, 1973). A growing literature shows that volatility risk and 
(il)liquidity risk have strong predictive power for future excess stock returns. However, 
it is still unclear whether these risk factors trigger the stock returns. In this paper, we 
test the association among volatility risk, liquidity risk, and stock market return, and 
examine how these risk factors affect the equity returns.  
 
Most previous studies use realized volatility or implied volatility (e.g. VIX for the US 
market) as the market risk measure.  In contrast, we employ a newly developed 
measure of variance risk premium, which is defined as the difference between implied 
volatility and realized volatility, so that it contains information on both conventional 
risk measures and also reflects exclusive information of investors’ risk aversion to the 
volatility risk (see Bakshi and Madan (2006) and Bollerslev, Gibson, and Zhou (2011) 
for details).  Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011) 
investigate the variance risk premium for the US stock market, and find that it has 
strong predictive power at monthly and quarterly horizons. Bollerslev, Marrone, Xu, 
and Zhou (2013) extend the study of the predictive power of variance risk premium to 
the international stock markets, and show similar evidence as for the US market. 
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Jones (2002) and  Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) document that liquidity can 
predict future stock market returns. However, if we step back from the traditional view 
on the return-liquidity relation, causality may not, or may not only, run from liquidity 
to the stock return. A number of papers find that past stock returns can affect future 
market liquidity. For example, Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001) 
document that stock market returns are able to forecast future market liquidity rather 
than vice versa for the US market.  Similarly, with a large sample of data across 46 
countries, Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004) show international evidence that liquidity 
follows the past returns.  
 
If return can impact the future market liquidity, then the variance risk premium may 
also do so. Failure to recognize that liquidity is the causal variable may cause 
misjudgements in the interplay among liquidity, stock return, and variance risk 
premium. Also, if liquidity responds to past returns or past variance risk premium then 
it makes sense to include these variables to supplement any forecasting tests of 
liquidity. Doing so is likely to avoid overestimating the true forecasting power of 
liquidity. Unlike previous studies, which mainly focus on the determinant role of the 
variance risk premium and liquidity, this paper aims to comprehensively test the 
interplay among variance risk premium, illiquidity, and stock returns for the US market 
over the period extending from January 1992 to December 2010. 
 
We first investigate whether past liquidity can cause stock market return, or whether 
past stock market return can affect market liquidity. Amihud (2002) and other related 
papers have shown that excess stock return also reflects compensation for market 
illiquidity.20 However, if we step away from the traditional view on the liquidity-return 
relation, and ask how the liquidity might be generated, it is quite natural to expect that 
return could affect future liquidity. This is empirically confirmed by Chordia et al. (2001) 
using daily data, and by Griffin et al. (2004) using weekly data. Thus, there is mixed 
                                                     
20 Amihud et al. (2005) provide a good review of the development of illiquidity theory. 
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evidence as to the return-liquidity relation, and to date there is no generally agreed 
upon explanation for it, nor has it been subject to a comprehensive examination. Also, 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, which captures the price impact dimension of liquidity, 
has not been used to test the relation between past return and liquidity. Hence, this 
paper adopts Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio as the liquidity measure and employs a 
large sample of monthly US data over the period 1992-2010. We comprehensively 
investigate the direction and magnitude of the return-liquidity relation using the 
Granger-causality test and impulse function. We find that illiquidity does not cause 
stock returns, while stock returns can cause illiquidity. This result is further confirmed 
by the impulse response test, as there is no evidence that stock returns respond to 
changes in market illiquidity. Our results imply that the liquidity, measured by the 
illiquidity ratio, follows the past stock market return rather than vice versa for the US 
market over the period 1992-2010. This indicates that research that seeks to exploit 
the potential impact of liquidity is unlikely to be successful for returns forecasting. 
Moreover, it implies that we should include the stock market return to supplement the 
forecasting test of liquidity.  
 
This paper also tests the relation between variance risk premium and stock market 
return, and between variance risk premium and illiquidity. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that examines the relationship between variance risk 
premium and illiquidity. If illiquidity responds to the stock market return, then it is also 
possible that illiquidity responds to the variance risk premium. Our empirical results 
show that the variance risk premium can cause stock returns and illiquidity, rather than 
vice versa. This finding is robust for different sub-samples. The result indicates that we 
should add the variance risk premium in the forecasting tests of liquidity. Furthermore, 
the result clarifies the interplay among illiquidity, stock returns and variance risk 
premium: variance risk premium affects the stock market return and illiquidity, and 
stock market return affects liquidity. Thus the traditional view that illiquidity predicts 
future stock returns may be simply serendipitous. Since variance risk premium, 
measuring investors’ risk aversion to volatility risk, affects stock market return and 
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then illiquidity, illiquidity contains information about the variance risk premium and 
thus indirectly impacts the stock market return.  
 
This study also tests the forecasting power of the variance risk premium and illiquidity 
for excess stock market returns. Our results show that the variance risk premium, 
rather than illiquidity, can significantly enhance the predictive power of the 
benchmark model. That is, the variance risk premium rather than the illiquidity 
contains useful information for forecasting future stock market returns. Moreover, we 
study the impulse response functions of illiquidity, stock returns, and the variance risk 
premium for a period of 24 months. We find that there is no impulse response for 
stock returns to illiquidity, while the variance risk premium significantly affects the 
stock market returns in the long term. In the short run, stock returns and most variance 
risk premium measures can significantly affect illiquidity. However, it is intriguing that 
the impulse responses of the variance risk premium to both the stock market returns 
and illiquidity cannot be observed. 
 
Finally, in the robustness test, we study how the variance risk premium/illiquidity are 
related to the US equities returns, by investigating the relation between the variance 
risk premium/illiquidity and the risk factors, specifically the Fama-French three factors 
and the momentum factor. The Granger-causality investigation shows that the 
variance risk premium causes the market risk premium, value factor and momentum 
factor. In other words, the variance risk premium affects the equity returns via these 
systematic risk factors. The test for the Granger-causality relation between illiquidity 
and systematic risk factors shows that market illiquidity cannot cause movement in the 
four risk factors, but the market risk premium and momentum do cause variations in 
illiquidity.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides models and the literature review. 
Section 4.3 presents data and summary statistics. Section 4.4 shows our empirical 
126 
 
 
 
results. Section 4.5 carries out a robustness check. Finally, Section 4.6 summarizes our 
conclusions.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Variance Risk Premium (VRP) 
4.2.1.1 Variance Risk Premium and Predictability for Returns 
 
The variance risk premium is defined as the difference between the variance under 
risk-neutral probability and that under the physical probability: 
 
                                                 , 1 , 1( ) ( )
Q P
t t t t t t tVRP E Var E Var                                 (1) 
 
where Q   and P  represent the risk-neutral and physical probability measures, 
respectively, and ( )E   is the expectation operator. Variance risk premium reflects the 
investors’ risk aversion to the market volatility risk (Bakshi & Madan, 2006; Bollerslev 
et al., 2009; Rosenberg & Engle, 2002). Bollerslev et al. (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron 
(2011) show that this premium is induced by the uncertainty of consumption related 
to macroeconomic uncertainty through a recursive utility framework.  
 
The classical intertemporal CAPM model of Drechsler and Yaron (2011) demonstrates 
that the aggregate equity risk premium is determined by the uncertainty of underlying 
returns, quantified by the return variance. When holding the market portfolio, 
however, an investor is also bearing the uncertainty of the variance itself (Drechsler & 
Yaron, 2011). Just as the equity risk premium demanded by investors is a result of fear 
of the uncertainty of future returns, so variance risk premium is required to 
compensate for the uncertain variance. Theoretically, Bollerslev et al. (2009) propose 
that the variance risk premium effectively isolates the factor associated with the 
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volatility of consumption growth volatility, and as a result, it should serve as an 
especially useful predictor for the returns over horizons for which that risk factor is 
relatively more important. Also, Drechsler and Yaron (2011) argue that the variance 
risk premium is especially relevant for unravelling the connections among uncertainty, 
the dynamics of the economy, preferences, and prices, and they derive conditions 
under which it predicts future stock returns. In addition, since the variance risk 
premium is required by investors for bearing the volatility risk, many papers directly 
extract the risk aversion from the variance risk premium (Bakshi & Madan, 2006; 
Bollerslev et al., 2009). 
 
There is a close relation between the variance risk premium and the risk aversion of 
representative agent. Bakshi and Madan (2006) show that the variance risk premium 
is determined by the higher moments of stock return distribution and the degree of 
risk aversion. Assuming a stochastic volatility process for stock returns, Bollerslev et al. 
(2011) find that the variance risk premium is related to the risk aversion. Under the 
general equilibrium framework, Drechsler (2013) shows that the variance risk 
premium is sensitive to the representative agent’s risk preference, which comprises 
the risk aversion and model uncertainty aversion.    
 
The forecast of stock return is implemented by regressing excess stock returns on 
certain predictors, and the predictability is tested by the coefficients of regression 
slope. If the estimates are statistically significant, then the excess stock returns may be 
predictable and partially explained by these predictors. In a traditional dividend 
growth model, price-dividend ratio is the discounted value of future stock returns. 
Campbell (1991) and Cochrane (1992) point out that dividend yield can predict excess 
stock returns. Campbell and Yogo (2006)  use the logarithm of dividend price ratio, 
logarithm of earning price ratio, short-term interest rate and term spread as predictors. 
Following their studies, in this paper, we consider dividend yield, P/E ratio and short-
term interest rate as predictors. 
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The multi-period return regression takes the following form: 
 
                                      
1
ℎ
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡+𝑖
ℎ
𝑖=1 = 𝑏0(ℎ) + 𝑏1(ℎ)𝑉𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+ℎ,𝑡                                
(2) 
 
In this regression, variance risk premium could be used to predict monthly (when h = 
1), quarterly (when h = 3) and yearly (when h = 12) future return (scaled by horizon h). 
Naturally, we obtain the slope coefficients b1 (h) and b2 (h) as functions of horizon h. 
According to the theoretical model of Bollerslev et al. (2009), the model implied slope 
coefficient of variance risk premium regressed on h months ahead future return shows 
a monotonically decreasing pattern, whereas the model implied R2 displays a humped 
shape, where the peaks are around the quarterly horizon. Furthermore, Drechsler and 
Yaron (2011) extend the long-run risks model proposed by Bansal and Yaron (2004) to 
capture the time variation and predictive power of variance premium. Both studies 
support the argument that the predictive power of variance premium is strong at short 
horizons (in months), which is contrary to traditional long-horizon predictors. 
 
However, in the empirical research, differences arise owing to the various measures of 
variance risk premium. Both terms are unobservable, and we have to choose their 
empirical counterparts. For the US market, the literature usually uses the VIX index 
(constructed through model-free implied volatility approach) as the measure of 
𝐸𝑡
𝑄(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡,𝑡+1), which is observable at time t in the US. However, the literature diverges 
on the choice of measure for expected realized volatility. For example,  Bollerslev et al. 
(2009) use the ex post realized return variation over [t-1, t] time interval, which is the 
lagged realized variance over [t, t+1]. The method is valid under the assumption that 
realized volatility is a martingale process. Under this assumption, the realized volatility 
would behave like a unit root process with the first order autocorrelation coefficient 
almost equal to one, which is usually not true in practice. Empirically, Bollerslev et al. 
(2009) find that the estimated slope coefficient of variance risk premium is significant 
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in time horizons of less than or equal to six months and the R2 shows a humped shaped 
pattern. 
 
Zhou (2010) considers lagged RV, ex post RV, 12-month moving average, recursive 
AR(12) forecast and full sample AR(12) forecast. In his empirical analysis, he mainly 
focuses on the method using the twelve lag auto-regressive estimates. However, when 
using this forecast instead of lagged realized variance, the predictive power of variance 
risk premium over one or two month horizon disappears.   
 
Drechsler and Yaron (2011) consider the high frequency S&P 500 futures realized 
variance forecasts by projecting futures realized variance on lagged VIX and index 
realized variance. Their slope coefficient estimates are statistically significant and large, 
which is consistent with the results of Bollerslev et al. (2009). 
 
In another related paper, following the usual practice in the variance swap market, 
Carr and Wu (2009) use ex post forward realized variance from daily price as the 
measure of expected realized variance. Although they do not directly consider an asset 
return predictability regression in their paper, they demonstrate a highly significant 
negative relationship between log difference of realized variance and implied variance 
(which is the opposite of the variance premium used above), and future excess return 
for the stock index and many of the individual stocks considered on a monthly basis. 
 
4.2.1.2 Realized Volatility 
 
The daily realized variance, RV, of market returns is traditionally measured by the 
squared (absolute) daily index returns, where the market return is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of consecutive daily closing index levels. Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1998) and 1998b) indicate that these traditional measures are poor 
estimators of day-by-day movements in volatility, as the idiosyncratic component of 
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daily returns is large. They demonstrate that the realized volatility measures based on 
intraday data provide a dramatic reduction in noise and a radical improvement in 
temporal stability relative to realized volatility measures based on daily returns. 
Therefore, many papers suggest using high frequency intraday returns to calculate the 
daily realized variance. For example, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001) 
and Areal and Taylor (2002) use the 5-minute intraday returns to calculate realized 
volatility, while Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2003) use 30-minute data. 
 
This paper also adopts high-frequency intraday data. We define the daily realized 
variance (𝜎𝑅𝑉
2 (𝑡)) for day t as the summation of intraday squared returns: 
 
                                                     𝜎𝑅𝑉
2 (𝑡) = ∑ 𝑟2(𝑡, 𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1                                                         
(3) 
 
where t is the t-th day, which is divided into N sub-periods, and r(t; j) denotes the j-th 
intraday return in day t. 𝜎𝑅𝑉 represents the realized volatility. This measure is used in 
several high-frequency studies, such as  Zhou (1996), Taylor and Xu (1997) and 
Andersen et al. (2003). In application, Andersen et al. (2001) and Areal and Taylor 
(2002) use the summation of 79 five-minute squared intraday returns to calculate 
realized volatility, while Andersen et al. (2003) use 30-minute data. Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2000), Ebens (1999) and Areal and Taylor (2002) also 
use the five-minute returns. Following the literature, we employ the five-minute high 
frequency intraday returns to construct the realized volatility.  
 
4.2.1.3 Model-Free Implied Volatility 
 
Implied volatility is regarded as the expected future volatility as extracted from 
relevant option prices. It is equal to the volatility parameter 𝜎, the value of which can 
be revealed when the option price is equal to its theoretical price according to the 
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pricing formula. The Black-Scholes (Black & Scholes, 1973) option pricing formula is 
commonly used to calculate the implied volatility. Given an efficient market, option 
traders incorporate historical price information, and further information about future 
events that affect volatility, into the option price. Therefore, if the option market is 
efficient and the option pricing formula is correct, the implied volatility should 
subsume the information incorporated in past volatility and provide a more efficient 
volatility forecast (Taylor, 2005). 
 
However, all these studies are based on Black-Scholes implied volatility from at-the-
money options. Although at-the-money options are the most actively traded, these 
studies ignore the information incorporated in other options (Jiang & Tian, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the Black-Scholes implied volatility is criticized as being derived from a 
model based on constant volatility, and therefore inconsistent in forecasting changes 
in volatility (Britten-Jones & Neuberger, 2000). Most importantly, tests based on the 
Black-Scholes implied volatility are joint tests of the Black-Scholes option formula and 
the efficiency of the option market. Therefore, their conclusions are based on the 
assumption of correct option model. As a result, these studies suffer from 
misspecification errors and there is inconsistency stemming from the constant 
volatility assumption of the Black-Scholes model. Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000) 
derive the model-free implied volatility from no-arbitrage conditions. In particular, all 
consistent processes for the price of underlying securities generate a common 
expectation of integrated variance under the risk-neutral measure over a specified 
horizon, and therefore imply the same forecast of volatility. Britten-Jones and 
Neuberger (2000) suggest that the common risk-neutral expectation of squared price 
volatility between the current date and the future date is given by the set of prices of 
options that expire on the two dates. Thus, they derive the forecast of volatility from 
the current option price via the risk-neutral integrated return variance.  
 
Unlike traditional implied volatility measures, model-free implied volatility is 
independent of option pricing models and requires only current option price. 
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Therefore, it should not be subject to misspecification errors. Since it does not rely on 
the Black-Scholes pricing model or any variant thereof, the model-free implied 
volatility does not require a constant volatility assumption and thus bypasses the 
criticism on the inconsistency of previous implied volatility measures. The information 
efficiency of Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000) model-free implied volatility is 
examined by Jiang and Tian (2005). They find that model-free implied volatility from 
S&P 500 index options subsumes all the information incorporated in historical realized 
volatility and the Black-Scholes implied volatility. Consequently, they suggest that 
model-free volatility is a more efficient and unbiased predictor for future volatility, 
compared with previous volatility measures.  
 
According to Carr et al. (1998) and Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000), the 
expectation of integrated variance under the risk-neutral measure can be calculated 
from a complete set of call option prices: 
 
                                𝜎𝑀𝐹
2 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = 𝐸
𝑄 [∫ 𝜎𝑡
2 𝑑𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇1
] = 2 ∫
𝑐(𝑇2,𝐾)−𝑐(𝑇1,𝐾)
𝐾2
∞
0
𝑑𝐾                         (5) 
 
where 𝜎𝑀𝐹
2 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) is the model-free implied volatility over the period from T1 to T2; 
c(T1; K) and c(T2; K) are the European type call option prices with strike price K and 
time to maturity T1 and T2, respectively; 𝐸𝑄 [∫ 𝜎𝑡
2 𝑑𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇1
]  denotes the expectation 
operator under the risk-neutral measure. Under the assumption of zero dividend yield 
and interest rate, it implies that the model-free implied volatility measure from T1 to 
T2 is determined by a series of option prices with time to maturity at these two days. 
Because no assumption of underlying process or specific option pricing model is 
imposed, this measure is considered to be model-free. 
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4.2.2 Market Liquidity  
4.2.2.1 Liquidity and Predictability for Returns 
 
It is generally acknowledged that liquidity has an incremental influence on excess stock 
returns. Many papers investigate the relation between liquidity and stock returns by 
testing the impact of liquidity on contemporaneous stock returns. In the first study to 
focus on this relationship, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) adopt the quoted bid-ask 
spread as a proxy for illiquidity and discover that expected stock return is an increasing 
and concave function of illiquidity. Subsequent studies use alternative measures of 
liquidity, such as the marginal cost of trading, dollar trading volume, and turnover ratio, 
and present consistent conclusions (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996).  
 
In addition, a growing literature explores the relation between liquidity and future 
expected return, both theoretically and empirically. A number of theories and 
empirical results suggest that liquidity has substantial predictive power for future stock 
returns, on both the firm level and the aggregate stock market level (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986; Baker & Stein, 2004; Jones, 2002). These studies argue that 
increases in liquidity, such as higher turnover ratio, lower illiquidity ratio, lower price 
impact of trade, or lower bid-ask spread, forecast lower future returns. 
 
Why is it that liquidity can predict future stock returns? The explanation is 
straightforward. Investors anticipate selling the stocks in the future, and know that the 
transaction cost will increase their cost of selling. The transaction cost may come from 
the problems of adverse selection or from the consideration of professional market-
makers (Jones, 2002). If the transaction cost is high, the investors discount the asset 
by a higher rate and thus require higher stock returns. As a result, the stocks are 
observed to have lower liquidity. Higher transaction cost, lower turnover and higher 
illiquidity ratio are supposed to generate higher future returns (Amihud & Mendelson, 
1986; Baker & Stein, 2004; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985). This theory fits well with a cross 
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section of individual stocks and is empirically supported with cross-sectional results by 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996). 
 
An alternative possible explanation for the cross-sectional relation between lagged 
liquidity and returns is from the perspective of behavioural finance. In the behavioural 
finance framework, investors are prone to over-optimism and over-pessimism. When 
irrational investors are excessively optimistic about the market, they will trade more 
actively and thus boost the liquidity. Conversely, when such investors are over-
pessimistic, they avoid trading and holding equity, and thus reduce the turnover of the 
market. In both cases, the stock price will eventually revise to the fundamental. Hence, 
this behavioural theory implies that liquidity and future stock returns are negatively 
related (Jones, 2002). 
 
However, these theories used to explain the link between liquidity and cross-sectional 
expected stock returns may not be directly applicable to the aggregate stock market. 
Specifically, these models provide little information on why the aggregate market 
liquidity presents variation over time or whether the variation of liquidity can affect 
the aggregate stock market (Baker & Stein, 2004; Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 
2000).  
 
Considering the short-sale constraint and the existence of irrational overconfident 
investors, Baker and Stein (2004) propose a behavioural explanation for the relation 
between liquidity and future stock returns. Specifically, irrational investors overreact 
to the private information about future fundamentals and thus boost the liquidity.  
Given the short-sale constraints, irrational investors are active only when their 
valuations about future returns are higher than those of rational investors; hence, the 
market is overvalued. Therefore, higher liquidity is an indicator of higher presence of 
these irrational investors, and, as a result, of the extent to which the market is 
overvalued.  
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For the aggregate stock market, Jones (2002) studies the annual time series of liquidity 
and stock market returns over the entire 20th Century for the US market. He adopts 
three liquidity measures: bid-ask spread, aggregate realized transaction cost, and 
turnover ratio. The results show that these liquidity measures can predict the future 
stock market returns up to 3 years ahead. That is, higher turnover forecasts lower stock 
market returns, while higher spreads forecast higher stock market returns. Similar 
results are shown in Lesmond et al. (1999) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007). 
However, Baker and Stein (2004) argue that the magnitude of the decrease in stock 
returns related to the increase in liquidity seems extremely large to be explained by 
theoretical models where the cost of trading influences the expected returns. 
 
A number of papers investigate the relation between liquidity and stock market return 
by studying the components of liquidity. The literature decomposes the liquidity into 
the expected liquidity and unexpected liquidity. Amihud (2002) proposes that liquidity 
predicts future stock market returns due to the positive relation between expected 
illiquidity and ex ante excess stock market returns. Investors estimate the expected 
illiquidity based on the information available in one preceding year, and then use the 
forecast to set prices that generate desired expected returns. That is, if investors 
anticipate higher market illiquidity based on the one-preceding-year illiquidity 
information, they will generate higher expected return to compensate for the higher 
expected market illiquidity.   Similarly, Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang (2005) find that the 
expected liquidity is significantly related to the expected stock market return. This 
indicates that past liquidity information could impact the future market price 
movement. In addition, they argue that after controlling for the expected illiquidity 
and contemporaneous unexpected illiquidity, the explanatory power of volatility for 
the market return disappears. 
 
4.2.2.2 Returns and Predictability for Liquidity 
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According to the asset pricing and behavioural finance explanations, causality must 
run from liquidity to stock returns. However, if we step back from this traditional view, 
and ask how the liquidity is generated, it is natural to expect that the past stock returns 
may influence the liquidity.  
There is some empirical evidence for the relation between past stock returns and 
future illiquidity. Smirlock and Starks (1988) use Granger-causality tests to investigate 
the empirical link between daily stock returns and trading volume for individual stocks 
in the US market from 15 June to 21 August 1981. They document significant causal 
relation from stock returns to the trading volume, and this relationship tends to be 
stronger in the periods surrounding earnings announcement. The results imply that 
delivery of information to investors follows a sequential rather than simultaneous 
process. In the case of simultaneous arrival of information, all the investors receive the 
information simultaneously, revise their expectation and trade. Thus, past returns 
offer no information superior to past volume for the future volume. In the case of 
sequential information arrival, investors receive information one at a time and then 
trade after reception. Therefore, in this case, past stock returns can provide 
information to improve volume forecasts over forecasts based on past volume alone. 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) show that higher daily positive price movement leads to 
higher liquidity for individual stocks. However, Tse (1991) and Saatcioglu and Starks 
(1998) find that past performance cannot significantly affect the future liquidity at 
market level in Japan and six Latin American markets.  
 
There is no generally agreed explanation for the relation between past stock returns 
and future liquidity. The tax explanation theory predicts that more trading will occur 
in the stocks that have poor past performance; however, this contradicts the empirical 
finding of the positive relation between past returns and liquidity. Theory of trading 
based on heterogeneity due to difference in information lacks convincing arguments 
for the relation between information asymmetries and past returns.  This is because, 
in order to explain the return-liquidity relation, such information asymmetries need to 
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increase following positive stock price movement; however, current studies are unable 
to offer convincing arguments as to why this should be so. 
 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) employ Stoll’s (1978) inventory model to 
explain the relation between past stock return and liquidity. Liquidity can be 
decomposed into two components: one due to asymmetric information and the other 
due to inventory costs (Glosten & Harris, 1988). For the aggregate stock market, 
asymmetric information is unlikely to exist; hence it cannot determine the market 
illiquidity. Then the inventory paradigm provides a more cogent explanation for the 
association between liquidity and stock returns at the market-wide level. This model 
states that the liquidity depends on the inventory holding cost, which arises from 
financing constraints and risk. Such cost seems particularly high in falling markets, 
where market marker inventory levels might be high, and is lower in rising markets. 
Thus, liquidity will follow the previous market moves, declining following past stock 
market return falls, and increasing after past market return rises.  The empirical results 
of Chordia et al. (2002) support this theory.  They adopt daily data over the period 
1988-1992 and use bid-ask spread as proxy for illiquidity. They document that stock 
market returns predict liquidity rather than vice versa for the US market. In addition, 
inventory cost theory applies to liquidity drying up in falling markets. First, the 
influence of financial constraints is asymmetric; for example, the short-sales restriction 
significantly affects the trading activities in down markets. Second, market makers are 
more risk-averse when stock prices decrease, and the fear of future liquidity shocks 
causes them to be unwilling to provide liquidity at the current time (Bernardo & Welch, 
2004). The results of Chordia et al. (2002) show that positive market price movement 
is followed by increases in liquidity of much smaller magnitude than those following 
the negative market price movement. In contrast, using an asymmetric VAR, Griffin et 
al. (2004) show a symmetric reaction of liquidity to past stock returns.  
 
Behaviour theories also provide possible explanations for the link between past stock 
returns and liquidity. According to the disposition effect proposed by Shefrin and 
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Statman (1985), investors are reluctant to trade in down markets and wish to realize 
the gains in up markets. This implies that past stock returns impact investors’ trading 
activities and thus affect liquidity. Odean (1998) draws on overconfidence bias theory 
to claim that overconfidence causes investors to trade more frequently and thus 
increases the liquidity. In addition, Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that 
overconfidence grows with past success in the market, hence liquidity increases 
following positive market returns. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) find that 
overconfidence bias at the market level and the disposition effect at the stock level 
could explain the positive relation between past stock return and liquidity for the 
developed markets. However, these competing behaviour theories cannot explain the 
findings in Griffin et al. (2004). Since investors are considered to be more 
overconfident in a long-term up market, while the disposition effect makes investors 
more willing to lock in gains in such markets, both disposition effect and 
overconfidence theory show a stronger return-liquidity relation in the periods 
following high stock market returns. In that case, investors in developed markets 
would be expected to trade more in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, in line with the 
better market performance. However, Griffin et al. (2004) find contrary evidence.  
 
An alternative explanation for the positive association between past return and 
liquidity is the cost of participation. (Griffin et al., 2004) Orosel (1998) participation 
model assumes the existence of sidelined investors. Such investors could but do not 
invest in the stock market because of the participation costs, such as trading and 
information costs. High stock market returns will induce these investors to increase 
their estimated profitability of the market and thus be more willing to participate. As 
a result, market participation rises following high past returns and falls following low 
past returns. Therefore, the participation model predicts a positive link between past 
stock returns and future liquidity. Moreover, this model suggests a symmetric return-
liquidity relation in up and down markets. The model implies a stronger return-
liquidity relation in the 1980s relative to the 1990s in developed countries, owing to 
the existence of more sidelined investors in the 1980s, and greater market 
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participation in the 1990s. This is supported by the evidence of Griffin et al. (2004). 
With a large sample of weekly data in 46 countries over the period 1983-2003, Griffin 
et al. (2004) examine several possible explanations for the link between past stock 
return and liquidity. They find a positive relationship between past stock returns and 
future trading activity, which is measured by turnover. Their results show that an up 
market predicts higher liquidity, with approximately the same magnitude of effect as 
for a previous down market. Also, they find that the return-liquidity relation is more 
pronounced in the 1980s than in the 1990s in developed economies. Thus, they 
confirm the participation cost explanation for the return-liquidity relation. 
 
Bekaert et al. (2007) adopt monthly data from 19 emerging markets and the US market 
over the period 1987-2003 and study the return-liquidity relation. They employ a VAR 
analysis with relative number of zero trading days as illiquidity proxy and discover a 
positive association between past returns and future liquidity in emerging markets. 
However, in contrast to the finding of Chordia et al. (2002), Bekaert et al. (2007) results 
reveal that the effect of past stock returns on future liquidity is not significant in the 
US. Also, they document that past returns can predict future market liquidity in 
emerging markets. Moreover, Bekaert et al. (2007) point out that the participation cost, 
which is supported by Griffin et al. (2004), cannot explain their findings. 
 
Hence, the literature on the return-liquidity relation has not come to a generally 
agreed conclusion; nor has there been a comprehensive examination on that relation. 
Therefore, it is important to comprehensively study the direction and magnitude of 
the return-liquidity relation. Different liquidity measures capture different dimensions 
of market liquidity.  In Chordia et al. (2002), bid-ask spread captures the trading cost 
dimension; Griffin et al. (2004) adopt turnover ratio to capture the trading quantity 
dimension; Bekaert et al. (2007) use relative number of zero trading days to capture 
the trading speed dimension of liquidity. Adopting a different approach, Amihud (2002) 
liquidity measure captures the price impact dimension of the market liquidity. 
Moreover, unlike the other liquidity measures, Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio does not 
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rely on the microstructure data and thus allows the study on the return-liquidity 
relation to cover long periods of time (Amihud, 2002). To date this measure has not 
been used to study the return-liquidity relation from the price impact aspect of 
liquidity.  Therefore, such research is necessary.  
 
Finally, the association between the variance risk premium and market liquidity has 
not yet been investigated in the literature. If stock market returns have a substantial 
influence on the market liquidity, then it is plausible that the variance risk premium 
also impacts the liquidity. If this is the case, we could observe a much stronger link 
between liquidity and stock market returns or variance risk. Thus, it is clearly 
important to test the direction of causality. 
 
 
 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Variance Risk Premium (VRP) 
 
According to Bollerslev et al. (2009), Carr and Wu (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron 
(2011), the variance risk premium (VRP) is defined as the difference between risk-
neutral and physical expected variances: 
                   
                                                 , 1 , 1( ) ( )
Q P
t t t t t t tVRP E Var E Var                                  
 
where Q   and P  represent the risk-neutral and physical probability measures, 
respectively, and ( )E    is the expectation operator. Variance risk premium reflects 
investors’ risk aversion to volatility risk (Bakshi & Madan, 2006; Bollerslev et al., 2011; 
Bollerslev et al., 2009). Bollerslev et al. (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011) suggest 
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that the variance risk premium is induced by the uncertainty of consumption related 
to macroeconomic uncertainty through a recursive utility framework, and hence it 
shows a strong predictive power for stock market returns. 
 
In empirical investigation, however, the literature diverges on how to construct the 
measure of variance risk premium, especially in the calculation of expected physical 
variances. For example, Bollerslev et al. (2009) directly use the ex post realized return 
variation over[ 1, ]t t  time interval, which is actually the lagged realized variance over
[ , 1]t t  . This method is only valid under the assumption of martingale process for the 
realized variance. As a result, the realized volatility would behave like a unit root 
process with first order autocorrelation coefficient almost equal to one.  
 
On the other hand, Drechsler and Yaron (2011) argue that high frequency S&P 500 
cash index returns may be subject to the autocorrelation existing in the “stable” index 
when summing up 500 separate individual stock prices. Instead, they consider the high 
frequency S&P 500 futures realized variance forecasts by projecting futures realized 
variance on VIX and lagged index realized variance. Their slope coefficients are 
statistically significant and slightly larger than those in Bollerslev et al. (2009), with an 
increasing pattern from monthly horizon to quarterly horizon. They also consider the 
robust regression method, which adopts an iterative reweighted least squares 
algorithm to down-weight the impact of outliers on estimates, and provides 
estimation as statistically efficient as OLS in the absence of outliers. Drechsler and 
Yaron (2011) investigate the return predictability by the variance premium with OLS 
regression and robustness regression. Their results show that the robust regression 
estimates are similar to the OLS estimates in both sign and magnitude. Thus they 
exclude the possibility that their results are driven by outliers. 
 
In another paper, following the usual practice in the variance swap market, Carr and 
Wu (2009) use ex post forward realized variance from daily price as measure of 
expected realized variance. Although they do not directly consider an asset return 
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predictability regression in their paper, they demonstrate a highly significant negative 
relationship between log difference of realized variance and implied variance (which 
is the opposite of the variance premium used above) and future excess return for the 
stock index and many of the individual stocks considered on a monthly basis. 
 
In this study, we construct the measure of variance risk premium using the respective 
methods of Bollerslev et al. (2009), Carr and Wu (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011). 
The variance premium of Bollerslev et al. (2009) is denoted by BTZVRP , that of Carr and 
Wu (2009)  is denoted by CWVRP  and that of  Drechsler and Yaron (2011) is denoted 
by DYVRP . 
 
4.3.2 Illiquidity 
 
A number of illiquidity proxies have been advanced, such as quoted bid-ask spread 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986), marginal cost of trading (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 
1996),  and the probability of information based trading (Easley, Hvidkjaer, & O'Hara, 
2002). These illiquidity measures, however, are calculated from microstructure data 
on quotes and transactions, which is unavailable for the long periods required by most 
studies of the return-liquidity relation (Amihud, 2002). 
 
Therefore, in this paper, we use Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, which is based on 
readily available data (daily volumes and daily returns) and captures the price impact 
dimension of liquidity. This illiquidity measure, denoted by ILLIQ, is the average ratio 
of absolute stock return to the trading volume in dollars on the same day.  
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where ,i dR  is the return on stock i  on day d  , ,i dVOLD  is the corresponding daily 
volume in dollars, and iD is the number of days with data available for stock i  during 
the pre- and post- addition measurement periods. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure is widely used in the literature as the proxy for liquidity. (Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009)  This liquidity 
measure is attractive as it could be easily calculated for long time period given the 
wide availability of trading volume and returns data. Additionally, this illiquidity proxy 
has a strong theoretical appeal. Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio presents the average 
daily price response associated with a dollar of trading volume, which renders it  a 
good proxy for the theoretically founded Kyle’s price impact coefficient (Hasbrouck, 
2005; Miralles and Miralles, 2006; Goyenko et al. 2009). By studying eight liquidity 
measures, Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) find that Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and 
turnover are the only two measures that are priced in the cross-section of stock 
returns.  Goyenko et al. (2009) run horseraces of various liquidity measures, such as 
effective spread and price impact ratio, in the U.S. market. They find Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity ratio is one of the best performers and do well in measuring price impact.   
 
4.3.3 Data and Sample 
 
In this paper, we use the monthly data of variance risk premium, illiquidity, and excess 
stock returns for the US market over the period extending from January 1992 to 
December 2010. In our empirical investigations, we divide the full sample into three 
subsamples: 1992 to 2006, 1994 to 2008, and 1996 to 2010. 
 
First, we use five-minute intraday returns of the S&P 500 index obtained from the 
Institute for Financial Markets to construct the monthly realized volatility, and employ 
the monthly end VIX index as a proxy for model-free implied volatility. The VIX index is 
downloaded from the CBOE (Chicago Board of Options Exchange). According to the 
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white papers published by the CBOE, the VIX index is the risk-neutral expectation of 
future 30 days return variance inferred from every day option trading data. We use the 
VIX index at the last trading day of every trading month as expectation of next month, 
so that we can obtain a non-overlapping sample. VIX has been widely used in the 
literature as a proxy for the risk-neutral expected volatility (e.g., Bollerslev et al. (2009) 
Drechsler and Yaron (2011). According to Eq.(1), using the methods of Bollerslev et al. 
(2009), Carr and Wu (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011) to construct the expected 
realized variance, we obtain three measures of variance risk premium, denoted by 
BTZVRP , CWVRP  and DYVRP , respectively. 
 
Second, we consider the illiquidity for the S&P 500 index and the aggregate stock 
market (NYSE), respectively. We obtain the daily returns, prices, and trading volumes 
of stocks from CRSP. According to Eq. (6), we construct the monthly illiquidity ratio for 
the NYSE (
NYSEILLIQ ), and that for the S&P 500 index (
500SPILLIQ ).  
 
Third, we also consider two stock return measures: the monthly excess returns on a 
value-weighted market portfolio (denoted byVW  ), and the S&P 500 index excess 
return (denoted by INDEX ). We download the monthly value-weight return, the S&P 
500 index return and the risk-free rate from CRSP. We obtain the monthly data during 
our sample period for the Fama-French factors ( m fR R , SMB , andHML ) and the 
momentum factor (MOM ) from Ken French’s website.  
 
Finally, our forecasting analysis considers a number of economic predictors as control 
variables; specifically, we use price-earning ratio (PE ), dividends yields (DY ), default 
spread (DFSP ), term spread (TMSP ), and the stochastically de-trended risk-free rate 
(RREL ), defined as the one-month T-bill rate minus its backward twelve-month moving 
averages. The monthly price-earning ratio and dividend yields for the S&P 500 are 
obtained from Standard & Poor’s. The other economic data are downloaded from the 
public website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for all variables used in this paper, namely 
variance risk premium ( BTZVRP  , CWVRP  and DYVRP  ), illiquidity ratio (
NYSEILLIQ  and
500SPILLIQ  ), stock return (VW  and INDEX  ), and economic variables ( PD  , PE  ,
DFSP ,TMSP , and RREL ). As shown, the means for BTZVRP , CWVRP  and DYVRP are 
17.93, 17.92 and 18.51, respectively, while the standard deviations for BTZVRP , CWVRP  
and DYVRP  are 20.95, 32.80 and 22.83 respectively. This suggests that, relative to 
Bollerslev et al. (2009) variance risk premium measure, Drechsler and Yaron’s (2011) 
measure is slightly more volatile. Table 1 also illustrates that the illiquidity of the 
aggregate stock market is higher in both the mean and the standard deviation than 
that of the S&P 500 index. As for the portfolio return measures, the aggregate stock 
market return and S&P 500 index return present similar mean and standard deviation.  
The means for VW and INDEX  are 0.50 and 0.39, respectively, while the standard 
deviations for VW and INDEX are 4.32 and 4.38, respectively. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics. This table shows the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The variables are liquidity measures （ILLIQNYSE and ILLIQSP500), 
variance risk premium (VRPBTZ, VRPCW and VRPDY), return proxies (VW and INDEX) and control variables (PD, PE, DFSP, TMSP and RREL). The analysis uses monthly data from 
Jan 1992 to Dec 2010.  
Tables and Figures 
 
  ILLIQNYSE ILLIQSP500 VW INDEX VRPBTZ VRPCW VRPDY PD PE DFSP TMSP RREL 
 Mean -2.39 -7.25 0.50 0.39 17.93 17.92 18.51 3.97 3.19 0.94 1.86 -0.15 
 Median -2.05 -7.10 0.97 0.94 13.79 14.94 12.44 4.01 3.12 0.83 1.78 -0.05 
 Maximum 0.06 -4.99 9.59 9.07 116.52 124.45 206.57 4.49 4.81 3.38 3.76 1.86 
 Minimum -4.71 -9.24 -16.86 -18.58 -180.68 -350.28 -41.73 3.38 2.71 0.55 -0.53 -2.51 
 Std. Dev. 1.20 1.15 4.32 4.38 20.95 32.80 22.83 0.28 0.41 0.45 1.23 0.90 
 Skewness -0.16 0.09 -0.70 -0.90 -2.77 -6.07 3.84 -0.12 2.00 3.13 -0.13 -0.58 
 Kurtosis 2.03 1.90 4.17 4.76 39.57 72.55 27.03 2.19 7.91 14.49 1.72 3.04 
 Jarque-Bera 9.88 11.93 31.50 60.11 12993.74 47146.38 6044.01 6.80 381.29 1627.72 16.26 12.60 
 Probability 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Sum -544.86 -1653.63 114.82 89.46 4088.11 4067.59 4219.45 904.53 728.38 215.31 423.75 -34.05 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 324.29 301.04 4227.54 4358.32 99640.97 243067.90 118281.20 18.42 37.96 46.81 340.98 181.98 
 Observations 228 228 228 228 228 227 228 228 228 228 228 228 
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Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix. This table shows the correlations among the variables used in this study. The variables are liquidity measures (ILLIQNYSE and ILLIQSP500), variance 
risk premium (VRPBTZ, VRPCW and VRPDY), return proxies (VW and INDEX) and control variables (PD, PE, DFSP, TMSP and RREL). The analysis uses monthly data from Jan 1992 
to Dec 2010. 
 
  ILLIQNYSE ILLIQSP500 VW INDEX VRPBTZ VRPCW VRPDY PD PE DFSP TMSP RREL 
ILLIQNYSE 1.000            
ILLIQSP500 0.954 1.000           
VW -0.015 0.020 1.000          
INDEX -0.016 0.020 0.999 1.000         
VRPBTZ 0.045 0.008 0.001 0.004 1.000        
VRPCW 0.102 0.070 0.009 0.006 0.283 1.000       
VRPDY -0.007 -0.045 -0.558 -0.582 0.085 0.097 1.000      
PD -0.253 -0.339 0.089 0.087 0.161 0.047 0.035 1.000     
PE 0.129 -0.010 -0.052 -0.065 0.231 0.296 0.296 0.044 1.000    
DFSP -0.214 -0.312 -0.154 -0.168 0.025 0.192 0.237 -0.287 0.690 1.000   
TMSP 0.259 0.179 -0.049 -0.048 -0.009 0.032 0.017 -0.505 0.216 0.294 1.000  
RREL -0.159 -0.013 0.096 0.100 -0.258 -0.183 -0.122 0.123 -0.611 -0.492 -0.369 1.000 
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Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix for these variables. High correlation is shown 
between illiquidity for the NYSE and the S&P 500 index, and the two portfolio return 
measures. Also, we find that illiquidity for the NYSE is negatively related to 
contemporaneous market portfolio returns, while illiquidity for the S&P 500 is 
positively related to contemporaneous portfolio returns. For the variance risk 
premium, we find that BTZVRP   and CWVRP   have positive correlation with 
contemporaneous illiquidity and index return, while in the case of DYVRP  , the 
relationship is negative. 
 
4.3.4 Methodology 
 
Theoretically, liquidity and variance premium are exogenous variables and expected to 
be the determinants of return. However, it is possible that the two-direction relation 
exists. That is, return may also affect liquidity and variance risk premium.  
 
4.3.4.1 Granger-Causality Test 
 
The first step to investigate the relation among variance premium, return and 
unexpected illiquidity is the Granger-causality test. This test is employed to examine 
the Granger-causality relations among these variables. Time series x is said to granger 
cause time series y, if the past values of x could significantly predict the present value 
of y and not vice versa. We test the causal relation between variance premium and 
index return by the application of bivariate VAR model. The lag length of the VAR 
model is chosen by optimizing the Akaike Information Criterion. And we test the two-
way relations, that is, we examines whether variance premium could granger cause 
index return, and whether index return could granger cause variance premium. Also, 
we investigate the granger-causality relations between unexpected illiquidity and 
index return, and between variance premium and unexpected illiquidity.  
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We seek to answer whether or not variance premium could cause the index return 
with one unrestricted model and one restricted model. The unrestricted model is 
regression of returns on the lagged returns and lagged variance premium. The model 
will be estimated with OLS and provide the unrestricted RSS. The restricted model is 
regression of returns solely on the lagged returns. Also, we run this model to obtain 
the restricted RSS. Then the F-statistics would be constructed with restricted RSS and 
unrestricted RSS. Then we could know whether or not the restricted form could be 
rejected with the F-statistic. If the restricted form could be rejected in this case, it 
means that variance risk premier could cause the index returns. The same test 
procedure is employed for testing the causal relations between unexpected illiquidity 
and index return, and between variance risk premier and unexpected illiquidity.  
 
In the next step, we add some exogenous variables to the VAR models, including P/E 
ratio, dividends yields, default spread (between Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond 
spreads), term spread (between the ten-year T-bond and the three-month T-bill yields), 
and the stochastically detrended risk-free rate (the one-month T-bill rate minus its 
backward twelve-month moving averages). (Bollerslev et al., 2009) This procedure 
makes us look into the relationships among variance risk premium, return and 
unexpected illiquidity after considering the impact of these exogenous variables. 
 
4.3.4.2 Impulse Responses Functions 
 
The Granger-causality test in VAR could tell whether or not variance premium could 
significantly impact the future values of index return. However, it could not reveal 
whether the sign of the impact is positive or negative and how long it will take for the 
impact to work through the VAR system. The impulse response function gives answers 
to these questions by examining the dynamic behaviour of the VAR system. Also, the 
impulse response functions can be used to predict the responses from variance 
premium to the index return. The figure of the impulse response presents the 
responsiveness of returns to a 1% exogenous change in the variance risk premium. 
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Thereby, from the impulse responses figures, we could know the sign of the impact 
and whether the impact is long-run persistence or just a temporary jump. So the third 
step in our main empirical test is the impulse response. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Granger-causality Test 
 
Table 4.3 presents the p-values of the chi-square statistics for the Granger-causality 
tests between the illiquidity and stock returns (Panel A of Table 4.3); between variance 
risk premium and stock returns (Panel A of Table 4.3); and between variance risk 
premium and illiquidity (Panel B of Table 4.3).  
 
With respect to the causal relation between illiquidity and stock returns, there is 
insufficient evidence that illiquidity, however measured, can impact the future stock 
returns. However, the results illustrate that illiquidity, both for the aggregate market 
and the S&P 500 index portfolios, can be significantly Granger-caused by stock returns. 
The significance level is 1% for the full sample and all sub-samples. Thus, there exists 
unidirectional causality from stock return to illiquidity, which is consistent with the 
finding of Chordia et al. (2002). 
 
For the Granger-causality relation between variance risk premium and stock returns 
on the aggregate stock market and S&P 500 index portfolios, there is compelling 
evidence that the variance risk premium Granger-causes stock returns. Table 4.3 shows 
strong evidence of causality running from the variance risk premium for all measures 
to the stock market returns. For BTZVRP and CWVRP , the significance levels for the full 
period and the sub-periods are 1%. Meanwhile, DYVRP  can significantly cause the 
aggregate stock market return for the full period 1992-2010, and the sub-periods 
1992-2006 and 1996-2010. There is no vice versa relation. For the full period and all 
sub-periods, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that stock returns do not cause the 
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variance risk premium. Thus, we conclude that the variance risk premium leads to 
stock market returns. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 illustrates the causal relation between illiquidity and variance risk 
premium. As shown, the variance risk premium significantly Granger-causes illiquidity. 
The only exception is the causal relation from BTZVRP  to illiquidity for the S&P 500 
index, which is insignificant for the full period 1992-2010 and the sub-period 1996-
2010. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the illiquidity measures do not cause 
variance risk premium. 
 
In summary, first, stock market return Granger-causes illiquidity, while illiquidity 
cannot significantly affect the stock return. Second, stock returns do not cause 
variance risk premium, but variance risk premium does significantly affect the stock 
returns. Third, illiquidity cannot Granger-cause the variance risk premium, while there 
is significant evidence that variance risk premium can impact the market illiquidity.  
 
Table 4.4 reports results for the Granger-causality tests between illiquidity and stock 
market return; between variance risk premium and stock market return; and between 
illiquidity and variance risk premium, after controlling for a number of economic 
variables. The control variables are price-earnings ratio, dividend yields, default spread, 
term spread, and the stochastically de-trended risk-free rate reported in Table 4.1. The 
results for the Granger-causality tests in Table 4.4 are consistent with those in Table 
4.3. Specifically, after controlling for the economic variables, the variance risk premium 
significantly Granger-causes stock market returns across the full sample period and all 
subsample periods, and also causes the market illiquidity. Hence, we can conclude that 
even after controlling for these economic variables, variance risk premium has an 
incremental effect on the stock returns and market illiquidity, while stock returns and 
illiquidity do not cause the variance risk premium. Moreover, stock market returns 
Granger-cause illiquidity and not vice versa.  
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Table 4.3: Granger-Causality Test without Control Variables. This table presents the p-value of the chi-square 
statistics for the Granger-causality tests between illiquidity and stock return (reported in Panel A), between 
variance risk premium and stock return (reported in Panel A), and between variance risk premium and illiquidity 
(reported in Panel B). The analysis uses monthly data from full sample period Jan 1992 to Dec 2010, sub-period 
Jan 1992-Dec 2006, sub-period Jan 1994-Dec 2008, and sub-period Jan 1996-Dec 2010. 
 
Panel A: ILLIQ & Stock Return, VRP & Stock Return 
 
 X1 VW INDEX 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
ILLIQNYSE 
1992-2010 0.000 0.470 0.000 0.467 
1992-2006 0.000 0.974 0.000 0.940 
1994-2008 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.192 
1996-2010 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.520 
ILLIQSP500 
1992-2010 0.000 0.287 0.000 0.278 
1992-2006 0.000 0.408 0.000 0.413 
1994-2008 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.052 
1996-2010 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.249 
VRPBTZ 
1992-2010 0.634 0.000 0.612 0.000 
1992-2006 0.328 0.001 0.190 0.001 
1994-2008 0.305 0.005 0.443 0.007 
1996-2010 0.187 0.001 0.203 0.000 
VRPCW 
1992-2010 0.164 0.000 0.110 0.000 
1992-2006 0.476 0.000 0.388 0.000 
1994-2008 0.729 0.000 0.643 0.000 
1996-2010 0.029 0.000 0.018 0.000 
VRPDY 
1992-2010 0.421 0.007 0.428 0.006 
1992-2006 0.181 0.071 0.195 0.098 
1994-2008 0.388 0.658 0.414 0.599 
1996-2010 0.428 0.015 0.427 0.022 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: VRP & ILLIQ 
 
 X1 VRPBTZ VRPCW VRPDY 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
ILLIQNYSE 
1992-2010 0.036 0.685 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.802 
1992-2006 0.002 0.444 0.084 0.464 0.000 0.880 
1994-2008 0.087 0.271 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.886 
1996-2010 0.035 0.004 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.620 
ILLIQSP500 
1992-2010 0.158 0.768 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.179 
1992-2006 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.674 0.000 0.651 
1994-2008 0.082 0.354 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.536 
1996-2010 0.900 0.005 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.246 
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Table 4.4: Granger-Causality Test with Control Variables. This table presents the p-value of the chi-square 
statistics for the Granger-causality tests with control variables (PD, PE, DFSP, TMSP and RREL) between illiquidity 
and stock return (reported in Panel A), between variance risk premium and stock return (reported in Panel A), 
and between variance risk premium and illiquidity (reported in Panel B). The analysis uses monthly data from 
full sample period Jan 1992 to Dec 2010, sub-period Jan 1992- Dec 2006, sub-period Jan 1994-Dec 2008, and 
sub-period Jan 1996-Dec 2010.  
 
 
Panel A: ILLIQ & Stock Return, VRP & Stock Return 
 
 X1 VW INDEX 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
ILLIQNYSE 
1992-2010 0.000 0.967 0.000 0.984 
1992-2006 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.319 
1994-2008 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.143 
1996-2010 0.000 0.943 0.000 0.868 
ILLIQSP500 
1992-2010 0.000 0.684 0.000 0.734 
1992-2006 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.258 
1994-2008 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 
1996-2010 0.000 0.654 0.000 0.730 
VRPBTZ 
1992-2010 0.205 0.000 0.216 0.000 
1992-2006 0.255 0.000 0.249 0.000 
1994-2008 0.231 0.043 0.182 0.060 
1996-2010 0.224 0.000 0.237 0.000 
VRPCW 
1992-2010 0.596 0.000 0.504 0.000 
1992-2006 0.432 0.000 0.359 0.000 
1994-2008 0.911 0.000 0.870 0.000 
1996-2010 0.615 0.000 0.532 0.000 
VRPDY 
1992-2010 0.339 0.000 0.354 0.000 
1992-2006 0.732 0.001 0.763 0.002 
1994-2008 0.173 0.000 0.179 0.000 
1996-2010 0.447 0.002 0.466 0.002 
 
 
 
Panel B: VRP & ILLIQ 
 
 X1 VRPBTZ VRPCW VRPDY 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
ILLIQNYSE 
1992-2010 0.086 0.920 0.000 0.606 0.000 0.944 
1992-2006 0.002 0.475 0.003 0.832 0.000 0.541 
1994-2008 0.009 0.068 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.136 
1996-2010 0.114 0.255 0.000 0.364 0.000 0.282 
ILLIQSP500 
1992-2010 0.837 0.681 0.000 0.576 0.000 0.353 
1992-2006 0.000 0.323 0.001 0.608 0.000 0.380 
1994-2008 0.013 0.020 0.000 0.832 0.000 0.145 
1996-2010 0.837 0.681 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.173 
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4.4.2 Impulse Response Functions 
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the estimated impulse response functions for illiquidity, stock 
market return, and variance risk premium for twenty-four months. Figure 4.2 plots the 
estimated cumulative impulse response functions. Both Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are 
plotted according to the VAR model for the full sample period from January 1992 to 
December 2010. The estimated response is represented by the solid line, with the 
confidence intervals (two standard errors) represented by the dashed lines. If the 
dashed lines contain zero (cross the horizontal axis), this implies that the effect is 
statistically insignificant. In each impulse response function graph in Figures 4.1 and 
4.2, the horizontal axis represents the months relative to the shock. Month 1 is the 
month of the shock; Month 2 is the first month after the shock, etc. The vertical axis 
in Figure 4.1 refers to the percentage change in each variable in the month following 
a one standard deviation increase in another variable. The vertical axis in Figure 4.2 
records the magnitude of the accumulated response, measured as a percentage 
change, from the month of innovation. 
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses Functions for Stock Returns, Illiquidity and Variance Risk Premium. Figure 1 plots the estimated impulse response functions for illiquidity, 
stock return and variance risk premium for twenty-four months. These figures are based on the VAR model for the full sample period from Jan 1992 to Dec 2010. Panel A 
presents the impulse response function for VW following a one standard deviation innovation in illiquidity and variance risk premium. Panel B presents the impulse response 
function for INDEX to illiquidity and variance risk premium. Panel C illustrates the response of illiquidity for NYSE to one unit change in index return and variance risk premium. 
Panel D reports the response for illiquidity for S&P500 index to the change in stock return and variance risk premium. The impulse response functions for variance risk 
premium to the illiquidity and stock return are reported in Panel E, Panel F and Panel G, respectively. The solid lines refer to the response of each variable in the month 
(represented in the horizontal axis of each figure) following one standard deviation in other variable. The magnitude of the response, measured as percentage change, is 
reported in the vertical axis in each figure. The dashed lines refer to the confidence intervals at two standard errors. 
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Panel C: The Response of ILLIQNYSE 
  
 
 
Panel D: The Response of ILLIQSP500 
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Panel F: The Response of VRPCW 
 
   
 
 
Panel G: The Response of VRPDY 
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative Impulse Responses Functions for Stock Returns, Illiquidity, and Variance Risk Premium. Figure 2 presents the estimated impulse response functions 
for illiquidity, stock return, and variance risk premium for twenty-four months. The figures are based on the VAR model for the full sample period from Jan 1992 to Dec 2010. 
Panel A presents the cumulative impulse response function for VW to illiquidity and variance risk premium. Panel B presents the cumulative impulse response function for 
INDEX to illiquidity and variance risk premium. Panel C illustrates the response of illiquidity for NYSE to one unit change in stock return and variance risk premium. Panel D 
reports the response of illiquidity for S&P 500 index to the change in stock return and variance risk premium. The impulse response functions for variance risk premium to 
the illiquidity and return are reported in Panel E, Panel F and Panel G, respectively. The solid lines refer to the accumulated response for each variable from the month of 
innovation (represented in the horizontal axis of each figure). The magnitude of the response, measured as percentage change, is reported in the vertical axis in each figure. 
The dashed lines refer to the confidence intervals at two standard errors. 
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Panel C: Accumulative Response of ILLIQNYSE 
   
 
Panel D: Accumulative Response of ILLIQSP500 
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Panel F: The Response of VRPCW 
 
   
 
 
Panel G: Accumulative Response of VRPDY 
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In Panel A of Figure 4.1, we present the impulse response functions for the aggregate 
stock market returns in reaction to illiquidity and variance risk premium. As shown, 
there is no impulse response for stock returns in reaction to illiquidity. This is 
consistent with our results from the Granger-causality tests, that illiquidity measures 
for both the aggregate stock market and S&P 500 index portfolios have no effects on 
the stock returns. In contrast, the variance risk premium significantly and positively 
affects the stock returns. In response to a one standard deviation disturbance in 
BTZVRP , stock market return starts increasing in the first month, then reaches 1% in 
the third month, and finally declines slowly from the fourth month. For the first five 
months, the impulse response function is above the horizontal line and the standard 
error lines do not contain zero. This implies that BTZVRP  has lasting positive effects on 
stock market returns using conventional confidence intervals. Similar patterns of 
impulse response are shown for the other two variance risk premium measures, 
CWVRP and DYVRP .  In addition, our results are robust for S&P 500 index returns, as 
shown in Panel B. 
 
Panels C and D of Figure 4.1 display the response of illiquidity to one unit change in 
stock returns and variance risk premium. As shown, one standard deviation 
disturbance originating from VW   and INDEX   result in around 1% decrease in 
market illiquidity for the first two months. Then the impulse response goes down 
slightly from the sixth month. The impulse response of illiquidity to the variance risk 
premium measures for the full sample period displays different patterns. The 
significant impulse response to BTZVRP  cannot be observed in the long run using 
conventional levels of confidence. The third figure in Panel C shows that one standard 
deviation disturbance originating from illiquidity for the S&P 500 index results in 
around 1% decrease in VW in the first two months. Then the shock lasts over the long 
term. The impulse response of illiquidity to DYVRP   is positive over the first four 
months and then gradually dies out, with zero contained in the two standard error 
lines all the time. Panel D reports the results for the S&P 500 index. Compared with 
the results in Panel C, the response of illiquidity for the S&P 500 index to the variance 
risk premium has a quite similar pattern. Also, the response to the stock returns is 
significant in the first four months and then dies out. Thus, Panels C and D show that 
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stock market returns have considerable impact on the illiquidity in the short term, and 
the impact of stock returns on illiquidity in the S&P 500 index lasts longer than the 
impact on market illiquidity.  In addition, it can be seen that, over the full sample 
period, the impacts of different variance risk premium measures on illiquidity show 
different patterns using conventional confidence intervals. Overall, in the short run, 
both S&P 500 index returns and most variance risk premium measures can significantly 
affect illiquidity. 
 
The impulse response functions of variance risk premium to the illiquidity and stock 
market returns are reported in Panel E, Panel F, and Panel G, respectively. The figures 
show that the impulse responses of variance risk premium to both the stock market 
returns and illiquidity cannot be significantly observed. Thus, it appears that neither 
stock market returns nor illiquidity impact the variance risk premium.  
 
The cumulative impulse response functions presented in Figure 4.2 confirm the 
conclusions drawn from Figure 4.1. It is simply another method to present the pattern 
of the response of one variable to a one unit change in each of the other variables. For 
example, the third figure in Panel A of Figure 4.2 illustrates the accumulated response 
of the aggregate stock market returns to BTZVRP : the accumulated impulse response 
increases to 3% in the first 5 months, which is consistent with the positive impulse 
response over the same period shown in Panel A of Figure 4.1.  
 
4.4.3 Predictability of Variance Risk Premium and Illiquidity 
 
The prediction of excess stock market returns has long been discussed in the literature. 
Numerous methods and variables have been advanced to forecast future stock returns. 
The typical specification used in the return forecast is presented in equation (7), which 
regresses excess stock market returns on lagged predictors.  
 
                                             1t t t
R x                                                        (7) 
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where 1tR  is the excess stock market return at time t+1, tx is the predictor at time t, 
and the significance of coefficient   is used to test the predictive power for the excess 
stock returns. In order to test whether illiquidity and variance risk premium are able 
to predict future excess stock returns, we run the regressive model (7) based on the 
illiquidity, variance risk premium, a number of economic variables and 2007-2008 
financial crisis dummy variables. In particular, the model (7) can be regarded as a 
benchmark model when tx  represents financial crisis dummy ( FC  ) and the 
conventional economic predictors price-earning ratio (PE ), dividends yields (DY ), 
default spread (DFSP ), term spread (TMSP ), and the stochastically de-trended risk-
free rate (RREL ).  
 
       1 1 2 3 4 5 6t t t t t t t t
R DY PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC                                  
(8) 
 
To test the incremental predictability of illiquidity and variance risk premium, we run 
the following multivariate regression models in which the economic predictors, 
financial crisis dummy and variance risk premium/illiquidity are incorporated: 
 
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *t t t t t t t t t tR VRP DY PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC FC VRP                         
(9) 
 
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *t t t t t t t t t tR ILLIQ DY PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC FC ILLIQ                         
                                                                           (10) 
 
Table 4.5 presents the results for the benchmark model (Panel A) and those for the 
forecasting power of variance risk premium (Panel B and Panel D) and illiquidity (Panel 
C and Panel E). We report the estimates and the Newey-West t-statistic for coefficients 
of all the predictors used in the regression. We also report the F-statistic of each 
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regression. Results for the aggregate stock market are shown in Panel B and Panel D, 
and results for the S&P 500 index returns are reported in Panel B and Panel E. 
 
As shown in Table 4.5, the predictability of economic variables in the benchmark 
model can be enhanced by the variance risk premium rather than by illiquidity 
according to the Newey-West t-statistic. Specifically, Panel A of Table 4.5 shows that 
the coefficients of all economic variables are insignificant, and these predictors cannot 
generate a statistically significant F-statistic. This is consistent with the empirical 
finding of Welch and Goyal (2008), that the economic variables show limited predictive 
power for the excess stock returns. However, when the variance risk premium is 
incorporated into the regressions, the F-statistic increases remarkably and all 
coefficients of variance risk premium measures are significant. In contrast, when the 
illiquidity is incorporated, the regressions do not generate a statistically significant F-
statistic.  Thus, there is insufficient evidence for us to reject the null hypothesis that 
illiquidity can forecast the future excess stock market returns. This is consistent with 
our results from the Granger test. 
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Table 4.5: Stock Return Prediction with Illiquidity and Variance Risk Premium. This table presents the results for the predictive power of variance risk premium (Panel B and 
Panel D) and illiquidity (Panel C and Panel E). Panel A reports the benchmark model. The dependent variable is market excess return (VW and INDEX), the independent 
variables are the lagged (once) VRP (VRPBTZ, VRPCW and VRPDY), ILLIQ (ILLIQNYSE and ILLIQSP500), control variables (PD, PE, DFSP, TMSP and RREL), 2007-2008 financial crisis 
dummy and the slope dummy (interaction term between financial crisis dummy and VRP, ILLIQ).  The benchmark modes are reported in Panel A. We report the estimates of 
coefficients and the corresponding t-values reported in parentheses for all the predictors used in the regression. This table also reports the F statistics. The reported 
coefficients and t-statistic are estimated using OLS with bootstrap (taking correlation of independent variables into account). 
 
Panel A: Benchmark model 
 
  Dep. Cons PD PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC F 
1992-2010 VW 
3.772 -0.714 0.062 0.281 -0.276 0.136 -2.827* 
1.144 
(0.69) (-0.55) (0.04) (0.19) (-0.72) (0.26) (-1.81) 
1992-2006 VW 
2.647 0.610 -1.136 -1.139 0.035 0.190  
0.494 
(0.50) (0.36) (-0.42) (-0.53) (0.10) (0.30)  
1994-2008 VW 
3.088 1.712 -2.807 -0.462 -0.094 -0.182 -2.019 
1.442 
(0.53) (0.91) (-1.21) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.34) (-1.48) 
1996-2010 VW 
8.647 -2.079 0.493 -0.593 -0.168 0.165 -2.759 
1.135 
(0.96) (-0.93) (0.31) (-0.33) (-0.38) (0.25) (-1.65) 
                   
1992-2010 INDEX 
4.075 -0.794 0.061 0.170 -0.267 0.148 -2.878* 
1.143 
(0.75) (-0.61) (0.04) (0.11) (-0.68) (0.28) (-1.77) 
1992-2006 INDEX 
3.235 0.690 -1.479 -1.103 0.062 0.154  
0.543 
(0.62) (0.40) (-0.54) (-0.51) (0.18) (0.24)  
1994-2008 INDEX 
3.369 1.865 -3.153 -0.393 -0.082 -0.203 -2.133 
1.499 
(0.58) (0.98) (-1.34) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.38) (-1.52) 
1996-2010 INDEX 
8.727 -2.108 0.488 -0.678 -0.158 0.188 -2.799 
1.125 
(0.97) (-0.94) (0.31) (-0.37) (-0.35) (0.28) (-1.61) 
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Panel B: Predictive Power of VRP for VW 
 
  Dep. Cons PD PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC VRPBTZ FC_VRPBTZ VRPCW FC_VRPCW VRPDY FC_VRPDY F 
1992-2010 VW 
3.549 -0.904 -0.078 0.083 -0.066 0.654 -1.160 0.064*** -0.024     
14.661*** 
(0.65) (-0.70) (-0.05) (0.06) (-0.17) (1.24) (-0.77) (3.25) (-1.08)     
1992-2006 VW 
5.479 1.133 -3.434 -0.047 0.205 0.199  0.065***      
2.079* 
(1.01) (0.67) (-1.21) (-0.02) (0.62) (0.31)  (2.90)      
1994-2008 VW 
3.512 2.658 -5.085 1.230 0.050 0.032 -1.199 0.070*** -0.057     
9.701*** 
(0.60) (1.21) (-1.62) (0.65) (0.14) (0.05) (-0.85) (3.02) (-1.64)     
1996-2010 VW 
3.224 -1.102 0.262 -0.219 0.084 0.880 -0.784 0.067*** -0.024     
14.739*** 
(0.38) (-0.51) (0.16) (-0.12) (0.19) (1.27) (-0.48) (3.33) (-1.05)         
                              
1992-2010 VW 
4.731 -0.781 -0.713 -1.244 0.152 0.735 0.807   0.118*** -0.073***   
47.291*** 
(0.93) (-0.67) (-0.49) (-0.98) (0.44) (1.50) (0.65)   (7.48) (-4.47)   
1992-2006 VW 
7.387 1.409 -4.841* 0.054 0.384 0.323    0.122***    
9.296*** 
(1.44) (0.94) (-1.95) (0.03) (1.28) (0.59)    (6.12)    
1994-2008 VW 
3.505 4.341*** -7.864*** 1.485 0.409 0.142 0.395   0.131*** -0.083***   
21.667*** 
(0.63) (2.75) (-3.47) (0.93) (1.33) (0.33) (0.38)   (6.09) (-3.82)   
1996-2010 VW 
3.947 -0.888 -0.361 -1.570 0.334 1.006 1.282   0.121*** -0.076***   
45.164*** 
(0.49) (-0.43) (-0.22) (-0.97) (0.84) (1.59) (0.91)     (7.32) (-4.44)     
                              
1992-2010 VW 
2.078 -0.986 0.652 0.007 -0.024 0.747 0.189     0.039** -0.102*** 
1.933* 
(0.38) (-0.76) (0.44) (0.00) (-0.07) (1.58) (0.14)     (2.09) (-3.30) 
1992-2006 VW 
4.693 0.946 -2.624 -0.875 0.196 0.189      0.048***  
1.799* 
(0.86) (0.57) (-0.95) (-0.42) (0.58) (0.30)      (2.74)  
1994-2008 VW 
2.284 0.979 -2.094 0.108 0.025 0.416 0.218     0.048*** -0.098*** 
2.295** 
(0.38) (0.49) (-0.74) (0.06) (0.07) (0.72) (0.16)     (2.66) (-2.96) 
1996-2010 VW 
4.309 -1.886 1.215 -0.702 0.153 0.995 0.630     0.040** -0.107*** 
1.915* 
(0.49) (-0.86) (0.75) (-0.39) (0.36) (1.62) (0.44)         (2.11) (-3.39) 
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Panel C: Predictive Power of ILLIQ for VW 
 
  Dep. Cons PD PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC ILLIQNYSE FC_ILLIQNYSE ILLIQSP500 FC_ILLIQSP500 F 
1992-2010 VW 
3.371 -0.939 0.254 0.618 -0.190 0.231 -15.066 -0.104 -2.989   
0.877 
(0.59) (-0.58) (0.17) (0.32) (-0.51) (0.45) (-1.37) (-0.27) (-1.17)   
1992-2006 VW 
1.554 2.881 -3.591 -0.108 0.095 0.149  0.603    
0.529 
(0.29) (0.94) (-0.88) (-0.04) (0.28) (0.23)  (0.98)    
1994-2008 VW 
1.651 4.382 -5.649 0.782 -0.019 -0.221 0.568 0.724 0.346   
1.529 
(0.26) (1.09) (-1.29) (0.29) (-0.05) (-0.41) (0.03) (1.12) (0.09)   
1996-2010 VW 
7.104 -1.920 0.535 0.062 -0.052 0.333 -15.750 0.018 -3.231   
0.827 
(0.73) (-0.84) (0.34) (0.03) (-0.12) (0.47) (-1.37) (0.03) (-1.19)     
                          
1992-2010 VW 
2.885 -0.398 -0.069 1.092 -0.174 0.271 -34.060   0.121 -3.612 
0.854 
(0.53) (-0.23) (-0.04) (0.52) (-0.47) (0.54) (-1.36)   (0.30) (-1.28) 
1992-2006 VW 
3.736 4.885 -5.441 1.558 0.185 -0.080    1.027  
0.721 
(0.71) (1.47) (-1.33) (0.52) (0.53) (-0.13)    (1.63)  
1994-2008 VW 
4.045 6.670* -7.579* 2.487 0.098 -0.425 -0.292   1.230** 0.054 
1.968* 
(0.69) (1.74) (-1.91) (0.85) (0.26) (-0.83) (-0.01)   (2.01) (0.02) 
1996-2010 VW 
11.095 -1.819 0.116 0.540 0.049 0.433 -39.881   0.491 -4.337 
0.868 
(1.11) (-0.82) (0.07) (0.25) (0.11) (0.65) (-1.48)     (0.88) (-1.43) 
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Panel D: Predictive Power of VRP for INDEX 
 
  Dep. Cons PD PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC VRPBTZ FC_VRPBTZ VRPCW FC_VRPCW VRPDY FC_VRPDY F 
1992-2010 INDEX 
3.821 -0.979 -0.058 -0.016 -0.065 0.651 -1.282 0.061*** -0.021     
12.828*** 
(0.70) (-0.75) (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.17) (1.22) (-0.81) (3.09) (-0.96)     
1992-2006 INDEX 
5.991 1.199 -3.716 -0.040 0.228 0.162  0.063***      
2.033* 
(1.12) (0.70) (-1.30) (-0.02) (0.68) (0.25)  (2.84)      
1994-2008 INDEX 
3.830 2.853 -5.477* 1.262 0.062 -0.015 -1.330 0.069*** -0.058     
8.538*** 
(0.66) (1.26) (-1.71) (0.65) (0.17) (-0.02) (-0.91) (2.98) (-1.63)     
1996-2010 INDEX 
3.479 -1.177 0.286 -0.317 0.087 0.886 -0.899 0.064*** -0.021     
12.960*** 
(0.41) (-0.55) (0.18) (-0.17) (0.19) (1.26) (-0.52) (3.19) (-0.93)         
                               
1992-2010 INDEX 
4.995 -0.855 -0.710 -1.374 0.169 0.755 0.782   0.118*** -0.069***   
52.829*** 
(0.98) (-0.72) (-0.48) (-1.06) (0.48) (1.53) (0.61)   (7.50) (-4.22)   
1992-2006 INDEX 
8.002 1.493 -5.205** 0.097 0.413 0.288    0.123***    
9.785*** 
(1.58) (0.99) (-2.08) (0.05) (1.35) (0.53)    (6.17)    
1994-2008 INDEX 
3.705 4.573*** -8.298*** 1.539 0.441 0.129 0.341   0.132*** -0.080***   
24.318*** 
(0.68) (2.86) (-3.62) (0.96) (1.41) (0.30) (0.33)   (6.17) (-3.69)   
1996-2010 INDEX 
4.110 -0.946 -0.351 -1.696 0.355 1.044 1.276   0.122*** -0.072***   
50.322*** 
(0.51) (-0.46) (-0.21) (-1.02) (0.87) (1.63) (0.89)     (7.32) (-4.20)     
                              
1992-2010 INDEX 
2.258 -1.062 0.691 -0.085 -0.015 0.770 0.172     0.037* -0.103*** 
1.774* 
(0.42) (-0.81) (0.47) (-0.06) (-0.04) (1.62) (0.13)     (1.97) (-3.08) 
1992-2006 INDEX 
5.234 1.018 -2.933 -0.845 0.220 0.153      0.047***  
1.783* 
(0.97) (0.61) (-1.05) (-0.40) (0.64) (0.24)      (2.70)  
1994-2008 INDEX 
2.494 1.059 -2.310 0.156 0.034 0.415 0.149     0.047*** -0.099*** 
2.221** 
(0.42) (0.52) (-0.79) (0.09) (0.09) (0.72) (0.11)     (2.62) (-2.77) 
1996-2010 INDEX 
4.424 -1.956 1.264 -0.791 0.166 1.034* 0.633     0.038** -0.108*** 
1.759* 
(0.51) (-0.89) (0.78) (-0.43) (0.39) (1.68) (0.43)         (2.00) (-3.18) 
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Panel E: Predictive Power of ILLIQ for INDEX 
 
  Dep. Cons PD PE DFSP TMSP RREL FC ILLIQNYSE FC_ILLIQNYSE ILLIQSP500 FC_ILLIQSP500 F 
1992-2010 INDEX 
3.756 -1.088 0.299 0.466 -0.179 0.238 -15.649 -0.137 -3.109   
0.874 
(0.65) (-0.67) (0.20) (0.23) (-0.47) (0.46) (-1.35) (-0.36) (-1.16)   
1992-2006 INDEX 
2.220 2.800 -3.761 -0.145 0.118 0.116  0.560    
0.545 
(0.43) (0.90) (-0.91) (-0.05) (0.34) (0.18)  (0.90)    
1994-2008 INDEX 
2.090 4.245 -5.692 0.815 -0.018 -0.226 -0.493 0.669 0.142   
1.551 
(0.33) (1.02) (-1.26) (0.30) (-0.04) (-0.42) (-0.03) (1.01) (0.04)   
1996-2010 INDEX 
6.570 -1.881 0.581 -0.033 -0.048 0.331 -16.174 -0.053 -3.302   0.822 
(0.67) (-0.82) (0.37) (-0.02) (-0.11) (0.46) (-1.34) (-0.09) (-1.17)       
                           
1992-2010 INDEX 
3.207 -0.574 -0.018 0.917 -0.167 0.281 -34.920   0.086 -3.701 
0.847 
(0.59) (-0.33) (-0.01) (0.43) (-0.44) (0.55) (-1.33)   (0.21) (-1.26) 
1992-2006 INDEX 
4.298 4.862 -5.682 1.529 0.209 -0.110    1.002  
0.729 
(0.82) (1.44) (-1.36) (0.50) (0.59) (-0.17)    (1.58)  
1994-2008 INDEX 
4.327 6.640* -7.748* 2.502 0.102 -0.434 -1.360   1.196* -0.050 
1.958* 
(0.75) (1.71) (-1.91) (0.84) (0.26) (-0.84) (-0.04)   (1.93) (-0.01) 
1996-2010 INDEX 
10.515 -1.856 0.175 0.401 0.047 0.442 -40.256   0.418 -4.368 
0.842 
(1.05) (-0.83) (0.11) (0.18) (0.10) (0.65) (-1.44)     (0.74) (-1.38) 
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4.5 Robustness Tests 
 
There is empirical evidence to show that variance risk premium/illiquidity is highly 
related with equity returns (Amihud, 2002; Carr & Wu, 2009; Smirlock & Starks, 1988). 
However, we cannot know whether the significant relation is quasi-rational behaviour 
or simply serendipitous or a function of economically rational expectation. Without 
understanding why variance risk premium/illiquidity is significantly related to the 
equity returns, we cannot be confident that the significant association is robust.  
 
Therefore, we study how the variance risk premium/illiquidity is related to the US 
equity returns. Specifically, we investigate whether the variance risk 
premium/illiquidity has a systematic and direct association with the Fama-French 
three factors, i.e., market risk premium (
m fR R ), size factor (SMB) and value factor 
(HML) (Fama & French, 1993), and also with the momentum factor (MOM) (Carhart, 
1997). We find the associations between variance risk premium/illiquidity and market 
risk premium in the Granger tests; hence, in the robustness check, we extend our 
investigation to the relation between variance risk premium/illiquidity and other 
systematic risk factors contained in the augmented Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model. 
 
 
To do so, we run the Granger-causality test again between variance risk 
premium/illiquidity and the risk factors (
m fR R  , SMB, HML and MOM). Table 4.6 
presents the results for the Granger-causality test with no control variables. Panel A of 
Table 4.6 shows that variance risk premium causes the market risk premium, value 
factor and momentum factor for the full sample period and most of the sub-sample 
periods, while it cannot cause the size factor. On the other hand, there is limited 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that any of the four risk factors can cause the 
variance risk premium. Panel B of Table 4.6 demonstrates that there is one-way 
causality running from market risk premium and momentum to illiquidity. For the 
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causal relationships between illiquidity and the size and value factors, causality 
relation is significantly evidenced in only a few sample periods. 
 
Table 4.7 reports the results for the Granger-causality test with control variables (price-
earnings ratio, dividend yields, default spread, term spread, and the stochastically de-
trended risk-free rate). The results are similar to those in Table 4.6. In Table 4.7, we 
find significant one-way Granger-causality relation running from the variance risk 
premium to the market risk premium and momentum factors in the full sample period 
and all the sub-sample periods.   
 
In summary, the variance risk premium Granger causes the market risk premium, value 
factor and momentum factor, and hence may affect the equity returns. In particular, 
this result is remarkable for the market risk premium and the momentum factor. It 
indicates that the variance risk premium affects equity returns as its changes are 
reflected in the time-varying systematically priced market risk premium, value factor 
and momentum factor. Also, the results show that illiquidity does not significantly 
Granger-cause any of the risk factors, namely market risk premium, size, value and 
momentum factors. This implies that illiquidity cannot affect equity returns through 
the risk factors included in the augmented Fama and French (1993) model. Conversely, 
two risk factors, market risk premium and momentum factor, can Granger-cause the 
illiquidity.  
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Table 4.6: Variance Risk Premium, Illiquidity, and Risk Factors. This table presents the p-value of the chi-square 
statistics for the Granger-causality tests between VRP  and risk factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) (reported 
in Panel A), and between illiquidity and risk factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) (reported in Panel B). The 
analysis uses monthly data from full sample period Jan 1992 to Dec 2010, sub-period Jan 1992-Dec 2006, sub-
period Jan 1994-Dec 2008, and sub-period Jan 1996-Dec 2010.  
 
Panel A: VRP & Risk Factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) 
 
 X1 VRPBTZ VRPCW VRPDY 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
Rm – Rf 
1992-2010 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.110 0.007 0.523 
1992-2006 0.004 0.284 0.000 0.064 0.061 0.249 
1994-2008 0.007 0.534 0.000 0.539 0.693 0.554 
1996-2010 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.018 0.015 0.542 
SMB 
1992-2010 0.428 0.389 0.076 0.137 0.088 0.769 
1992-2006 0.781 0.200 0.062 0.014 0.253 0.784 
1994-2008 0.510 0.147 0.116 0.100 0.067 0.713 
1996-2010 0.504 0.365 0.112 0.143 0.075 0.887 
HML 
1992-2010 0.048 0.024 0.004 0.416 0.001 0.984 
1992-2006 0.004 0.190 0.001 0.689 0.006 0.373 
1994-2008 0.469 0.438 0.202 0.730 0.003 0.978 
1996-2010 0.581 0.011 0.006 0.388 0.001 0.882 
MOM 
1992-2010 0.001 0.328 0.003 0.219 0.000 0.596 
1992-2006 0.000 0.669 0.287 0.396 0.019 0.277 
1994-2008 0.266 0.049 0.145 0.112 0.039 0.501 
1996-2010 0.007 0.410 0.011 0.311 0.002 0.602 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ILLIQ & Risk Factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) 
 
 X1 ILLIQNYSE ILLIQSP500 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
Rm – Rf 
1992-2010 0.501 0.000 0.373 0.000 
1992-2006 0.917 0.000 0.454 0.000 
1994-2008 0.203 0.000 0.231 0.000 
1996-2010 0.550 0.000 0.348 0.000 
SMB 
1992-2010 0.121 0.161 0.265 0.115 
1992-2006 0.639 0.037 0.354 0.782 
1994-2008 0.275 0.254 0.732 0.617 
1996-2010 0.610 0.129 0.776 0.818 
HML 
1992-2010 0.475 0.080 0.812 0.133 
1992-2006 0.998 0.002 0.605 0.016 
1994-2008 0.798 0.008 0.362 0.079 
1996-2010 0.951 0.188 0.524 0.322 
MOM 
1992-2010 0.951 0.000 0.929 0.000 
1992-2006 0.796 0.000 0.874 0.000 
1994-2008 0.715 0.000 0.709 0.000 
1996-2010 0.712 0.000 0.837 0.000 
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Table 4.7: Variance Risk Premium, Illiquidity, and Risk Factors with Control Variables. This table presents the p-
value of the chi-square statistics for the Granger-causality tests with control variables (PD, PE, DFSP, TMSP and 
RREL) between VRP  and risk factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) (reported in Panel A), and between illiquidity 
and risk factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) (reported in Panel B). The analysis uses monthly data from full 
sample period Jan 1992 to Dec 2010, sub-period Jan 1992-Dec 2006, sub-period Jan 1994-Dec 2008, and sub-
period Jan 1996-Dec 2010. 
 
 
Panel A: VRP & Risk Factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) 
 
 X1 VRPBTZ VRPCW VRPDY 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
Rm – Rf 
1992-2010 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.444 0.001 0.427 
1992-2006 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.167 0.008 0.862 
1994-2008 0.054 0.211 0.000 0.775 0.000 0.263 
1996-2010 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.021 0.003 0.531 
SMB 
1992-2010 0.745 0.274 0.339 0.035 0.037 0.527 
1992-2006 0.638 0.055 0.498 0.009 0.362 0.558 
1994-2008 0.666 0.071 0.404 0.051 0.019 0.802 
1996-2010 0.648 0.471 0.219 0.070 0.069 0.959 
HML 
1992-2010 0.044 0.002 0.006 0.307 0.000 0.835 
1992-2006 0.003 0.147 0.000 0.830 0.006 0.223 
1994-2008 0.256 0.182 0.043 0.679 0.015 0.967 
1996-2010 0.352 0.005 0.012 0.373 0.000 0.832 
MOM 
1992-2010 0.000 0.197 0.001 0.191 0.006 0.131 
1992-2006 0.000 0.073 0.052 0.688 0.000 0.286 
1994-2008 0.040 0.112 0.076 0.067 0.003 0.221 
1996-2010 0.001 0.339 0.005 0.432 0.015 0.052 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ILLIQ & Risk Factors (Rm – Rf, SMB, HML and MOM) 
 
 X1 ILLIQNYSE ILLIQSP500 
X2 Sample period X1->X2 X2->X1 X1->X2 X2->X1 
Rm – Rf 
1992-2010 0.973 0.000 0.731 0.000 
1992-2006 0.300 0.000 0.190 0.000 
1994-2008 0.305 0.000 0.027 0.000 
1996-2010 0.846 0.000 0.791 0.000 
SMB 
1992-2010 0.845 0.037 0.116 0.023 
1992-2006 0.414 0.041 0.199 0.275 
1994-2008 0.442 0.339 0.246 0.011 
1996-2010 0.128 0.096 0.191 0.027 
HML 
1992-2010 0.659 0.070 0.240 0.122 
1992-2006 0.788 0.001 0.288 0.012 
1994-2008 0.431 0.001 0.860 0.029 
1996-2010 0.658 0.166 0.154 0.281 
MOM 
1992-2010 0.841 0.000 0.293 0.000 
1992-2006 0.798 0.000 0.411 0.000 
1994-2008 0.148 0.000 0.136 0.000 
1996-2010 0.652 0.000 0.451 0.000 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the Granger-causality relation among variance risk premium, 
illiquidity, and stock market returns using the US monthly data from January 1992 to 
December 2010. We find that the variance risk premium can trigger stock market 
returns, and in turn, illiquidity, but this conclusion does not hold vice versa. More 
importantly, market illiquidity cannot affect the stock market returns, but stock returns 
cause illiquidity. Our results are robust for different sub-sample periods and are also 
confirmed by the impulse response test. Consequently, the variance risk premium 
shows a strong predictive power for future excess stock returns, but illiquidity is found 
to have little predictive power. 
 
In addition, we examine how the variance risk premium/illiquidity is related to the 
equity returns by investigating the Granger-causality relationship between the 
variance risk premium (and illiquidity) and the systematic risk factors contained in the 
augmented Fama and French (1993) model. We find that the variance risk premium 
triggers variations in the market risk premium, value factor and momentum factor, 
while market risk premium and momentum factor affect the illiquidity. These findings 
imply that the variance risk premium mainly drives equity returns, as its information 
is reflected in the time-varying market risk premium, value and momentum factors. 
Finally, illiquidity cannot affect equity returns by acting on the risk factors included in 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
 
This Chapter summarises the main findings of the thesis, and makes suggestions for 
future work. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
5.1 Main Findings 
 
This thesis aims to apply liquidity to explain certain stock market phenomena. We 
investigate the explanatory power of liquidity on the disappearing dividend puzzle, and 
also the interplay among liquidity, stock market return and variance risk premium.  
 
We begin by empirically examining the role of liquidity, risk and catering in explaining 
the disappearing dividend puzzle. This research adopts an extended sample period, 
1989-2011, and covers a large sample of data covering eighteen countries, 
amalgamated into nine major financial markets: Canada, US, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Australia, France, Germany, UK and Other European. 
 
We first test the determinants of dividend payout policy. The results show that risk 
plays an important role in explaining the probability of a firm being a dividend payer. 
For the case of firms in the US, France, UK and Other European markets, liquidity is 
another important determinant of dividend policy, along with risk. Across the nine 
markets considered in our sample, the average marginal effects show that risk explains 
14% to 33% and liquidity explains 4% to 11% of the firms’ probability of paying 
dividends. Further, we also find that the firm-specific and market-driven risk variables 
remain strongly significant in explaining dividend payout policy, even after accounting 
for the effects of the firms’ characteristics and liquidity. 
 
Then, we study the role of liquidity, risk and catering in explaining the disappearing 
dividends puzzle. We find that catering incentive matters for firms operating in 
common law countries (Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and UK in our 
sample). However, we find no evidence for the presence of catering incentive in firms 
operating in the US and in civil law markets (France, Germany and Other European in 
our sample). Our results concur with Ferris et al. (2009) in that countries with greater 
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investor protection (common law countries) are more responsive to changing investor 
preferences and therefore significant catering occurs in such countries. With regard to 
the effects of liquidity, we find that liquidity fails to replace catering incentives in 
explaining the changes in propensity to pay across markets. However, once adjusted 
for risk, the changes in propensity to pay can no longer be explained by the catering 
incentive, even among the common law countries. Our results indicate that the role of 
catering reflects risk difference between dividend payers and non-dividend payers. Our 
evidence corroborates Hoberg and Prabhala’s (2009) findings in the US market and 
reveals that the risk-based explanation of the catering phenomenon persists across 
several financial markets.  
 
We next examine the dividend payout patterns in China. China is a fast-growing 
economy, but with a relatively low level of corporate governance and with complicated 
ownership structure. (Anderson et al., 2009) This research investigates the impact of 
shareholder, managers and board on both the cash dividend payments and stock 
dividend payments in China over the sample period 1999-2013. 
 
For the cash dividend payouts, we first employ a logit model to explore the 
determinants of cash dividend payouts. The results show that liquidity and risk are 
significantly negatively related with the probability of being a cash dividend payer. 
Further, managerial stake is insignificantly associated with firms’ cash dividend payout 
policy, while firms with larger board size and fewer annual board meetings are more 
likely to pay cash dividend. Then we test the catering theory for cash dividend 
payments. The result shows that catering incentive is positively associated with the 
changes in the unadjusted propensity to pay cash dividends, even after controlling the 
financial crisis dummy.  Further, catering incentive still matters in explaining the 
propensity to pay after we adjust the propensity with managerial stake or board 
characteristics. However, the significant explanatory power of catering incentive 
disappears once we control for liquidity or risk. This means that the catering incentive 
actually measures the difference in firms’ liquidity or risk between cash dividend 
payers and non-cash dividend payers. Therefore, board structure, rather than 
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managerial stake or shareholders’ preference, exerts influence on the cash dividend 
payout decisions in China. 
 
For the stock dividend payouts, the result of the logit model shows that risk can 
negatively impact the probability of being a stock dividend payer, while liquidity 
measured by turnover can positively influence stock dividend payments in China over 
our sample period. This supports our prediction that firms with higher liquidity are 
always accompanied with higher stock price; such firms prefer to pay stock dividend 
to realign stock price into preferred price ranges. Additionally, managerial stake 
contributes little to explain firms’ stock dividend payments, and firms with larger board 
size are less likely to pay stock dividend. Then we test the catering theory for stock 
dividend payouts in China. The results illustrate that dividend premium matters for the 
changes in unadjusted propensity, and for the propensity adjusted for managerial 
stake and board structure. However, once we control liquidity or risk, the catering 
incentive contributes little toward explaining the changes in propensity to pay stock 
dividend. This implies that stock dividend premium captures the different 
characteristics (risk and liquidity) of the firms. Therefore, board, rather than managers 
or shareholders, can impact firms’ stock dividend decisions in China. 
 
The study of the interplay among liquidity, stock market return and variance risk 
premium enables us to gain a comprehensive understanding of the direction of 
magnitude of the relation between (il)liquidity and market return, the relation 
between variance risk premium and market return, and the relation between 
(il)liquidity and variance risk premium. To do so, we investigate the interplay among 
variance risk premium, (il)liquidity, and market returns using the US monthly data from 
Jan 1992 to Dec 2010.  
 
We first test the Granger causality relation among (il)liquidity, variance risk premium 
and market returns. The results show that the variance risk premium can trigger 
market returns, and in turn, illiquidity, but this conclusion does not hold vice versa. 
More importantly, market illiquidity cannot affect the market returns, but stock 
returns Granger-cause illiquidity. Our results are robust for different sub-sample 
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periods and are also confirmed by the impulse response test. Consequently, the 
variance risk premium shows a strong predictive power for future excess stock returns, 
but little predictive power of illiquidity is found. 
 
In addition, this study examines how the variance risk premium/illiquidity is related to 
the equity returns by investigating the Granger-causality relationship between the 
variance risk premium (and illiquidity) and the systematic risk factors contained in the 
augmented Fama and French (1993) model. We find that the variance risk premium 
triggers variations in the market risk premium, value factor and momentum factor, 
while market risk premium and momentum factor affect the illiquidity. These findings 
imply that the variance risk premium mainly drives equity returns, as its information 
is reflected in the time-varying market risk premium, value and momentum factors. 
Finally, illiquidity cannot affect equity returns by acting on the risk factors included in 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  
 
5.2 Future Research 
 
Several interesting areas have emerged for further research. 
 
First, future research may investigate the explanatory power of liquidity, risk and 
catering on the share repurchase decisions. Our study has concentrated on dividends, 
but firms may also pay out cash to their shareholders via share repurchase. As argued 
by Allen and Michaely (2003), the surge in share repurchases is one of six major 
aspects of dividend policy. Therefore, our research could be extended to share 
repurchase decisions.  
 
Second, the empirical model in our study is a discrete model in which firms are 
classified as either dividend payers or nonpayers. However, Li and Lie (2004) argue that 
corporate managers are far more likely to face decisions related to changing the level 
of existing dividends rather than decisions to pay or not pay dividends. Therefore, our 
study could be extended to include decreases and increases in existing dividends.  
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Third, liquidity is generally described as the ability to trade large quantities quickly at 
low cost with little price impact. This definition highlights four dimensions of liquidity: 
trading speed, trading quantity, trading cost and price impact. Therefore, when testing 
the interplay among illiquidity, variance risk premium and market return, we could use 
another proxy for liquidity, such as Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure and turnover. 
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